GABRIEL MARCEL'S NOTION OF "PRESENCE" AND PAUL TILLICH'S CONCEPT OF "RELIGIOUS SYMBOL": TOWARD AN ECUMENICAL UNDERSTANDING OF EUCHARISTIC MEMORIAL AND THE MANIFOLD PRESENCE OF CHRIST

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PREFACE

The Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church officially acknowledged what had for some time been taking place in its theological circles: a new awakening of the theological endeavor, set in the framework of the philosophy of the day and formed by contemporary questioning. Much of the same had been going on in the different non-Roman traditions, certainly since the end of the nineteenth century. However, now that the same language was being spoken and the same types of questions were being asked, a type of exchange could take place that never before was possible.

This dissertation is concerned with one such exchange and is, in a sense, a product of it. The subject is eucharist, the overriding question is how this can be better understood and appreciated by people today; put more precisely, the question is whether and (if this is answered affirmatively) in what ways the work of two philosophical theologians (I use the term loosely for Marcel) can benefit a contemporary understanding of eucharist.

Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich were contemporaries. They not only lived at the same time, they also lived in the same "worlds." While Marcel was something of a philosopher, something of a dramatist, something of an art critic, who rejected all these titles, and Tillich was in the very proper sense a systematic theologian, their paths intersected in two important dimensions: the one phenomenological, the other existential. Their sharing in these dimensions provided a basis from which their investigations can be compared and related; their sharing in these dimensions provided a means whereby their reflections "make sense" to their contemporaries both inside and outside of the theological circle.

To one who is struggling to understand the mystery of the eucharist in a contemporary way all of this began to jell together. The Second Vatican Council had "opened the windows" of the Roman Catholic Church and welcomed the thought-forms of contemporary philosophy into her home. It had further caught the interest of this writer when in its "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy" it stated:

> To accomplish so great a work, Christ is always present in His Church, especially in her liturgical celebrations. He is present in the sacrifice of the Mass, not only in the person of His minister...but especially under the Eucharistic species. By His power He is present in the sacraments, so that when a man baptizes it is really Christ himself who baptizes. He is present in His word, since it is He Himself who speaks when the holy Scriptures are read in the church. He is present, finally, when the Church prays and sings, for He promised: "Where two or

> three are gathered for my sake; there am I in the midst of them"(Mt. 18:20).[1]

The idea of the manifold presence of Christ in the eucharistic celebration of the church proved curious. It at once held greater attraction than the narrower question of transubstantiation: it seemed to allow for more possibilities. Related to this was another question: the role of the symbolic materials used.

Vatican Council II was responsible for the ritual changes of the eucharistic celebration, and these, in turn, were welcomed at times enthusiastically, at times obediently, or at times were disregarded. In some instances they were too dramatic. In most instances, there was something missing in the reformed rite: people spoke about it in different ways: a lack of "holiness," a loss of "mystery," a three-ring circus. Many ritual gestures had disappeared; these had been replaced by words and more words. Indeed, something was missing: a genuine respect for ritual and symbolic action.

In reading Marcel one cannot but be impressed by how he captures the intimacy and lived experience of human reality: more positively in his philosophical writings, more negatively in his dramas. The goal is "presence," being with; the reality, however, often falls short of that. "Presence" is what enables true community. It is "presence" that brings the human being to fullness and with him/her the entire community. But "presence" is more than just the key to human living, it is also the key to deep, rich living: living in the reality of Absolute Being, God.

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[1] Vatican Council II, The Documents of Vatican II, ed. by Austin P. Flannery, Preface by John Cardinal Wright (New York: Pillar Books, 1975), pp. 4-5.

Could Marcel's notion of "presence" aid in a contemporary quest for eucharistic understanding? Would such a notion aid in distinguishing anything of the manifold "presence" of Christ? Could it at all aid in understanding and adapting the new eucharistic rites? The possibilities seemed fascinating.

But was Marcel consistent in his notion of "presence"? Did he perhaps have several notions of presence? Were these vague or worked out? Since Marcel could not write methodically, no matter how hard he tried, he offered no systematic presentation. If Marcel was to be used to understand the mystery of eucharist, his position itself would first have to be examined.

Tillich, on the other hand, possesses all the qualities of a great systematic theologian. One cannot help but be impressed at the breadth of his knowledge, when, for example, one reads his Systematic Theology.[2] Tillich encounters a wide variety of theological questions, but underlying all his reflections is the concern that his explanations meet the questions of today in a way that the answers might be understood. Central to this "method of correlation" is the concept of "religious symbol." Tillich developed this concept so that it would serve a major function in his "method of correlation," that it would serve "on the boundary" between human and divine reality. For every question that he heard people asking, Tillich suggested a theological answer in the form of a symbol that could serve as the locus for both human understanding and divine revelation.

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[2] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, three volumes in one (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, first published 1951-1963, this edition 1967).

Could such a concept also have a religious function, even if not a major function? Could "religious symbol" be applied to sacramental reality, to sacramental "presence"? Could it also be applied to eucharistic ritual action? Or, from another direction, since Tillich saw Jesus the Christ as the New Being as a central symbol in his theology, could one use his notion of "religious symbol" while rejecting the content of that central symbol as Tillich conceived it? If Tillich were to be used in a contemporary understanding of eucharist, these questions too would have to be investigated.

The question then arises: whether the insights of these two men could be combined; whether they could be used in relation to each other. Obviously, the way they reflect sounds similar and what they seem to presuppose sounds equivalent, but what they treat is different. Could Marcel's insights nourish and deepen Tillich's and vice versa or are there no points of intersection? As Corita Kent does in art, so too the juxtaposition of these two positions can produce a new reality which catches and suggests nuances never before noticed. Certainly Marcel was a Roman Catholic and Tillich a Lutheran, but both spoke contemporaneous philosophical language and both showed existential concerns. If they were to be used in some sort of a eucharistic investigation their relationships would have to be explored.

The creative process begins in this way. Once the "hunches" be identified, investigation is open to act its own course. This had been fueled by teaching courses in the theology of the eucharist, in the nature and function of ritual action, and in practical preparation for eucharistic celebration. The end product proved exciting: the scope of the final chapter was at once expanded and limited: it was expanded to include the question of eucharistic memorial, in which the manifold presence of Christ was set; it was limited to the broad outlines of this question due to the wealth of material available for every section of it and the size restriction of this dissertation.

The theses of this dissertation can be clearly stated: (1) Gabriel Marcel's notion of "presence" is consistent in itself and contains within itself the possibility of being used in understanding and explaining something of the eucharistic mystery; (2) Paul Tillich's concept of

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"religious symbol," although primarily epistemological, does possess a religious function that is consistent and valid, even apart from any Christological considerations, and can also be used in understanding something of the eucharistic mystery; (3) Marcel's "presence" and Tillich's "religious symbol" are compatible and complementary; (4) these notions enrich a contemporary understanding of eucharistic memorial and the manifold presence of Christ within that memorial in that they (a) provide a different atmosphere in which eucharistic memorial might be understood and (b) take the reality and necessity of the symbolic material of the religious symbol seriously.

The dissertation naturally divides itself therefore into four sections which we have combined into three because of the close relationwhip of (3) and (4). These three are preceded by an introductory section concerned with the changing eucharistic atmosphere today; a short conclusion in the manner of a summary has been added to the final section. The chapters are therefore arranged under the following subjects: (1) the state of the eucharistic question, (2) Gabriel Marcel's notion of "presence," (3) Paul Tillich's concept of "religious symbol," (4) a contemporary understanding of "memorial" and the "manifold presence of Christ" within that "memorial."

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF THE EUCHARIST

The eucharistic contributions that we believe Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich make can hardly be examined and assessed without understanding something of today's changing eucharistic atmosphere. Our first task, therefore, is to show how the eucharistic climate has changed through this century so as to encourage new insights and approaches. This will be accomplished through a broad survey of those factors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which have most influenced the matter at hand. Secondly, we will show the directions in which eucharistic theology is presently moving by briefly describing some of the major eucharistic scholars and their works, something of the liturgical movements that are taking place in the various churches, and something of the ecumenical dialogues of this century. Finally, we will examine the level of consensus being achieved in the most recent and important of the ecumenical documents. This will provide the background for Marcel and Tillich's specific contributions to the eucharistic areas of memorial and the manifold presence of Christ, which are the concerns of this dissertation.

Toward a Changing Eucharistic Climate

The developments in eucharistic theology in this century, both within the individual churches and ecumenically, have been tremendous due to a variety of movements and circumstances that had begun yet a century before. General cultural changes, changes in philosophy and in systematic theology, developments in scripture studies and in the related sciences, in ecumenism and in the liturgical movement all contributed to the new situation in eucharistic thought. Ours is a new age with new concerns and new perspectives. Yet, our age is rooted in the past and lives in response to the past. Our first concern, therefore, is to acknowledge some of these roots: the movements and developments that directly or indirectly contributed to our present eucharistic situation.

It would be incomplete to speak about the contemporary eucharistic situation without in some way acknowledging the remote contributions of several movements of the eighteenth century: pietism, the Enlightenment, and the beginning of historical biblical criticism. Pietism, with its call for a change of heart and a return to scripture, personal devotion and morality, showed its obvious discontent with the scholastic framework of the theological endeavor of that time. It urged a change of focus, albeit a

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more fundamental one. What it did for theology through men like Schleiermacher and Ritschl, was to reshape the questions and concerns of Protestant theology by focusing both on subjective experience rather than on objective reality and on the fresh and freeing Word of God rather than on the objective distinctions and logical consequences of warring theological camps.

The greatest theological revolution, however, took place under the banner of the Enlightenment. Through a fundamental switch from external to internal authority, this movement overturned the scholastic grounding of the theological endeavor and prepared the soil for a new planting, a new orientation. As human reason became supreme, areas previously untouchable became matter for investigation and critique. From this point of time on, the person as "subject" and as "knower" would have to be taken more into account.

One could, obviously, go on and on about the contributions of the Enlightenment, but that is not our concern here. What is our concern is how this movement contributed to our present eucharistic situation. Most proximately, the Enlightenment provided the atmosphere, the tools and the process for the historical biblical criticism begun by Johann Semler and Johann Michaelis. Through form criticism the life of Jesus, together with questions on the validity, sequence and relationship of the scriptural sources could be examined with a critical eye. From this would issue new investigations into the life and practices of the early Christian communities, freeing the church from near fundamentalism, magicism, and simplistic eucharistic judgments.

The Enlightenment also provided new ways of perceiving "God," the "church," and "revelation" in general. While these perceptions, threatening and suspect to orthodoxy, were judged limited and narrow in perspective, they were nevertheless somewhat truth-bearing because they contained in themselves an awareness of the humanness of the believing situation. The questions that such perceptions raised would have to be faced in all subsequent dialogue.

The nineteenth century was the benefactor of all this.[1] It produced scholars like David F. Strauss and Ferdinand C. Baur and their consistently historical critical approach to the New Testament, Otto Pfleiderer and his history-of-religions criticism, Julius Wellhausen and William Wrede and their radical historical criticism. These studies produced mixed consequences for eucharistic theology. The strong rationalistic approach left no room for mystery and thus much of the Last Supper was relegated to myth. On the other hand, Jesus Christ, who he was and what he said and did, became the central concern of scriptural investigation--but more than that, it became a central concern for Protestant theology as such.

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[1] For the development of scriptural criticism during this century see Werner Georg Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of Its Problems, trans. by S. McLean Gilmour and Howard C. Kee (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972). For the development of eucharistic theology during this time see Yngve Brilioth, Eucharistic Faith and Practice: Evangelical and Catholic, trans. by A. G. Hebert, 7th ed. (London: S. P. C. K., 1965), pp. 144-152, 214-228, 260-289; Alf Härdelin, "The Eucharist in the Theology of the Nineteenth Century," in R. E. Clements et. al., Eucharistic Theology Then and Now (London: S. P. C. K., 1968), pp. 76-89.

The study of Scripture uncovered another area that was to grow into full stature a century later: the eschatological element in the life and mission of Jesus the Christ. This concern was brought to new life in the systematic works of Albrecht Ritschl and Adolf Harnack and in the scriptural works of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer. Although these men were not of one mind in their eschatological positions, they placed before their respective communities the _issue_ _of_ _eschatology_ in the work and person of Christ--an issue that would later take on great eucharistic importance.[2]

The history-of-religions approach to Scripture soon produced eucharistic articles. Albert Eichorn's _Das Abendmahl im Neuen Testament_ (1898) and Wilhelm Heitmüller's _Taufe_ und Abendmahl bei Paulus (1903) both noted the difficulty of relating the cultic meals of the early Church to the meals of Jesus. The history-of-religions approach also produced the hellenistic studies of Albrecht Dieterich, Paul Wendland, Franz Cumont and Richard Rietzentstein, and the Judaic studies of Herman Gunkel, Wilhelm Bousset, and Martin Dibelius which would lead to a fuller understanding of the early Christian milieu in which the eucharist was celebrated.[3]

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[2] Schweitzer already notes some eucharistic importance. He sees the distribution of loaves and the Last Supper as eschatological sacraments. _The Quest of the Historical Jesus_, trans. by W. Montgomery, first Eng. ed. 1906 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 381. See also his _Das Abendmahl in Zusammenhang mit dem Leben Jesu und der Geschichte des Urchristentums_ (Tübingen and Leipzig, 1901).

The Romantic Movement, too, helped shape the contemporary atmosphere. In its re-established synthesis of knowledge and human experience, the person-as-individual gave way to the person-in-relationship and the person-as-microcosm of the world--ideas which contributed to an organic notion of Church and to a broadened Christology.[4] Seeing the concrete as the visible expression of the spiritual gave the Romantics a heightened sense of sacramentality. With a sensitivity toward the "mysterious," an openness to biblical criticism, and a sense of organic development, the Romantics could see the presence of the Spirit in the form of worship which had evolved.

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[3] The publishing of the Greek text of the Didache in 1883 also spurred academic and theological interest in this area.

[4] Härdelin, "The Eucharist," pp. 78-81.

This was the spirit of F. A. Staudenmaier's Der Geist des Christentums dargestellt in den heiligen Zeiten, in den heiligen Handlungen, und in den heiligen Kunst (1835), a famous book on liturgy at that time. This too was the spirit of Roman Catholics like P. B. Zimmer, F. von Baader and A. Gügler in Landhut, Munich and Lucerne, and of Lutherans like I. A. Dorner.[5]

Special mention must also be made of the Tübingen Roman Catholic theologians, J. A. Möhler for his organic model of the Church and his resultant ecclesial notions of eucharist and eucharistic sacrifice, and M. J. Scheeben for his description of Christ as Ursakrament. These men worked in a Roman Catholic theological situation that was generally conservative and neo-Thomistic, that was defensive and apologetic in attitude and suspicious of cultural development. While the popularity of their work was quite limited then, it has nevertheless served as the backbone of contemporary Roman Catholic eucharistic thought, popularly through the writings of E. Schillebeeckx and Vatican Council II.

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[5] For more on Alois Gügler and the Lucerne theologians see A. Härdelin, "Kirche und Kult in der Luzerner theologischen Romantik," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 89 (1967): 139-175. For an excellent survey of the development of German Catholic theology see B. Welte, "Zum Strukturwandl der katholischen Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert," Auf der Spur des Ewigen (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), pp. 380-409.

This same basic sacramental thrust was part of the Oxford Movement in Anglicanism and provided its members with new understanding of the eucharistic presence and some understanding of eucharistic sacrifice.[6] Furthermore, the Oxford Movement brought forth a rebirth of eucharistic piety in the spiritual life of England at least in some seminal way and also influenced Roman Catholicism in its emphasis on patristic studies.[7] But once again, the immediate effects of this movement and its eucharistic thrust were quite limited and were actually clouded by the Tractarians' Romanizing tendencies. It remained for scholars years later to uncover its true worth.

The major Protestant influence in this century came from liberal theology, beginning with Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). While Schleiermacher was influenced by Romanticism, he also reacted to it. His basic theological approach was Christological and ecclesial but without a strong sacramental principle. Schleiermacher's eucharistic doctrine was therefore situated in its scriptural and early church context. He stressed the centrality of the eucharist in the worship of the early church and its importance for communion with Christ and with the community of believers.[8] His pietism and romanticism caused him to stress the role of the Spirit and the experience of grace that united believers and called them to visible unity. Theologically this situated the eucharist, therefore, above the individual churches: as a gift of forgiving and redeeming grace to all those called through the Spirit for the purpose of building up the community of believers.

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[6] Härdelin, "The Eucharist," pp. 80-87. For a full study of Tractarian ecclesiology and eucharistic faith and practice see Härdelin, The Tractarian Understanding of the Eucharist (Uppsala: Almquist and Wiksells, 1965).

[7] Brilioth, Eucharistic Faith, p. 215.

What liberal theology did, then, was to center the major theological endeavor in Christ and in the context of his church (which was viewed as larger than any of the existing churches). This stress was significant because of its wide popularity. Liberal theology further expressed itself in missionary activity and in the application of Christianity to social problems.[9] This latter tendency would bear the first ecumenical fruits and influence eucharistic dialogue from the viewpoint of lived and shared faith.

Such, then, was the atmosphere of the nineteenth century. Protestant theology was primarily liberal, but not

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[8] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der Christliche Glaube, 2 vols. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1931; reprint ed., edited by Martin Redeker, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1960), II, 278-284, 340-367.

[9] Härdelin sees the liberal spirit at work in the International Missionary Conference in Edinburgh (1910) and at the Ecumenical Conference of Life and Work in Stockholm (1925). "The Eucharist," p. 80.

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strongly eucharistic. Roman Catholic theology was primarily conservative and neo-Thomistic. But the situation was changing and even in Roman Catholicism the seeds had been sown.

The twentieth century brought with it the experience of war. Yet even World War I could be seen as contributing positively to the eucharistic atmosphere. The war that signalled an end to the optimistic disposition of liberalism was the war that begat Karl Barth's neo-orthodoxy. Barth's contribution to the eucharistic atmosphere seems to rest mainly on his attention to the Word of God, his concern with kerygma, his Christocentrism, his notion of church as a pilgrim church in constant need of renewal, and his return to the sources of Christianity and Protestantism in seeking the faith of the early church and his own Protestant foundations.

What is amazing is that both liberalism and neo-orthodoxy contributed to the ecumenical spirit. Liberalism contributed the Christ-centeredness and the church-centeredness necessary for the ecumenical movement. It also contributed a period of optimism that helped people believe that great things could happen. Basing Christian faith and reality on the religious experience one had of Christ brought down barriers faster than any theological dialogue could. Neo-orthodoxy, on the other hand, recognized the sinfulness of the human situation and refocused attention on the transcendence of God and freely gracing Word of God. The humility and faithfulness resulting from this would provide a powerful atmosphere for reconciliation and scriptural renewal upon which ecumenism must be based.

Furthermore, the experience of war itself had a profound ecumenical effect: communities of Christians worked together for common purposes as a result of this world-wide human sinfulness. As people realized their individual sinfulness and as they acknowledged the sinfulness of their respective churches, they moved much closer to real communion with one another without polemic or self-righteousness.

Critical history was meanwhile unearthing the real Luther and was re-examining the Reformation.[10] As the scholastically hardened commentaries and interpretations were seen as wanting, a richer, fuller Lutheran position emerged. The discovery of the centrality of the eucharist for Luther and of his solid belief in the real presence challenged the practices of his twentieth century followers. Eucharistic awareness was coming to bloom.

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[10] For a historical sketch of recent Reformation literature see Harold Grimm, *The Reformation in Recent Historical Thought* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964). For some of the finest works in this area today see R. H. Bainton, *The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952); Heinrich Bornkamm, *Das Jahrhundert der Reformation* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1960); Harold Grimm, *The Reformation Era, 1500-1650*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973); Joseph Lortz, *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, 2 vols., 3rd ed. (Freiburg i. Br: Herder, 1949). For a sketch on recent literature on Luther see Harold Grimm, "Luther Research Since 1920," *Journal of Modern History*, 32 (1960): 105-118.

Existentialism, having gained new power through the viciousness of World War I, added its call to people to return to the real world and to accept responsibility for it.[11] Through the existential thought and language of men like Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Buber, and through the existential phenomenology of especially Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, new insights into human living would be gained. Through a phenomenology of the body, attention to the symbolic nature of the person, interest in human presence and in the growth of "being," eucharistic theology would take on new understanding.

Interest in symbolism too was making itself felt. Rudolf Otto's The Idea of the Holy (1923) centered attention on the human experience of the "holy," and provided a stimulus for further studies in the power and role of religious symbols.[12] That same year, Ernst Cassirer finished his classic, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, which served in turn as a springboard for Susan K. Langer's Philosophy in a New

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[11] Marcel was one such person, who, previously an idealist, through the experience of World War I became more concerned with the existential.

[12] Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. by John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950; A Galaxy Book, 1958).

Key.[13] Finally we must note Tillich's article for his symbolic approach in his own systematic theology.[14] At this point in time, however, symbols were no longer viewed in contradistinction to reality, but as vehicles of reality. Therefore, as reflection on religious symbols would increase, so would their importance in eucharistic thought.[15]

Finally, one must acknowledge the contributions of the Roman Catholic liturgical movement. From the lively work of Dom Lambert Beauduin and the Belgian practical rediscovery of the communal nature of the liturgy, the movement spread to Austria where under Pius Parsch a biblical element was added. This addition not only helped people grasp the full significance of the liturgy through uniting it with its chief source, it also promoted the direct and abundant use of God's Word in all forms of Christian spirituality.[16] In Germany the movement spread through I. Herwegen and Odo Casel. Drawing from the theological emphasis of Scheeben and Möhler, Casel expanded the idea of Christian "mystery" present in the liturgical celebration. Briefly put, Casel saw the liturgy as a celebration of the mysteries of Christ and his Church, and realized that the ritual and sacramental deed of the Church makes Christ's act of salvation present. Applied to the eucharist, this meant that the eucharist was the making-present in time of the once-for-all sacrificial act of Christ. It also meant that the real presence was an action, not a substance. Thus Casel was able to rejoin presence and sacrifice--notions that had long been separated.[17]

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[13] Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. by Ralph Manheim, with an Introduction by Charles W. Hendel, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-1957). Susan K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).

[14] This article first appeared as a paper in Blätter für deutsche Philosophie I (1928, no. 4) and was reprinted in Tillich's Religiöse Verwirklichung (Berlin: Furche-Verlag GmbH, 1930): 88-109. More will be said later about this article.

[15] Showing the relation of Tillich's notion of religious symbol to contemporary eucharistic theology is a major purpose of this paper.

[16] Louis Bouyer, Liturgical Piety (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955), p. 66.

The time between the world wars proved the right time for the beginning of eucharistic study and eucharistic dialogue. From the extremely brief survey presented here, one can see that many strands together changed the face of the theological endeavor offering new possibilities and approaches, ours being one of them.

The Directions of Eucharistic Dialogue

There are several ways that one can assess the eucharistic situation theologically: (1) by examining the works of individual authors, (2) by analyzing the statements of groups of theologians especially if those groups are ecumenical in nature, and (3) by studying the liturgical practices of the individual churches. Through the first way one becomes aware of the wide spectrum of thought in the given area, the basic insights underlying the variety of opinions, and the specific nuances and thrusts of the respective authors. Through the second way one recognizes what of those individual contributions has gained wider acceptability, what is more fundamentally consensed. Through the third way one sees what of all this is making its way to pastoral application; what is finding its way into the lives and actions of Christians. Each of these ways is important; each gives a unique type of insight. Together they provide a richness of eucharistic understanding. The brief sketch that follows will provide something of each of these ways.

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[17] Odo Casel, The Mystery of Christian Worship, ed. by Burkhard Neunheuser, with a preface by Charles Davis, trans. from the 4th German ed. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1962). This work first appeared in 1932 and played a significant role in the furthering of eucharistic theology even though it is recognized as having many false interpretations today.

On the theological level, real ecumenical dialogue found its way primarily through the World Council of Churches, which was prefigured in part by the Faith and Order Movement. After World War I this movement set about regrouping and in 1927 the first World Conference on Faith and Order took place in Lausanne. This conference already found agreement on the fact of Christ's real presence in the eucharist, although the participants differed with regard to the manner of that presence. Moreover, they had all already

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acknowledged the eucharist as the church's most sacred act of worship.[18]

The Faith and Order Conference at Edinburgh (1937) became the occasion for real progress in the doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice.[19] The trigger for this agreement was the book The Fulness of Sacrifice by F. C. N. Hicks who maintained that Medieval theologians discussed the Mass as sacrifice without having clear ideas of Jewish notions of sacrifice in the early church.[20] What Hicks, and later the conference, did was to expand the notion of the sacrifice of Christ to include his incarnation, earthly ministry and resurrection-ascension as all part of his self-emptying, sacrificial attitude.[21] The Conference also dealt with eucharistic action in terms of thanksgiving and placed the question of eucharistic presence in an eschatological context.

During this time the issue of sacrifice was also being discussed by certain Roman Catholics, most notably

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[18] Lukas Vischer, A Documentary History of the Faith and Order Movement: 1927-1963. (St. Louis: The Bethany Press, 1963), nos. 54, 55, p. 39.

[19] This conference, however, dealt mainly with the church and with related ecclesial questions.

[20] F. C. N. Hicks, The Fulness of Sacrifice (London: 1930) as cited in Kent S. Knutson, "Contemporary Lutheran Theology and the Eucharistic Sacrifice," Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue: The Eucharist as Sacrifice, vol. 3 (Washington: U. S. Catholic Conference; New York: U.S.A. National Committee for Lutheran World Federation, 1968), pp. 171-172.

[21] Vischer, Documentary History, no. 90, p. 57.

Maurice de la Taille in his Mysterium Fidei (1919)[22] and Anscar Vonier in his A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist (1925).[23] While Maurice de la Taille treated sacrifice in its broader context and as continuing in heaven, Vonier centered his attention on the term "sacrament," and on a sacramental view of Christ's sacrifice. The eucharist as sacrifice was thus expanding in two different and complementary directions.

The Halle Resolution (1937) touched off new debate on the Lord's Supper by Lutheran theologians all over Germany. At issue here was the statement that the fact that the Lord himself was the gift bestowed in the Supper takes precedence over the manner of that presence. But most importantly, the document changed the central emphasis from the bodily presence of Christ to the presence of Christ's person.[24]

In New Testament studies H. Lietzmann's work, Messe und Herrenmahl. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Liturgie

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[22] Maurice de la Taille's work has been translated into English by Joseph Carroll from the second and third editions, 1923 and 1929, under the title The Mystery of Faith 2 vols. (New York and London: Sheed & Ward, 1940-1950). Also important is the mass of his patristic scholarship.

[23] Anscar Vonier, A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist (New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1925). Vonier treats eucharistic sacrifice in the context of sacramentality. The framework is still, however, neo-scholastic.

[24] Eugene Skibbe, Protestant Agreement on the Lord's Supper (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1968), pp. 73-74.

(1926), which basically addressed itself to the possibility of two main types of primitive eucharists, catalyzed further eucharistic studies.[25] Yngve Brilioth's Eucharistic Faith and Practice (1926) underlined Lietzmann's notion of "mystery" and showed how this mystery was inseparable from four fundamental eucharistic elements: communion, sacrifice, thanksgiving and memorial.[26] Oscar Cullman accepted some of Lietzmann's hypotheses but went further: he found continuity between all of Christ's pre-Easter meals (including the Last Supper) and the primitive eucharists celebrated by the early Church through the post-Easter meals celebrated with Jesus.[27] Finally Joachim Jeremias moved these questions into a much larger eucharistic arena in his classic work Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu (1935).[28]

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[25] Publication of successive fascicules of an English edition began in 1953 under the title Mass and Lord's Supper. Although the hypothesis is no longer generally supported, the work gave great impetus to eucharistic studies.

[26] The work is cited above.

[27] "La signification de la Sainte-Cène dans le christianisme primitif," Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses (Strasbourg, 1936). An English translation appears under the title Essays on the Lord's Supper, trans. by J. G. Davies (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1958), pp. 5-23.

[28] The English title is The Eucharistic Words of Jesus, trans. from the third German edition by Norman Perrin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966; reprint ed., Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977). This work itself has begotten many more studies.

But such scholarship did not arise in a vacuum. It was aided by such men as Frazer and Oesterly in anthropology, Max Weber in sociology, Dalman in geography, Alt, Albright and Noth in history and archaeology and E. Schürer in the background of Christianity. Otto Eissfeldt and Ernst Sellin provided a better understanding of Israel's cult and worship and Walther Eichrodt stressed the communion aspect in covenant theology. It is here too that the pioneer work of J. Pederson and S. Mowinckel should be mentioned in researching the cultic life of Israel and relating that to her tradition.[29]

In other developments Henri de Lubac had already shown that both the early scholastic theologians and those of the High Middle Ages did not stress Christ's eucharistic presence, but rather the unity of all believers on the basis of eucharistic communion with Christ. Dom Gregory Dix produced his great liturgical work in 1945 which became the most comprehensive and usable history of eucharistic development in the English language and, through its emphasis on the four-fold action of the eucharist, provided a key for understanding the eucharistic service.[30] Pius XII's Mediator Dei

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[29] These men were the forerunners of the Scandinavian school which stressed the role of memory among the Israelites and thus provide specific background for the question of memorial.

[30] Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 2nd ed. (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1946).

(1947) enlarged the scope of Roman Catholic eucharistic concern by expanding the notion of the presence of Christ beyond the eucharistic species.[31]

In preparation for the World Faith and Order meeting in Lund, two major works were published: *Ways of Worship* and *Intercommunion*.[32] The former dealt mainly with liturgical developments in the major WCC denominations as well as in the Roman Church. The "Report of the Commission" in this book cited the following areas for theological concern: the mode of the real presence of Christ in eucharistic worship (the main question in those churches striving for liturgical reformation), the relation of Word and Sacrament, the importance of the *epiklesis*, the eucharist as Paschal Mystery, the eucharist as sacrifice, and the eschatological nature of the eucharist.[33] In *Intercommunion* the "Report of the Commission" cited the widespread recognition of the church as the Body of Christ and as belonging to the

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[31] Pius XII introduced a notion of the manifold presence of Christ: in the sacraments, under the eucharistic species, in the priest, in the Word, and in the praying community. The issue is again taken up in Vatican Council II, "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," and serves as the basis of our concerns in the last chapter.

[32] P. Edwall, E. Haymann and W. D. Maxwell, eds., *Ways of Worship* (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1951); Donald Baillie and John Marsh, eds., *Intercommunion* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1952).

[33] Edwall, *Ways of Worship*, pp. 29-34. Barth's contribution toward the Scriptural orientation of worship is also noted.

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very essence of the Gospel. It was acknowledged that all the churches of the WCC in some way participate in the reality of the church of Christ. With regard to the eucharist, it was agreed that

> this dominical sacrament is everywhere controlled by the words of the institution, and is everywhere a memorial of Christ's death and a Sacrament of His Body and Blood in which He is truly present to give Himself to us, uniting us to Himself and to His eternal sacrifice, through use of His appointed elements of bread and wine.[34]

However, the report also noted the continued disagreements: the recognition that the churches still meant different things by the eucharist, that the Lutheran and Reformed churches still differed on presence, that there were still differences in the notion of sacrifice, and that there were also real differences of ethos and order.[35]

The impact of these reports could be seen in the majority statement of the Lund meeting, 1952. The ecclesial aspect of the eucharist was central to this meeting. Pauline theology was taken seriously, and the eucharist was seen as being the sign of unity in the church, as mirroring the oneness of the church. While the meeting affirmed that all the baptized, baptized into Christ's Body, should thereby share in eucharist, it also recognized that each person is also baptized into a sociological group, separate and independent from the others. The question then becomes complex: to celebrate eucharist as the sign of unity in the individual church, or to celebrate it as the sign of the unity that all share in Christ through baptism.[36]

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[34] Baillie, Intercommunion, pp. 41-42.

[35] Baillie, Intercommunion, pp. 23-33.

Those reports were influenced by phenomenology, a philosophical perspective gaining popularity.[37] Concerned with meaning, particularly meaning within a human context, phenomenology helped change the eucharistic questions being asked. The questions now became: what is the meaning of the eucharist within the church and within the churches; why is the Lord present in the eucharist; what does the giftedness of the Lord imply?

Phenomenology was also developing an anthropology of the symbolic act based on a view of the person which is not dualistic. Through reflection on the relation of the person to his/her body, for example, phenomenology provided eucharistic theology with new ways of expressing the sacramentality of the person, types of human presence and insights into value and meaning formation. It also provided insights into the symbolic value of the meal setting, the meaning of memorial, the relationship between Word and sacrament and different ways of viewing the individual sacraments. Furthermore, phenomenology complemented the work already done in mystery, sacrifice, sacramentality and ecclesiology.[38]

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[36] Vischer, Documentary History, pp. 120-123, esp. nos. 155, 156, 163.

[37] Schillebeeckx treats the influence of phenomenology in The Eucharist, pp. 99-101, 110-121. Kenan Osborne also acknowledges the influence. "Eucharist in Theological Perspective: Contemporary Understanding of the Eucharist," The Eucharist in Ecumenical Dialogue ed. by Leonard Swidler, Preface by William Baum (New York and Paramus, N. J.: Paulist Press, 1976), p. 5. See also A. Gerken, "Dogmengeschichtliche Reflexion über die heutige Wende in der Eucharistielehre," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 94 (1972): 220-226.

The "Arnoldshain Theses" of 1957, an agreement of theologians of the Lutheran, Reformed and Union churches of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) symbolized another step forward in eucharistic consensus.[39] This agreement was influenced by a vigorous study of the New Testament and the presence of nine New Testament scholars among its authors. The document presented the consensus in biblical language and thus saved it from medieval misunderstanding. It dealt in summary fashion with what the eucharist is: entrance into the Paschal Mystery, sacramental participation, unity in the church, fellowship, sharing in the suffering of Christ and eschatological anticipation. The consensus also listed what the eucharist is not: a disappearance of the bread and wine through destruction or substitution, a repetition of the once-for-all unique sacrifice on Calvary, a purely natural or supernatural action (but not both), a means of salvation through mere physical eating, or a purely spiritualized (in the sense of unreal) understanding of the Body and Blood of Christ.[40]

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[38] It is in this context that Marcel's "presence" and Tillich's "religious symbol" take on important meaning for both employ the phenomenological method.

[39] An English translation of this agreement can be found in Scottish Journal of Theology 15 (March 1962): 1-3. See also Skibbe, Protestant Agreement, pp. 91-93.

Although the Roman Catholic response to ecumenical dialogues remained poor, progress in eucharistic studies was being made here also. Eugene Masure's book on sacrifice appeared in 1947, and was followed by Charles Journet's La Messe.[41] These studies continued the work of de la Taille and Vonier in their larger understanding of sacrifice. Like Vonier they used a notion of sacramental causality to show the relationship between Christ's sacrifice and the eucharist. Josef Jungmann's classic work on the history of the Roman rite appeared in 1948, contributing intensely to the

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[40] See esp. nos. 1-5, 7. Thomas Torrance, while praising the consensus for many insights, notes several weaknesses: a limited notion of atonement, the absence of a strong notion of reconciliation emanating from the life and ministry of Jesus, and therefore absence of the notion of sacrifice and anamnesis. See his article, "The Arnoldshain Theses on Holy Communion," Scottish Journal of Theology 15 (March 1962): 4-21.

[41] Eugene Masure, Le Sacrifice du Corps Mystique (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1950). The English edition is The Sacrifice of the Mystical Body, trans. by Anthony Thorold (London: Burns & Oates, 1954). Charles Journet, La messe: présence du sacrifice de la croix (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957).

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understanding of that development.[42] This was followed by Louis Bouyer's work in eucharistic spirituality.[43] One should also acknowledge the strong theology of the Word that is found in both Bouyer and Rahner, thus moving Roman Catholics ever closer to respect for that Protestant contribution.

With regard to real presence, the Roman Catholic theological focus after World War II was on the relationship between the metaphysical approach and the sacramentality of eucharistic presence.[44] J. de Baciocchi was the first to break out of this and to situate the reality of the eucharistic presence within sacramental presence itself. While accepting the ontological depth of transubstantiation, he situated this depth on the sacramental level. A. Vanneste moved in another direction to make transubstantiation intelligible, beginning with creation and the fact that the *ultimate* meaning of things comes from God. B. Welte meanwhile suggested interpreting transubstantiation on the level of meaning rather than on the level of physical change.[45] Influenced by phenomenology, these theologians had begun to approach the eucharist anthropologically: as a symbolic act concerned with sacramental reality.

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[42] Josef Jungmann, *Missarum Sollemnia: Eine genetische Erklärung der Römischen Messe*, 2 vols., (Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1948).

[43] See his *Liturgical Piety*. See also *Eucharistie: théologie et spiritualité de la prière eucharistique* (Paris: Desclée 1966); English edition, *Eucharist*, trans. by Charles Underhill Quinn (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968).

[44] For a partial bibliography of the theologians in this section, cf. J. M. Powers, *Eucharistic Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 180-183; also Schillebeeckx, *The Eucharist* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), pp. 107-121.

At the same time, the decrees of the Council of Trent on the eucharist (especially with regard to substance) were coming under new scrutiny in the studies of E. Gutwenger, G. Ghysens, K. Rahner and E. Schillebeeckx. A healthy expansion of the concept of "sacrament" which focused sharply on the interrelationship between Christ, the church and the eucharist was taking place in the works of K. Rahner and Schillebeeckx, and appreciation for the manifold presence of Christ was growing.[46]

There was also forward movement on the pastoral-liturgical level. After World War II the Roman Catholic liturgical movement spread to England, Ireland and France, the latter especially under the influence of Danielou, Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar and Karl Rahner.[47] The movement attempted to shift popular piety from the tabernacle to the altar. It wanted to relate eucharist to the Mass and make the Mass the center of spiritual life. There was new emphasis on the community and on active participation as well as agitation for the vernacular and congregational singing.

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[45] Welte, Auf der Spur des Ewigen, pp. 459-467.

[46] Karl Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments, trans. by W. J. O'Hara (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963). E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter With God, trans. by Paul Barrett, English text rev. by Mark Schoof and Laurence Bright (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963).

[47] Spain, Italy and Portugal showed the least progress.

The Lutheran liturgical movement assumed a strongly confessional thrust with a serious acceptance of the Confessions and a stress on evangelical preaching and biblical study. Several of the sacraments were also stressed: baptism as a participation in the death-resurrection of the Lord; individual absolution as fulfilling human needs; the Holy Eucharist as the chief parochial service of the congregation; the sacred ministry as fulfilling a role in the church.[48] On the level of worship, these years saw the inclusion of contemporary folk hymns, an attempt to supply sacramental aspects not found in existing Lutheran hymnals, an emphasis on celebration, praise and thanksgiving, communion hymns that stressed adoration, fellowship, praise and joy. All this was crowned by The Holy Communion (1970) which was an effort to make the eucharist truly catholic, evangelical, functional and contemporary.

The Anglican liturgical renewal produced new perspectives on the real presence, eucharistic sacrifice, the

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[48] Arthur C. Piepkorn, "The Protestant Worship Revival and the Lutheran Liturgical Movement," The Liturgical Renewal of the Church, ed. by Massey H. Shepherd (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 90-93.

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nature of baptismal regeneration and the priesthood of believers, the dominical institution of the sacraments, primitive liturgical forms of consecration, the value of the church year and recovery of the Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus. There has also been a revival of liturgical worship undergirded by an intense study of the scriptures and influenced by eschatology.[49]

The sixties saw a widening of the influence of the ecumenical movement: increased interest was shown by the various Third World groups, ecumenical dialogues mushroomed and the charismatic movement surfaced powerfully and cut across churches in revitalized forms of worship. This activity roughly paralleled what was happening on the political front. This was an era of protests and demonstrations, an era of people generally working for or against various causes. It was, in many ways, an era of idealism.

In the area of theological scholarship, studies begun in the fifties multiplied in the sixties. F. L. Leenhardt's work, Ceci est mon corps (1955) proved a catalyzing agent in further ecumenical eucharistic study.[50] In this work he sought to retain the word transubstantiation, using it in the light of the Protestant view of reality, thereby moving cautiously between the extreme Protestant position that attributes salvific power to the word of faith alone and the extreme Catholic position which tends to view the sacraments as magic.[51] Max Thurian's book on the memorial character of the eucharist did much to clarify the Roman Catholic notion of "re-presentation" and to draw Protestant theologians into an appreciation of it.[52] E. L. Mascall's Corpus Christi (1953) showed the development that had taken place in the area of sacrifice and Johannes Betz's study provided a better understanding of the Greek Fathers with regard to eucharistic beliefs.[53] In Roman Catholic circles 1964-65 marked the beginning of a new phase in the reinterpretation of Christ's real presence in the eucharist through the scholarship of such men as Charles Davis, P. Schoonenberg, L. Smits and J. Powers who articulated eucharistic theology within the framework of human meaning and not physical

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[49] Piepkorn, "Protestant Worship Revival," p. 87.

[50] This pamphlet was printed in Cahiers Theologiques, vol. 37 (Nuechatel and Paris: Delachaux and Niestle, 1955). An English translation appears in Essays on the Lord's Supper, pp. 24-85.

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[51] Cf. Powers, Eucharistic Theology, pp. 112-113.

[52] Max Thurian, L'Eucharistie, Mémorial de Seigneur, Sacrifice d'action du grâce et d'intercession (Neuchâtel and Paris: Delachaux and Niestle, 1959). English translation: The Eucharistic Memorial, Ecumenical Studies in Worship, nos. 7, 8 (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960, 1961). J. D. Benoit and J. Leenhardt espoused much of this position also. This notion has been challenged by N. Hook, The Eucharist in the New Testament (London: Epworth Press, 1964), p. 144ff. We too will voice some reservations.

[53] Johannes Betz, Die Eucharistie in der Zeit der greichischen Väter, 2 vols. (Freiburg im Br.: Herder, 1955-1961.

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structures. Finally, Geoffrey Wainwright's book, Eucharist and Eschatology, brought an understanding of the eucharist in eschatological perspective to English speaking readers.[54]

Other studies were also taking place. Biblical exegesis was examining the Paschal theme, convenant context, Paul's eucharistic position, John's linking of present and future and word and sacrament. Liturgical renewal and sacramental theology examined the "eucharistic" form of prayer, the role of Christ as our present mediator with the Father, the "People of God" theme, and the indispensable union of anamnesis and epiklesis. Ecumenical considerations continued the questions of intercommunion and initiated discussion on ways of validating ministry.[55] Ecumenical dialogue and the charismatic renewal called for study into the role of the Holy Spirit in the Church and in the eucharist.

The Second Vatican Council served as a blessing for the types of research and reflection that were being carried on by many contemporary theologians. Through this Council the Roman Church for the first time publicly declared a belief in the church of Christ that was not synonymous with the Roman Church and which allowed participation of the other churches.[56] For the first time, too, Reformation bodies were acknowledged as "churches" who celebrated "sacraments."[57] Sacramental language was used to refer to Christ and the Church, showing acceptance of larger concepts of sacramentality.[58] Baptism and the presence of the Holy Spirit were seen as the bonds that united the churches.[59]

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[54] Geoffrey Wainwright, Eucharist and Eschatology (London: Epworth Press, 1971).

[55] The question of ministry was laid to rest at Edinburgh and was revived only in Montreal (1963). A study on the ministry was undertaken at Louvain which noted new converging insights with regard to apostolicity and validity of ministry. Cf. "The Ordained Ministry," Faith and Order, Louvain, 1971, Study Reports and Documents (Geneva, World Council of Churches, 1971), pp. 78-101. See also: Nils Ehrenström and Günther Gassmann, Confessions in Dialogue (Geneva: WCC, 1972), pp. 132-138; Kilian McDonnell, "Ways of Validating Ministry," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 7 (1970): 209-265.

While the emphasis of the Council's "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy" was liturgical renewal, the document did contribute to the development of eucharistic doctrine in several ways.[60] First, through its language it accepted contemporary eucharistic approaches and themes: paschal mystery (5), the relationship of Christ and the church (7), eucharist as realiz-ing eschatology (8), covenantal notions (10), the importance of the Word (24), thanksgiving (48, 56) to name a few. Second, in reiterating the notion of the manifold presence of Christ, it added: "He is present in his word since it is he himself who speaks when the holy scriptures are read in the church," (7) thus raising the Word to new importance in the Roman tradition. By centering both word and sacrament as vehicles of the presence of Christ, the groundwork is set for further examination of that relationship. Third, the element of joyful participation emanates throughout. The Council thus recognizes a larger notion of sacrifice, the essential relation of sacrifice to meal, the value of eucharistic communion, and the thanksgiving form of the prayer.

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[56] "The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," The Documents of Vatican II, nos. 8, 15, pp. 357, 366, 367. For further remarks on this point see Kilian McDonnell, "The Concept of 'Church' in the Documents of Vatican II as Applied to Protestant Denominations," Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue, vol. 4: Eucharist and Ministry (Washington: United States Catholic Conference; New York: U.S.A. National Committee for Lutheran World Federation, 1970), pp. 307-324.

[57] "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," no. 15.

[58] "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," no. 1.

[59] "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," nos. 1-3, 15.

[60] "The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," The Documents of Vatican II. The numbers in this paragraph refer to the numbers of this document.

Certainly much more has been written on the eucharist since the Second Vatican Council, more than can be covered in this short chapter. We have already noted several of the major directions of eucharistic thought today: the new emphasis on eschatology and the need to take the "in-between situation" of our own existence seriously; the emphasis on a much larger understanding of Christ's sacrifice and the relation of that to covenant theology; the movement to understand the real presence of Christ in a larger framework; a heightened appreciation for the meal aspect and ritual form of the eucharist; a renewed sense of memorial which ties

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the two classical questions of real presence and sacrifice together; an appreciation for the richness and multidimensionality of the eucharist; an appreciation for phenomenology which helps us understand sacramentality, presence and absence, and the role of religious symbols, and helps us to relate these to human living. We now turn to several important ecumenical consensus statements to see to what degree these notions are receiving broad acceptance today.

Eucharistic Consensus Today: Some Major Documents

Our investigation centers around three major documents: "The Eucharist," a consensus statement from the World Council of Churches; "The Eucharist: a Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement"; and "The Anglican-Roman Catholic Agreed Statement in Eucharistic Doctrine."[61] Each of these is recognized as a major consensus statement, each deals with the eucharist, each is contemporary. Together these documents provide a larger consensus than does any single one. Our task is not merely to examine each but to compare them

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[61] The document is cited in the Commission of Faith and Order, One Baptism, One Eucharist, and a Mutually Recognized Ministry (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1975) pp. 18-28. "The Eucharist: A Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement," Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue, vol. 3, The Eucharist as Sacrifice, pp. 187-198. "The Anglican-Roman Catholic Agreed Statement in Eucharistic Doctrine," Documents on Anglican Roman Catholic Relations, vol. 2 (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1973), pp. 12-17.

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all. We do this to show the level of agreement/disagreement with regard to the eucharist and to point out the specific questions and areas of interest that these eucharistic documents underscore.

Eucharistic Consensus:
World Council of Churches

Beginning with the Faith and Order Commissions' meeting in Montreal during the Vatican Council and continuing through 1975, one can see the gradual evolution of present eucharistic consensus in the WCC. The final document of this evolution is "The Eucharist," which contains the eucharistic consensus of almost twenty-five years (reaching back to Lund, 1952). Many documents have contributed to this final product: besides the agreements reached at Lund, are the agreements of Montreal (1963),[62] "A Faith and Order Study of the Holy Eucharist" (1966),[63] the agreements from Bristol (1967),[64] "The Eucharist in Ecumenical Thought," (1969)[65] which provided the main draft of the final agreement, the "Dombes Agreement,"[66] which clarified one major area. The final text reflects "the extent to which there is now wide and growing agreement on many of the aspects of eucharistic thought" (no. 2). In studying this document we will first of all pay special attention to its general structure, then briefly examine its most important themes and points of consensus. In doing so we will both acknowledge the contributions of the various previous agreements and show how the newest document adds some refinement to its previous draft.

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[62] "Worship and Oneness in Christ's Church," Faith and Order Findings (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963).

[63] "Faith and Order Study of the Holy Eucharist," Studia Liturgica 5 (Summer, 1966): 121-125.

[64] "The Holy Eucharist," New Directions in Faith and Order, Bristol, 1967 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1968).

[65] "The Eucharist in Ecumenical Thought," Study Encounter 5 (1969): 108-114. The paper was later revised under the title "The Eucharist."

[66] "Towards a Common Eucharistic Faith? Agreement

In its preamble the document states that the richness and variety of meanings which the eucharist conveys cannot be completely exposed in any one document. It further recognizes the danger of dealing separately with different aspects which in reality form a single whole. Thus, while the document seeks to be specific with regard to points of articulation, it nevertheless seeks to call the reader's attention back to the unity and mystery of the eucharist. The point seems simple enough, but failure to remember it has led to minimal and even magical conceptions in its past history. This in turn has led to denominationalism and division.

The preamble situates the eucharist within the worshipping life of the People of God, who are called to this through baptism. The eucharist is the memorial of the

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between Roman Catholics and Protestants," trans. by Pamela Gaughan, Modern Eucharistic Agreement (London: S.P.C.K., 1973), pp. 53-78.

saving acts of God. In this simple statement are found the two actions, the two events that make up the eucharist: on the one hand, the eucharist is an action of the church, constantly repeated, proclaiming and celebrating a memorial through word and sacrament; on the other hand, the reason the church can and must do this is because God has first acted on us in his Son, Jesus, through his incarnation, life, death, resurrection and ascension. In the church's action the action of God is made present because Christ himself, "with all he has accomplished for us and for all creation, is present." (Montreal and Bristol) This action of the church, then, becomes the center and climax of the church's entire sacramental life.

The document in its first section situates the origins for Christian eucharistic belief through stressing the action of God in Christ. Out of love Christ shared a meal with his followers before his death and after his resurrection, and he commanded that this meal be held until his return. The Last Supper and Emmaus are united; the document acknowledges the New Testament research and shows the continuity between the Last Supper and post-resurrection Christian practices. The language is Pauline-Lukan with the emphasis on a meal, the new paschal meal. It is also carefully sacramental: sacrament is the "effective sign and assurance of the presence of Christ." (Lund) The second paragraph (no. 4) first speaks of the sacrifice of Christ in Johannine terms as he "who sacrificed his life for all men and who gave himself to them as bread of life." The language is also more cultic and quite paschal: the lamb being slain and eaten as food becomes the Bread of Life of the new covenant being sacrificed and eaten as food. Thus the connection is made between presence and sacrifice: the eucharistic meal is the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, the sacrament of his real presence as one who was sacrificed.

But what is the purpose of this sacramental meal of the sacrificed, risen Christ? One who shares in the meal is sanctified and made one, that is, reconciled in love, so united that those made one with Christ become Christ in the world--they themselves are called to reconcile and to offer themselves in him as a living sacrifice.

The second section of the document stresses the action of the church in the eucharist. Thus while the preamble acknowledges the existential situation in which the church does eucharist, the actual document begins from the theological position that God acts first; the church is graced. The action of the church is seen in a Trinitarian perspective and reflects the rich heritage of the early eucharistic prayers. Thus the eucharist is seen, first of all, as thanksgiving to the Father for what he has accomplished (through creation, redemption and sanctification) in the church and in the world (Montreal).[67] Secondly, the eucharist

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[67] In this sense the eucharist is the "great sacrifice of praise."

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is seen as anamnesis (representation and anticipation) of Christ with all that he has accomplished for us and all creation, with all that he is accomplishing now and all that he will accomplish in the fulfillment of the Kingdom. Thirdly, the eucharist is seen as invocation and gift of the Spirit: the church confidently prays for the Spirit so that it may be sanctified, renewed and strengthened.

Not only is the action of the church interaction with the Trinity, but it is also interaction within itself, through its members. Pauline ecclesiology and eucharistic theology fill this last part of the second section. Because the eucharist is communion with Christ present, it is also communion with all who are now or ever were members of this body. And as this eucharist is seen as solidarity with all creation, so too, each member is called to responsible concern not only for all Christians, but for creation too.

The third section cites a basic implication of the two-fold action of eucharist: mission to the world (this section too is Pauline in theme). Since the church becomes the body of Christ through the eucharist, the mission of Christ becomes the mission of the church through that same eucharist. Mission is not just a consequence of eucharist; mission is actually part of eucharistic life. The reconciliation theme briefly touched upon in the preamble is amplified here. Besides all that has already been said about the church, the members of the church are called to be servants of reconciliation (the cross theme) and witnesses of resurrection. Solidarity with all people and with all creation is a eucharistic demand! Realizing this is the situation, then, new ecumenical eucharistic sensitivity seems to be in order, that is, the recognition of the truth and validity of each Christian church's ministry and sacraments.

The final two sections of the document deal with what might be called footnotes. The fourth section lists the elements that are generally to be found in eucharist, and the fifth section makes several recommendations with regard to eucharist: that eucharist should be renewed in all the churches, that the variety found in eucharistic theology and practice should not be a threat to the unity of faith, that eucharist be celebrated once a week, that since the eucharist is in reality the real presence of the Lord made available for us to eat in sacramental form, respect should be paid to the elements after the service: that the elements might be reserved for those who are sick or absent, or that they should be consumed.

In its entirety "The Eucharist" presents a thought-out and well balanced statement on the wide range of eucharistic agreement. The document is not merely a series of unrelated statements, but is an organic whole which gives proper perspective to the related areas. While the document is not a great deal different from "The Eucharist in

Ecumenical Thought" (1969), some clarifications have been made. One section in particular, regarding various parts of the eucharistic action, was expanded to recognize the fuller liturgical traditions and transferred from the preamble to the fourth section to give greater clarity to the document as a whole. The section on respect for the elements was taken from the "Dombes Agreement" and should be seen as a positive contribution to the question of eucharistic reservation. Finally, a section on ministry found in the 1969 draft is not included here, owing to the formation of another consensus statement specifically on ministry.

Yet for all that the document is also cautious and conservative. Sacrifice and real presence are treated only generally, suggesting approaches to the problems rather than treating them specifically. The document also lacks a strong notion of covenant, although it does obliquely refer to it with regard to the paschal nature of the eucharist and with regard to the eschatological strains celebrated in foretaste and anticipation. A reason for this might indeed be because of the strong sacrificial relationship to covenant.

Having treated the structure of the document and the document as a whole, let us now turn to specific themes and see what types of consensus have been affirmed. Affirmation of the fact of real presence is not limited to one section, but permeates the document. It is touched on in the preamble, underlined in the sacramental language of the first section, expanded in the section on anamnesis and related to sacrifice, explained in the epicletic section, expanded on a different plane in the ecclesial and ethical sections and reaffirmed in the section on reservation. This approach seems much better than that of limiting the theme to one section, but at the same time, it loses force and specificity and seems to skirt a major eucharistic problem. Paragraph 15, added to the original draft, merely gives a direction by which the question of real presence might be resolved: real presence effected in anamnesis and epiklesis is for communion, for us, not for itself. On the other hand, the document makes many positive points: the language of real presence is sacramental, not physical; the union accomplished is pan-temporal and pan-spatial; bread and wine are the locus of the presence and are meant for sharing; the way the change takes place is explained both by the power of the Word and the Spirit, thus acknowledging both the Lutheran (and in a general way the Western) tradition, as well as the Eastern tradition.

Scriptural scholarship is responsible for the rediscovery of the berakah form of prayer which the eucharistic prayer takes, although the distinctions made recently between thanksgiving and acknowledgment are not found here. Scriptural scholarship is also responsible for the rediscovery of the Jewish concept of memorial both with regard to the presence involved and to the recalling of salvific action. The move from a presence of thing or person-in-him/herself to person-in-event has enabled the synthesis of sacrifice and presence to take place. This perspective, as paragraph 12 suggests, allows for a greater understanding of and appreciation for sacrifice.[68]

The notion of sacrifice is primarily centered in this paragraph although it is also referred to in other places. One finds an unwillingness to say too much about this aspect, however, and in this respect the document shows its conservatism. On the other hand, it does try to situate the question of sacrifice on solid theological grounds: in the context of anamnesis. Through this notion the once-for-all character of Christ's sacrifice can be preserved while at the same time explaining its present reality and efficacious power. Furthermore, the concept of sacrifice has been expanded into its full biblical meaning and away from purely cultic nuances.

The notion of anamnesis ties the Word and sacramental elements of the eucharist together quite nicely. Both contribute to the fullest expression of anamnesis: word points to sacrament, sacrament is fulfilled with the word; word arouses faith and sacrament seals it.

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[68] It should be stated at this point that paragraphs 12, 15, 29 and 32 were added to the original draft. Their importance derives from pointing out new perspectives by which old problems can be seen and evaluated in a new light, rather than from any substantial change or clarification.

The document also reaffirms the importance of the epiklesis. For too long this notion, strong and central to the East, had been missing in the Western tradition. It is true that our concerns have been so centered on Jesus Christ and the Word that little attention has been given to the Spirit until recently. As pneumatic theology develops in Western theology, however, we can well expect further ramifications in our eucharistic theology.

In like manner the document stresses the ecclesial and ethical notions of the eucharist as centrally important. In effect, this takes the eucharist out of a purely ritual or in-church realm and situates its importance right in the middle of the real world. Eucharist says something to the world and to the Christians who people it. This document reaffirms the importance of eucharist in the recurring questions on the role of religion in culture and the challenges of secularism.

Finally, the question of the permanence of the presence and the way it is approached here can help reconcile the parties whose practices in this area differ. While the statement does not go far enough in the view of this writer, it does call for mutual respect based on a realization of the implications of belief in the real presence. On the other hand, it should also call for a rethinking of eucharistic adoration in the light of the strong communion stress.

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Eucharistic Consensus: Roman Catholic Dialogues

The two most important of the Roman Catholic dialogues involve the Anglicans and the Lutherans. Significant agreement was found in both sets of dialogues. The two also offer opportunities for comparison. It will be our aim, therefore, to compare the consensus statements, "The Eucharist: A Lutheran-Roman Catholic Statement," and "The Anglican-Roman Catholic Agreed Statement in Eucharistic Doctrine." We will also compare these statements to the WCC statement we have examined above.

On a cursory level one would say that the Windsor document is broader in scope than is the Lutheran-Roman Catholic statement, but that neither has the breadth of "The Eucharist." The Windsor document has a preamble like "The Eucharist" which speaks of the general reconciling mission of the Lord and of the Christian's introduction into that mission through baptism, deepened through eucharist. The Windsor document goes on to speak of the "mystery" of the eucharist and from there about eucharistic presence. While the Windsor document thus makes a positive contribution--the concept of mystery--it does not treat the eucharist in its broader context: related to the mission of the Church, to its individual members, to an incarnational-redemptive world context. Both of these statements go further than does the Roman-Lutheran statement which specifically sets out to treat only sacrifice and presence.

What is found in all three statements is agreement in the following with regard to sacrifice and the eucharist: (1) a larger sense of sacrifice (one which takes in the whole of the Paschal Mystery); (2) the once-for-all nature of Christ's sacrifice; (3) use of the notion "memorial" in connecting Christ's sacrifice to the eucharist; (4) uniting the Church into the movement of Christ's self-offering through the notion of memorial.

What is missing in all three statements is an adequate biblical notion of covenantal sacrifice which could contribute much to ecumenical agreement. What is also missing is some notion of *new* covenant, and the presentist-futurist eschatology which that seems to imply.

With regard to the presence of Christ the three documents agree: (1) that the real presence of Christ is only understood within the context of Christ's redemptive *activity* whereby he gives himself to his own: Christ's presence is for us, not for itself; it is the presence of Christ *in event*, not just of Christ's body in itself; (2) that the presence of Christ cannot therefore be separated from his sacrifice: because of his sacrifice he is present in this way; because of his presence his sacrifice is effective; (3) that his presence to us is under the signs of food and in the context of the sacramental meal which he instituted; (4) that his presence is therefore for us, for our communion in him; (5) that he is really present, not spatially but sacramentally--effectively signified by the bread and the wine; (6) that this change is effected by the power of the Holy Spirit.

The Lutheran-Roman Catholic statement speaks of reservation of the eucharist for the sick as does "The Eucharist." It speaks of the manifold presence of Christ as does the Windsor document. Both (the Lutheran-Roman Catholic and the Windsor) speak about the role of faith with regard to the eucharistic presence. Besides this, the Windsor document considers the entire action of the eucharist and its pan-temporal nature: remembering the past, celebrating the present and anticipating the future coming of the Lord. This it does in common with "The Eucharist."

In the area of individual contributions, it might be said that "The Eucharist" is by far the broadest and most integrated of the documents, emphasizing also the ecclesial and ethical demands and including all of creation in its scope. The Lutheran-Roman Catholic statement, on the other hand, is the narrowest of the three, but it treats the areas of sacrifice and presence in greater detail than do the others, at least with regard to the specific doctrinal points: the notion of "offering Christ," the convergence of actual eucharistic worship practices, the question of eucharistic adoration, the practice of communion under both kinds, and the issue of transubstantiation. The Windsor document, while being neither the broadest nor the most specific, does add the idea of mystery and presents a more existential notion of presence (borrowing from Marcel himself through Jean Tillard).[69] Thus each statement in its own way helps the convergence of eucharistic faith and doctrine.

The three documents that we have considered confirm the eucharistic work of hundreds of scholars, some of whom we have mentioned above. The documents show a deep sensitivity to the research of countless biblical, liturgical, sacramental and systematic theologians. They also reflect the supporting work of countless others: cultural and biblical anthropologists, philosophers, historians, sociologists, etc. On the other hand, the documents symbolize the newness of such ecumenical endeavors and the theological tensions that are still quite prevalent: consensus must often sacrifice specificity. They are a gauge of the eucharistic climate today, of an atmosphere that calls for continued research and dialogue.

Conclusion

In this opening chapter we have presented a panorama of much of the eucharistic field. We have briefly examined some of the new approaches and tools used, all done through the contributions of the past. We then picked a sampling to show the growth and expansion of this field. Lastly we examined some of the ecumenical fruit of this endeavor. But the field is still growing and developing, branching out in all directions. It is within this context and within this process that the contributions of Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich must be weighed.

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[69] We will return to these in later sections.

Marcel and Tillich will not provide a comprehensive eucharistic theology that takes all the above areas of eucharistic concern into account. They will provide, however, major contributions to certain of those areas, especially to eucharistic presence and memorial and the related question of eucharistic sacrifice. They bring with them the expertise of the phenomenological method, a deep appreciation for mystery, strong ontological concerns, and existential urgency. We believe that these contributions can be made without distortion to their thought, although we recognize that we are using their ideas in ways not specifically conceived by them. However, it could be for just that reason that their work seems so fresh: it is open and available to all of human reality and not just to sacramental or narrowly cultic situations. The remainder of this paper will be concerned with substantiating this hypothesis.

What this chapter has done is provide the setting: for a contemporary understanding of eucharistic presence and memorial; for the specific ontological, existential and phenomenological contributions of Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich to these questions.

CHAPTER II

GABRIEL MARCEL'S NOTION OF "PRESENCE"

The first chapter of this dissertation traced the basic directions eucharistic theology has taken in this century. Existential and phenomenological contributions were briefly noted as part of this overall survey. In this chapter we will examine the thought of one major Christian existentialist, Gabriel Marcel, to see in what ways his work might serve the eucharistic situation. Certainly, Marcel is not noted for his eucharistic treatises; he never really concerned himself with that subject at all. Yet, his work has an appeal for eucharistic theology today because it deals most centrally with the question of "presence" from an intersubjective point of view. To this is added a strong phenomenological approach and a sound ontological underpinning. A primary question is, therefore, whether there can be any relation between Marcel's notion of presence and eucharistic areas that also deal with presence.

This chapter merely seeks (1) to unearth Marcel's entangled reflections on "presence" and to give them some type of order and (2) to evaluate the consistency of these reflections taken as a whole.[1] By far the more difficult of the tasks is the former since Marcel could never move himself to a systematic treatment; the latter task, however, is also necessary if we are to show that Marcel's thoughts on presence have value for eucharistic theology. It will be the burden of this chapter to substantiate the hypothesis that Marcel's concept of "presence" enjoys a breadth, depth and consistency that makes it attractive for contemporary eucharistic understanding.

The chapter will be divided into the following sections: (1) a brief introduction to Marcel's thought; (2) "presence" on the level of subject-object; (3) "presence" on the level of being; (4) the "presence" of the Transcendent; (5) other "presences"; (6) critique and conclusion.

An Introduction to the Thought of Gabriel Marcel

Gabriel Marcel, dramatist and art critic, musician and philosopher, could best be characterized as living in the midst of colorful, throbbing humanity. There is nothing lifeless or ethereal about his later works, although his early writings are drenched in idealism.[2] Personal experiences directed his later philosophical wanderings. Marcel's continued fidelity to these life forces prevented him from constructing a systematic philosophy and sensitivity to people and events caused new questions and new discoveries. These in turn enabled Marcel to remain on the cutting edge of reflection and intercommunion. It is the vibrancy of his living, the down-to-earthness of his reflections, the fear of lifeless generalizations that enable Marcel to speak, even after his death, so pointedly and so vividly to people today. His remarks on "presence" will enliven and enhance our penetration into the mystery of the eucharist.

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[1] Just how Marcel's concept of "presence" relates to eucharistic questions will be taken up in chapter four, following a study of Paul Tillich's concept of "religious symbol."

[2] Gabriel Marcel's early writings are: Fragments philosophiques 1909-1914, with an Introduction by Lionel A. Blain, Philosophes contemporains: testes et études, no. 11 (Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, [n.d.]; Journal métaphysique, Bibliothèque des idées (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1927).

Marcel's journey as homo viator, however, was not an easy one, nor is it easily followed. It is filled with the ambiguities of questions unanswered and thought forms too poetic for rigid understanding. We must begin the journey quietly and slowly, painstakingly and patiently, in humility and wonder.

Many experiences have been the subject of Gabriel Marcel's investigations. Some have produced abundant fruit; some have ended in admitted failure. In this paper our concern will be Marcel's philosophical works, although some attention will be given to his plays. We will further limit our concern to his more existential, less idealistic writings since he moved from idealism quite early in his career. We begin by charting Marcel's philosophical terrain: the basic insights and distinctions which support his considerations on "presence" must be laid bare.

Primary and Secondary Reflection

Marcel viewed the analytical method as only a partial approach to philosophical investigations. Besides this sort of reflection which he considered necessary for human experience, he sought a way of preserving the unity, integrity and immediacy of the original human experience, so much in danger of being forgotten or destroyed by analysis. His answer was a two-staged method of reflection.

In the first stage of reflection, called primary reflection, experience is broken apart and analyzed. Subject and object are distinguished and both become objects for examination, description, clarification and classification. The object surrenders its uniqueness for the sake of universality. It becomes verifiable and is able to be possessed by another subject.

However, through this process of objectification something positive and valuable of the original experience is lost or at least forgotten: the immediacy, the intimacy, the living reality of that experience. The fluidity and the participatory aspects of the experience are bracketed out in analysis.

Thus, Marcel introduced secondary reflection: to recover the unity of the primary experience.[3] Secondary reflection seeks to deepen, enrich and intensify the original experience by reflecting on the primary reflection of that experience: a reflection to the second power. The point of departure, noted Marcel, "Ce sera la considération de la situation fondamentale dans laquelle je me trouve placé en tant qu'être humain--ne disons pas encore en tant que créature--de par ma condition d'homme elle-même."[4] What is reflected upon is not the immediate consciousness itself, but the primary mediation through which immediate consciousness is constituted as experience. It is not the instrument of thought that distinguishes secondary reflection from primary reflection. Both use this instrument. What does distinguish them is the direction of that thought. Primary reflection tends to reify its concepts and thus abstract from existence; secondary reflection reestablishes the primacy of the existential.[5]

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[3] Idem, Le mystère de l'être, vol. 1: Réflexion et mystère, Philosophie de l'esprit (Paris: Aubier, 1951), p. 97.

Marcel recognized that for secondary reflection to be able to reroute the impetus of thought in the direction of participation (for that is precisely what is needed), there must be some point at the level of cognition where participation has not been lost hold of. Furthermore, there must be something to account for secondary reflection's assurance of the inadequacy of the categories of primary reflection and for its impetus to transcend these categories. Since thought arises _out_ of immediacy, at the point of its origin a non-conceptualizable contact is irrevocably established. It is around this point that secondary reflection ceaselessly gravitates.[6] Marcel at times calls this non-conceptualizable contact a "blinded intuition."[7] It is this intuition that gives secondary reflection its assurance and demand.

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[4] Idem, Présence et immortalité (Paris: Flammarion, 1959), p. 20.

[5] Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (New York: Fordham University Press, 1962), p. 43.

Blinded intuition has no definite content; it is not objective. It cannot be viewed as the "possession" of a person, something the person "has." Nor is it an abstract power of some sort over which the individual has control. Although blinded intuition "manifests" itself through and in the subject, it is not the subject's own. It is rather gift to the subject. Marcel suggests that blinded intuition is the _assurance_, the certitude a person has, not about something, but about everything. It is an assurance that envelops the person, that gives the person assurance about participation in something larger. This is done positively through a sense of absolute presence and negatively through a sense of finitude or exigence for being.

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[6] Ibid., p. 44.

[7] The term "blinded" does not refer to an intuition that reaches out at anything. "Blinded" refers to the fact that intuition is not intuition of some particular thing. The difficulty is that our language does not have a word for what Marcel wishes to communicate.

At the base of "blinded intuition" is Being itself.[8] Marcel described this Absolute Being as absolute Truth and absolute Light. Absolute Being is the ground of all beings and blinded intuition is an expression that flows from the Truth and Light of Absolute Being and finds its "concrete expression" (although unconceptualizable) in the existential person. Thus the assurance and certitude a person experiences about his/her existence and being as well as the felt lack of being-fully are actually manifestations of Absolute Being--of the person participating in Absolute Being--of absolute presence. But in all cases the exact "what" of the "experience" remains unconceptualizable.

This point is the key to the possibility of secondary reflection. It is what establishes the certainty of my existence and my being. It is what unifies the existential situation and allows for real knowledge. Yet "what" it is is difficult to explain, especially in introductory material. The point should become clearer in the following pages.

"I-it" and "I-thou"

The insight that gives rise to the need for secondary reflection also serves as the reason for another Marcellian distinction: a distinction of levels on which the person lives. Marcel distinguishes two different levels on which one lives his/her daily life: the level of "I-it" or "I-s/he" and the level of "I-thou." One lives on both levels interchangeably. In fact, the idea of "level" may be too severe for what is meant, since this way of speaking sounds as if one moves up and down from one level to the other in an abrupt sort of way. Rather, what Marcel has in mind is the _manner_ in which an "I" addresses an object.

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[8] When Being is capitalized it refers to Absolute Being.

On the level of "I-it" one distinguishes between what is _me_ and what is _not-me_. On this level of primary reflection one relates to anything _not-me_ as _object_, i.e., as related to me in some way (because of the very fact that I am attending to it), yet as basically existing independently of me. In functional terms this is the level on which one acts upon these objects: one uses, possesses, transforms, destroys, builds upon, examines, tests, controls, communicates, etc. Moreover, this is also the level of subjectivity since objects are always to or for _subjects_. The subject or self will always remain at a distance from the object under consideration. It will maintain a closed attitude toward that object. Self-consciousness, pride, jealousy, covetousness, desire and anguish are all privy to this level.

Marcel calls the level of "I-thou" a deeper level, the level on which _human_ interaction takes place. It is not the level of subject-object, but the level of the intersubjective and the transsubjective. On this level one neither speaks _about_ nor thinks _about_ another; one speaks _to_ someone.

This is not the level of the objective, but of the dialogic.[9] It is a level marked by continuity, process, immediacy, spontaneity and communion. On this level the action is *other*-centered, with "other" meaning "person," not "object." It is the level of complete involvement of the person in another and vice versa. For Marcel this is the level of welcome, thanksgiving and adoration, the level of love, freedom, hope, grace, fidelity and creativity, and most importantly, the level of mystery, being and presence.

Problem and Mystery

Marcel's distinction of primary and secondary reflection and his distinction of levels on which one lives implies another distinction: the distinction between problem and mystery. Marcel sums up this distinction in these words:

> ...un problème est quelque chose que je rencontre, que je trouve tout entier devant moi, mais que je puis par là-même cerner et réduire--au lieu, qu'un mystère est quelque chose en quoi je suis moi-même engagé, et qui n'est par conséquent pensable que comme *une sphère où la distinction de l'en moi et du devant moi perd sa signification et sa valeur initiale*. Au lieu qu'un problème authentique est justiciable d'une certaine technique appropriée en fonction de laquelle il se définit, un mystère transcende par définition toute technique concevable.[10]

In a problem the object is separate from the subject; it is able to be seized and examined by the subject. Mystery, on the other hand, encompasses the self, making it impossible for the self to transcend the "boundaries" which are beyond its own horizon and in which it exists. Yet even the language of this last sentence is misleading since it is impossible to speak of "boundaries" with regard to mystery.

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[9] Second person dialogue is a key to Marcel's system.

[10] The stress is Marcel's. Gabriel Marcel, *Être et avoir*, Philosophie de l'esprit (Paris: Fernand Aubier, 1935), p.

Another way of suggesting non-transcendability is by saying that in mystery a problem (so to speak) encroaches upon its own data, thus prohibiting proper analysis.[11] The questioner is caught up in his/her own question, and although s/he continually questions and finds partial answers, s/he finds no answer that leaves him/her completely satisfied. A problem, on the other hand, admits of a solution, an end-point, at which the questioner can attain a satisfying solution, one that suggests no further question. In a problem, the *object* is what is epistemologically important; in mystery, the *relationship* between subject and object is what is important. We could call this difference in *investiganda* a difference in ontological status between problem and

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169. For further treatment of problem-mystery see ibid., pp. 145-147; *Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique*, with an Introduction by Marcel de Corte, Philosophes contemporains: textes et études, no. 3 (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Paris: J. Vrin, 1949), pp. 57-64; *De refus à l'invocation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940), pp. 94-96; *M. E. I.*, 227-233; *Les hommes contre l'humain* (Paris: La Colombe, 1951), pp. 68-70; *Existential Background of Human Dignity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 80-83.

[11] *P. A.*, p. 61.

mystery.[12]

There is also a difference of mood between problem and mystery. A problem can be solved through primary reflection; a mystery can only be discovered, and that only by means of secondary reflection. Thus, while the mood of problem is one of thirsting for acquisition, the mood of mystery is one of wonder and humility in the presence of fullness.

Marcel does not wish to imply that mystery enjoys a higher status than problem or that problems are merely to be tolerated. Both problem and mystery make up one's life; both are important for one's well-being; both are valid knowing processes for differing and valid aspects of reality.

Experience

Having noted some major distinctions which Marcel makes in his philosophical position, we now turn to his peculiar use of certain philosophical terms, the first of which is "experience."

By the term "experience" Marcel does not mean the reflected analysis or recollection of some immediate action or process of actions. By "experience" Marcel has in mind the immediate happening itself. The experience happens in a lived-reality constellation. What is important for Marcel is the unity of the happening and its connection with, its insertion into, its participation in lived reality. This pre-reflected experience is the point of departure for Marcel's method, and it is this experience which is then broken apart and analyzed in primary reflection and later restored in secondary reflection.

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[12] Rudolph J. Gerber, "Marcel and the Experiential Road to Metaphysics," Philosophy Today 12 (Winter, 1968): 268.

Existence

The primary experience or ground experience for Marcel is the experience of existence. "I exist!" The reality of one's existing is not something that one must first reflect upon. It is rather one's "exclamatory self awareness," one's experience of being manifest in the world.[13] This manifestation is not distinct or divided; it is first and immediate, whole and one. It is the experience of "I *am* my body; but I *am* also my habitual surroundings," *before* any distinction between subject/object or between thought/object.[14] In this experience there is a pre-reflected unity of the self and the global situation in which the self finds itself present. Existence is manifest as the unifying ground. The self is the center of this awareness, and from this experience it acknowledges the existence of everything else which in some way is related to it.

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[13] For a detailed treatment of the notion of existence see the following works of Marcel: "Existence et objectivité," *J. M.*, pp. 309-329; *Le mystère de l'être*, vol. 2: *Foi et realité*, Philosophie de l'esprit (Paris: Aubier, 1951), pp. 21-34; *E.B.H.D.*, pp. 35-54.

[14] Existence encompasses object, non-object at once; it is not conceptualizable. *J. M.*, pp. 304-305.

This acknowledgment is not that of a subject to an object. What appears to me is not an object, but pre-reflected presence; presence so thorough that it suggests an opaque unity. Marcel describes this presence as an "absolute presence:" neither the presence of something nor someone. One cannot even say that the universe is present at this level, because that too would involve reintroducing a duality between the subject and object in an experience which, by principle, can involve no such distinction.[15]

This ground experience of existence, then, is not conceptual; it is not a quality that can be characterized without contradiction.[16] Nor can existence be experienced as a "passive state," a sort of objective reality in which one finds oneself.[17] It is not a larger "something" in which I, as existent, share. There is only a unity of existence and existent, the former realized in the latter and not beyond it.[18]

On the other hand, there are sensed feelings that describe something of the experience of existence. Certainty is one of these: certainty in the existence of the world and certainty in one's own existence in the world (without separating the two into subject and object).[19] Marcel also describes existence as gift, the gift of his being here, as a "standing out," a "sealing off," (obtrurer) and as a "being captured."[20]

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[15] Ibid., p. 321.

[16] Ibid., p. 320; E.A., p. 51.

[17] J.M., pp. 304, 311. A state of pre-existence or even the possibility of pre-existence is impossible for Marcel.

[18] Ibid., pp. 312-313.

Sensation

Marcel rejects the notion that sensations are "sense wave messages" which the body receives and then converts into sense experience which then registers in the brain.[21] Sensation is not some sort of "transmission;" it is, rather, the immediate given of experience, prior to all reflection and thought.[22] It is of the level of pure feeling where nothing is explained or understood; sensory confusion.[23] As such, sensation is absolute mediation for consciousness. At the same time it is in itself a non-mediatable immediate which points to the real unity of the person rather than to a hypothetical dichotomy.[24] It is only because of sensation that an experience of existence is possible. Sensation is the very root of one's experience; it is a mode of one's existing.[25]

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[19] Ibid., pp. 312-313. Immediate consciousness is infallible; there is no place for error in it. Error enters the world with reflection and judgment. Ibid., p. 131. Recalling the role of "blinded intuition" may be of help here. In the concrete experience of existence it is blinded intuition that infallibly assures the self of its own existence and of that of the world around it. It makes this assurance through sensation, which is nothing else than the incarnate presence of the self in the body, sensed as a unity. This will be treated below.

[20] P.I., p. 139.

[21] For further elaboration see Marcel's works: M.E. I, 119-140; J.M., p. 225; R.I., pp. 37-44. Note that for Marcel sensation is in no sense an object. J.M., pp. 266-267.

[22] Sensation is a pure immediate, i.e., incapable of mediation, incapable of specification, non-object of the infra-objective order. S.M., p. 319. See also R.I., p. 38.

[23] Edward Ballard's interpretation of Marcel in "Gabriel Marcel: The Mystery of Being," Existential Philosophers:

The experience of existence is infallible for Marcel; it is certain and so is sensation. The role of sensation is not one of conversion, but one of discovery and welcome. What is discovered and welcomed is attained or apprehended almost as a thou.[26] There is no place for error because there is no judgment, no reflection.[27]

The existential situation, then, is not only one of being in the world, but also one of receiving and opening up to the world. From another perspective it is the world presenting itself to me through sensation: a continuous and immediate process, not on the level of objectivity, but pre-reflected, approximating the level of I-thou.

Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty, ed. George Alfred Schrader (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 216.

[24] J.M., pp. 249, 266-267. "...la sensation étant le mode suivant lequel la continuité de quoi que ce soit avec mon corps peut m'être donnée." Ibid., p. 261.

[25] M.E. I, 125; E.B.H.D., p. 45.

[26] P.I., p. 146.

[27] As was said earlier, error enters into the world with reflection.

Being

Marcel uses the word "being" (_être_) sometimes in its universal extension, sometimes as a synonym for existence, sometimes in opposition to it. Furthermore, he uses the word in its verbal form, as a substantive, and also in referring to God. What makes the matter even more confusing is that he does this on the same page, even in the same sentence.[28] Our concern is to sort out and examine these various uses.

(a) "_Being_" _as_ _an_ _absolute_ transcends the individual.[29] It is something in which each individual is involved and in which all beings are called to participate in some way. Marcel states that Being in this sense refers to a pleroma or a fullness in which beings participate and grow.[30] He notes in this regard:

> It would not be wrong to say...that we human beings are a species in-between; between Being and Non-Being, or even that we are called upon to _be_--that it is our responsibility to _be_. What begins to emerge here is the plenitude to which we aspire.[31]

The "Absolute Being" that Marcel is referring to here is the same reality that grounds "blinded intuition." Marcel also speaks about this manifest reality using different terms: a "blindfold knowledge (connaissance aveuglée) of Being," "reflexive intuition," that which is "given as an indivisible whole (ensemble)."[32] He implies this reality in expressions like "absolute judgment" and "absolute appeal."[33] He also notes its reality through a negative experience, summarized in the phrase, "exigence for being." Marcel admits that all these expressions are lacking, but he is at a loss as to how to talk about this "presence"--the immediacy of the reality that at once grounds, envelopes, confronts and "is with" the existential person.

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[28] Gallagher, _Gabriel Marcel_, p. 50.

[29] We will capitalize Being when it is referred to as absolute.

[30] _E.B.H.D._, p. 89.

[31] Ibid., p. 77.

Another expression that Marcel uses for Being is light:

> L'expression johannique: là lumière éclairant tout homme venant au monde définit, de façon rigoureuse et en termes d'une adéquation insurpassable, ce qui est vraiment la caractéristique existentielle la plus universelle qui soit. On le verra clairement si on ajoute, à titre de complément, à cette expression ce corollaire que l'homme n'est homme que pour autant qu'il est éclairé par cette lumière.[34]

Light is an illuminating source which, because it is illuminating, is incapable of becoming an idea.[35] Being is this light; it is the fullness of light. My exigence for being is my awareness of the darkness around me, of the opaqueness of my reality. I need light to enlighten my life so that I can see reality as it is.

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[32] E.A., pp. 36, 141, 178 respectively.

[33] Ibid., p. 181.

[34] H.H., p. 199. This comparison is essential for Marcel. See his article, "What Can One Expect of Philosophy," Philosophy Today 3 (1959): 261.

[35] E.B.H.D., p. 86.

But Truth is also denoted in the light. It is in the light that Truth is manifest. What is of Truth shares in the light. Truth, in turn, has a value connotation since it manifests itself as a demand.[36] Thus epistemology and ethics find their ground, their point of origin, in Being.

To explain how a person participates in Being, Marcel uses the example of an instrumentalist in an orchestra performing a polyphonic work:

> Each performer indeed plays his part in the ensemble; but it would be absurd to identify this ensemble with an arithmetical sum of juxtaposed elements. We should completely misunderstand what a musical ensemble really is. But we can very well imagine the process of thought in the course of which the instrumentalist, who in the beginning was conscious only of the part which had been entrusted to him--if only because he had to work on that part separately at first--little by little becomes consciously aware of the ensemble. And it is probable that by that very fact the interpretation of his own part will be transformed.[37]

From this example one can clearly see that Being is not an ideal. Nor is it a *quid*. There is no way to describe it more precisely.

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[36] Pedro Adams, "Marcel: Metaphysician or Moralist," *Philosophy Today* 10 (Fall 1966): 186. Truth not only suggests certainty, but also demand.

[37] *E.B.H.D.*, p. 78.

Through recognizing that his/her life is involved in a drama which is properly his/her own but which at the same time extends far beyond him/herself in all directions, the person him/herself comes to see his/her life as participating in Being.[38] In the depth of his/her being the person feels a great "exigence for being."[39] S/he realizes that his/her center does not lie in him/herself and is forced to seek it outside. S/he is not everything s/he should be. S/he lacks self-satisfaction; his/her life is pervaded with a certain uneasiness.[40] S/he must transcend her/himself to be more. This other-centeredness of being is an extremely important point in Marcel's thought. It gives direction, purpose and hope. Being more and more is what the person strives for, what the person's life is all about.

(b) Marcel also refers to "being" as a noun, as an individual human being, blessed with his/her own particularity and his/her own existential perspective. This designation is not given to things considered as objects; these are considered as "scarcely beings at all."[41] The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, Marcel wants to emphasize the interiority of being, the demands of being which are not adequately fulfilled by things; on the other hand, he cannot thereby refer to "things" as "non-beings" because that would lead to confusion and eventual meaninglessness in the context of existence.

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[38] E.A., pp. 174-175, 227.

[39] M.E. 2, 38.

[40] Gabriel Marcel, L'homme problématique, Philosophie de l'esprit (Paris: Aubier, 1955), pp. 107-109. This uneasiness is a metaphysical uneasiness reaching to the person's very center. The person seeks equilibrium in answer to the question, "Who am I?" Cf. P.I., pp. 21-23; Gabriel Marcel, Homo viator; prolégomènes à une métaphysique de l'espérance, Philosophie de l'esprit (Paris: Aubier, 1944), pp. 193-194.

(c) The mention of interiority leads to another important way in which Marcel uses the word "being." He refers to the *being of a being*, the *act of being of the individual*. Once again "being" is used as a verb, but here the emphasis is on the individual person, not the absolute. Marcel reflects:

> La réflexion philosophique la plus élémentaire suffit à montrer que *être* ne peut pas être une propriété puisque c'est ce qui rend possible l'existence d'une propriété quelle qu'elle soit; cela même faute de quoi aucune propriété ne peut être conçue. Encore faut-il se garder, bien entendu, de l'espèce de schème d'après lequel l'être serait en quelque façon antérieur aux propriétés. Rien ne peut être plus fallacieux que l'idée d'une sorte de nudité préalable de l'être que des qualités ou des propriétés viendraient ultérieurement habiller.[42]

Thus my being does not precede my being-who-I-am or what-I-am; it is coterminous with my qualities and properties.[43] It begins as soon as there is creation; it is affirmed by my

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[41] *M.E.* 2: 29-31.

[42] Ibid., p. 23.

[43] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

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"I am."[44] Viewed another way, it is what withstands any analysis of experience, any attempt to get to the root elements of experience.[45] There is, therefore, something concrete and important here at the heart of my human reality which remains, despite analysis, because it cannot be possessed by analysis.[46] In fact, the more I participate in being, the less I am capable of knowing or of saying in what it is that I participate, or better, the less such a question has any meaning for me.[47]

Marcel also uses comparison and contrast in seeking to describe "being." "Being," for example, is not "having." When one "has" something, one relates to what one has as somehow not a part of oneself, something outside oneself, something which is completely contained in itself _qua_ other. Viewed in terms of internality and externality, "having" implies that what one has is both in some way external to oneself and, through the process of possessing it, in some way a part of oneself. "Being," on the other hand, cannot be possessed. It is not something one "has;" it is rather, _present_ to oneself. The two _processes_ also differ. In "having," the object one possesses eventually takes possession of oneself and denies one's freedom; "being," on the other hand, grows as it welcomes the presence of the other in freedom.

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[44] _E.A._, p. 218; _P.I._, p. 154.

[45] _P.A._, p. 52.

[46] _R.I._, pp. 91-92.

[47] Ibid., p. 80.

"Being" is not "existence" either.[48] Etymologically the experience of "existing" is one of emerging and arising, but to experience "being," one must withdraw into oneself, recollect oneself. While "existence" can in some way be grasped, one's "being" cannot; there will always be a gap between the person as s/he conceives her/himself , and his/her being. Both Roger Troisfontaines and Kenneth Gallagher attempt to clarify Marcel's distinction in this regard. Gallagher seems more on the mark in viewing participation in love as the type of experience for "being" and incarnation in one's body as the type of experience for "existence."[49] Accession to the realm of "being" is not by mere free acceptance of one's situation, but by recognition that the roots of this situation go down into the eternal.

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[48] In *J.M.*, p. 177, Marcel states that existence and being cannot be equated. In *E.A.*, p. 34, he calls existence a modality of being. In *M.E.*, pp. 2, 29-34, however, he rejects his previous stances and states that existence seems ultimately to be indistinguishable from authentic being. He then abandons the ontological level of the problem, leaving it unresolved, and moves to the experiential level. However, it is perhaps here that some connection can be made between being and existence. If the experience of existence rests in "blinded intuition," and if the infallibility of this intuition manifests the truth of Absolute Being, then the experience of being and the experience of existence must both be based in Absolute Being--they must find their unity here.

[49] Roger Troisfontaines, *De L'Existence A L'Être: La Philosophie de Gabriel Marcel*, Bibliotèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de Namur, fascicule 16, I tome (Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Vrin, 1968), p. 45. He clarifies Marcel's distinction between existence and being as follows: "Le fil conducteur c'est que l'*existence* désigne,

The last comparison we shall make is between "my being" and "my life." Although Marcel sees "my life" as mystery rather than as a problem and certainly not as a possession of mine, he refuses to consider "being" and "life" identical.[50] Marcel suggests that "my being" is located beyond "my life," that "my being" is the transcendent dimension of "my life." "My life" can, in fact, jeopardize "my being;" it can even become such that "my being" must be saved from it.[51] Then too, "my life" ceases in death because it is bound to the incarnate situation. "My being," on the other hand, continues through hope. This is the difference

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ici, une participation au réel, antérieure même à la conscience qu'on en prend . . . tandis que l'être ne convient qu'à la participation dans laquelle s'engage librement un sujet qui, par cet acte même, se constitue ou s'affirme comme personne." Thus the distinction as Troisfontaines sees it is that existence is an imposed situation while being is a freely accepted one.

Kenneth Gallagher, Gabriel Marcel, pp. 58-62, 166, claims that Troisfontaines puts a stress on Marcel's original text by implying that Marcel's thought moves from existence to objectification to being. He further states that since there is a point, according to Marcel, where existence is indistinguishable from authentic being, a point where the eternal shines through, then being requires not only freedom, but also consciousness of the eternal in which I participate. This distinction changes the direction of the response: it is not the free attachment to my situation which ushers me into being, but my free attachment to being which enables me to accept my situation.

[50] Marcel analyzes "my life" more thoroughly in M.E. 1, 163-185; P.A., pp. 63-71.

[51] E.A., pp. 103, 291-292.

between suicide and sacrifice: in sacrifice I offer up "my life" in hope, believing that I will not die.[52]

(d) Marcel uses "being" in one final sense: God. He calls Absolute Being "God." This naming of Absolute Being is admittedly a faith stance on Marcel's part. All people do not necessarily believe in God, but many who do not do admit of Absolute Being. The reality is the same although the relationship may be quite different. For Marcel, Absolute Being reveals itself as personal, as Absolute Thou, as God. This has a profound influence on his work.

Even before receiving the gift of faith Marcel was occupied with considerations about God. Indeed, God had a place in his philosophy; since each person has a deep exigence for being, each person can only be satisfied in Absolute Being. Yet in this world each person also realizes that s/he will never be able to reach that fullness, that Absolute Being will always remain transcendent--yet not completely removed, for each person's being is in some way related to Absolute Being. Using the image of "light" one can say that Absolute Being enlightens each person, shows him/her who s/he really is and how s/he can become more. As the person participates more in his/her own being, s/he also participates more in the light of Being. As Marcel's thought turned toward intersubjectivity, it discovered that Absolute Being was Absolute Thou: God was Absolute Thou.

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[52] Ibid., pp. 103, 126-128, 159-161. We are not speaking of physical death here, but of a more real, spiritual death.

In his works Marcel attempts to wed or at least weave together philosophical and theological considerations about God. His image of God is Platonic-Augustinian rather than Aristotelian, and his approach to God is through love rather than logical proof. Marcel sees faith as a gift, the graced invitation from God, which he himself felt quite personally. It was from the assurance of this graced situation that he sought further understanding: *fides quaerens intellectum*.

Even before his grace experience, however, Marcel realized the impossibility of experiencing God in any other way than intersubjectively. Through reflection he began to sense something of the revelation of Absolute Being, something that is open even to strangers of positive religion as long as they have ventured beyond the frontiers of the problematical realm: that Being is Absolute Thou and that as such S-he cannot be verified. Unlike the existential person who must be both "thou" and "s/he" because of one's body and the fact of finitude, God can only be "Thou."[53]

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[53] *J.M.*, pp. 136-137, 255; *P.A.*, p. 91.

Several corollaries flow from Marcel's view of God: (1) since God is Absolute Thou, since S-He is transcendent, it is impossible to characterize Him-Her without limiting Her-Him; (2) if existence is closely bound to space, time and limitation (a viewpoint Marcel held at least for some time), God cannot "exist"; (3) since all people by their very nature are called to be more, all are called to Absolute Being, to God, and here alone can they be who they really are.[54]

Marcel, we shall see, also placed great import on the fact of the person's essential freedom. Because of this he is very careful not to view the God-person relationship as one-sided. Fearing that the person might be thought of as an instrument of God with no freedom of his/her own, he refused to consider God in terms of causality. Marcel's doctrine of creation shows the same care, although he seems to find no difficulty in calling God "creator."

Summary

We have begun our presentation on Marcel by sketching the terrain that was "home" for him. The distinctions of primary and secondary reflection, of I-it and I-thou, of problem and mystery are extremely important, not only for understanding Marcel's work, but also for our own eucharistic considerations. His peculiar use of the notions "experience,"

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[54] E.A., pp. 247-248.

"existence," and "sensation" must also be understood. Finally, one must constantly be aware of the various ways that the term "being" is used throughout because of its diversity of meaning. With these distinctions in mind, we can proceed to the heart of our investigation.

"Presence" on the Level of Subject-Object

Every one of us has experienced "being present" to someone else. We have also experienced that strong bond that somehow unites us to another person and makes us feel "like we've known him/her all our lives." If we would ask ourselves why this happens, we would probably stab at an answer and then wonder if what we thought really made any sense at all.

Marcel states that "presence" is something which reveals itself immediately and unmistakably in a look, a smile, an intonation or a handshake.[55] It is a reality, a kind of influx, that depends on me to be open to it, but does not depend on me to create it. These statements seem so vague, yet the fact is, there is no rigorous definition of presence. Marcel explains:

> Presence can only be--not grasped, for that would be contradictory--but evoked through the aid of direct and unchallengeable experiences which do not rise from the conceptual apparatus which we make use of in order to

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[55] P.A., pp. 81-83.

> reach objects.[56]

Our human experience, no matter how untransmittable, offers us sensed feelings of presence which are immediately alive and rich despite their indefinability.

The question is, "which sensed feeling is the best starting point?" The options are many. We will begin with the experience of existence because this is the ground experience of human life for Marcel, and we will follow a developmental approach.

The Experience of Existence: Absolute Presence

I exist! I become aware of my own existence and that of the world around me in a way that precedes any distinction between subject and object or between thought and object. The experience is one of absolute presence: neither the presence of something or someone, but definitely positive nevertheless.[57] Let us examine this further.

The phrase "absolute presence" seems to have been wisely chosen. A number of its connotations clarify its meaning. The word "absolute," besides conveying the feeling of unspecification, also conveys a feeling of completeness and wholeness. The word aptly expresses the sense of

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[56] E.B.H.D., pp. 66-67.

[57] Absolute presence is an expression that grasps much of the immediacy of the experience of existence. The same term, moreover, can also be used when referring to the immediacy of the experience of being. Both find their ground in Absolute Being.

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"pre-conceptual communion" which the person experiences with the entire world around him/her.

The word "presence" immediates the experience. The sense of global awareness which existence suggests is immediately present, that is, here and now. Furthermore, the word "presence" also suggests a continuity, a lastingness, which corresponds to this immediacy: the experience of existence is continuous; it is not just a one-time event. Precisely because it is immediate and continuous the experience is unconceptualizable. In fact, we can only speak about this experience through a series of reductions rather than memories (which also require conceptualization).

The word "presence" also suggests that the experience is somehow "with" me, even if I as yet am unobjectified in the experience. "Being with in some way" is a quality of presence as is "being without" a quality of absence. The words "presence" and "absence" are "feeling words" in the sense that something positive or negative must be experienced for these words to be used. In this respect "presence" is the sensed unity with something. With regard to the experience of existence, "presence" is the sensed unity with the world (used in an all-inclusive sense). The I, with whom it is one, is not I-as-person, nor even I-as-subject, but I-who-am-somehow before any distinctions are made: I-in-the-world.

However, "presence" does imply some consciousness on my part, even if that consciousness is pre-reflected;

otherwise there is no possibility of anything "being with" me. This consciousness is unobjectifiable for Marcel. One could possibly call it a primary state of attention or awareness that necessarily belongs to human beings. It is grounded in sensation.

Conceptualization: Subject and Object Distinguished

The experience of existence is not, however, a static concept. It is rather an experience of dynamic participation, of dynamic unity. Presence is a "giving" and a "receiving," a "becoming one with." Presence, in this respect, parallels sensation which is a "welcoming" and a "uniting with." The ramifications of this will become more obvious in the succeeding pages.

But as soon as I distinguish myself from my feelings, as soon as I think of myself as someone who has these feelings, I move from the level of community to that of disunity, to that of analysis. Through the process of primary reflection I separate myself from the immediacy of the experience, from the presence which this immediacy involves. The separation leads to objectification: through reflection I become a "subject" with respect to everything else.

In this sense my body, one with me, can become an object for me.[58] When I begin to reflect on my body I disengage it from the immediacy of sensation and I begin to determine and objectify it. My body becomes my home (the place where I live), or it becomes something that I use. In this process I disengage my body from myself.

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[58] It is only in reflection that my body can be considered as object. Marcel spends pages analyzing the relationship of

My Body as Presence: Secondary Reflection

Although my body can be objectified in thought, in reality this is not the case. Any experience I have, upon secondary reflection, will deny this objectification. My body is not a place where I live, a sort of housing for me; my body is more than that. It is in a certain sense "my life." "My life" is determined by my body and in many ways is conditioned by the physical condition of my body. The two cannot be separated in reality.

It does not take long for me to realize that I really do not "possess" my body either. If I did possess it, I would have complete control over it. Sickness and natural death testify that this is not the case at all. Furthermore, if I did possess my body, I would be able to dispose of it at will or give it away like anything else. I certainly cannot give it away, nor can I dispose of it, for instance, through suicide, without at the same time disposing of myself. Thus to speak of being able to possess my body is not accurate.

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himself to his body. See the following: R.I., pp. 29-41; M.E. 1, 119-125; J.M., pp. 322-329; E.A., pp. 12-13, 119-120, 126-127, 224-229; P.I., pp. 184-185; "Some Reflections on Existentialism," *Philosophy Today* 8 (1964): 253.

Is it adequate to see my body as an object which I can use? Marcel admits that I have real priority to my body when it is a question of active use, but not when it is a question of knowledge.[59] I de facto use my body. Everything I feel implies my body: my body is the absolute mediator for me and in that sense my body is me. I cannot distinguish myself from it unless I am willing to reduce it to an object, but that would be to cease treating it as an absolute mediator. I can only use my body in this way because of a certain "felt community" I have with it which is indivisible. The difficulty arises from the fact that I think of my relation with my body as an analogy of my relation with other instruments that I might use, whereas in fact, the latter presupposes the former.[60]

Nor can my body be conceived of as a receiver of sense transmissions. My body is, rather, the embodiment of sensation; it is the absolute mediator for consciousness. Through my body I "sense" the community, the opaque unity of existence. My body is, therefore, the ground of my existence, the sine qua non of my consciousness, both pre-reflected and reflected. It is the point of convergence between what is me-as-subject and every object. My body, then, is the absolute mediator of body-subject and subject-object. Marcel described this mediation as "sympathetic mediation" or "submerged participation."[61]

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[59] E.A., p. 15.

[60] Ibid.

If, therefore, my body is not a place, a possession, an instrument or an object, then is my body I myself? Certainly I am more than my mere physical body, my flesh, bones, blood and organs. From that perspective I am not my body. On the other hand, the way that I exist in the world is as embodied. From that perspective, I am my body.[62]

But the word "am" in the above statement must be carefully understood. Negatively, "am" denies the gap which I would be postulating as soon as I asserted that my body was merely an instrument of mine. It also denies that anything but a unity really exists between the two terms: there are not two separate realities. Positively, it implies that speaking of my body is, in a certain sense, a way of speaking of myself. If "am" is further emphasized, then existence becomes central in the statement, not the two concepts.

Nevertheless, the statement "I am my body" still presents problems, since both I and body are terms of the statement. The statement is objective in that the terms have been objectified and disengaged. Because of this the danger of "language" versus "reality" makes itself apparent. Even in a statement of identity the body is in danger of being thought of as separate from the self. The move from that conceptualization to the "body-as-material-entity" is slight. For Marcel, both understandings are untrue and must be excluded from further consideration.[63]

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[61] M.E. 1, 117, 119-140.

[62] S.M., pp. 252-253, 323.

The danger of using any words at all to try to describe the relation of me and my body is great. However, Marcel does succeed in using some terms which, although not entirely adequate, help more than hinder: presence, incarnation and participation. All have one thing in common: they are relational.

We have already encountered "presence" in our discussion concerning "absolute presence." We have seen that "absolute presence" is the pre-reflected consciousness of the global world (including myself) as opaque unity. We know that this presence is revealed in sensation (sensory confusion). Through primary reflection I might separate myself from this confusion, thus, even from my body, but through secondary reflection I realize that my body, although sensed, is nevertheless really I manifest in the world that I sense. We can draw an analogy: as "absolute presence" is grounded in sensation prior to reflection, my "presence" is grounded in my body prior to primary and secondary reflection. My body is my-presence-in-the-world; through it and because of it I am present.

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[63] A more insightful statement might be "I am" rather than "I am my body." The former makes no determination on my body; it merely exclaims the experience of existing, an experience in which I am one; I am in, with, and through my body (understood).

Reciprocally, my body is also present to me-as-subject. When I act, my body acts; when I think, my body joins in the process. In the existential situation the two are mutually dependent. In this we see another characteristic of presence made manifest: mutuality and reciprocity. Both terms, the presentor and the presentee, are not only interchangeable, but of like value or importance. Both receive this importance only because of what they are together in the act of presence. In fact, the product of this presence, the body-subject, is of greater value and importance than either of the terms.

Because the subject-body is a presence *for itself* and *in* the world, it becomes the focus of all existents and existence in general.[64] Through sensation and reflection the subject-body recognizes other subjects or things as "other." It is, therefore, only through my body that anything has the possibility of being present to me, even as existent. This type of presence could be called "physical presence" in that it requires sensation and takes place on

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[64] "...moi ayant conscience de mon corps, c'est-à-dire le saisissant à la fois comme objet (corps) et comme non-objet (mon corps) voilà par rapport à quoi se définit toute existence." *J.M.*, p. 305.

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the level of subject-object.[65]

But presence is only one way of conceiving the self-body relation. The self is not only "present" to the body, it is also "incarnate" in it.[66] Incarnation gives a new emphasis to the subject-body relationship. In De refus à l'invocation Marcel states that to be incarnated is to appear to oneself as a body, as this particular body, without being identified with it nor distinguished from it.[67] The term "incarnation" emphasizes the body as center, as nucleus, as embodiment of self-presence. It establishes the body as the prototype of all feeling and having. It also constitutes the subject as existent, and the subject, in turn, informs the body.

As presence emphasizes the immediacy of the relation and incarnation the depth of the relation, so participation stresses the dynamism of the relation. One would not use

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[65] This must not be confused with the rather common understanding of "physical presence" as mere spatial proximity. On the contrary, what is necessary for any "presence" whatsoever is some sort of consciousness on the part of the subject or person. Admittedly, this type of presence is a derivation from Marcel's normative meaning of presence (on the level of being). In fact, he does not treat of this presence specifically, but the notion does seem to bridge "absolute presence" and the more normative presence, and it does seem to explain several of Marcel's examples below.

[66] For incarnation the subject must fundamentally be bound to a body. E.A., p. 11.

[67] R.I., p. 31. Identification and distinction are correlative operations which are only significant in the realm of objects.

"I-it" terms in referring to this participation; one would have to use "I-thou" terms.[68] In participation the subject and the body assume something of a dyadic relationship. The body participates in consciousness and vice versa, and the subject-body participates in the world, in what is not subject, and vice versa. The participation in both cases is on the level of feeling or sensation. In this participation the object is received (in the sense of welcomed) without forcing it to become part of the subject, i.e., allowing it to retain its status of otherness. This balance of respectful distance and presence is necessary if true dynamic participation is to continue. The real significance of this last statement will be seen on the level of being.

This, then, is how Marcel describes body-subject as presence, as incarnation, as participation. The words used merely suggest what is ontologically. They cannot define nor are they mutually exclusive. The notions of "presence," "incarnation," and "participation" are but our feeble attempts to explain, to grasp from different points of view, the unexplainable: the reality of our lives.

"Presence" on the Level of "Being"

In Marcel's treatment of the primary experience of existence he notes the interrelatedness of that experience as well as its immediacy. In the awareness of myself I exclaim the awareness of my body, but in the awareness of myself I exclaim the awareness of others, too. Sensation, which makes my body present to me and me-as-body present in the world, makes others also present to me. In fact, I do not constitute myself as interiority except in so far as I take cognizance of the reality of the other.[69] The two go hand in hand.

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[68] Although "I-thou" terms would be used in speaking in terms of participation, on the level of subject-object there is as yet no "I" or "thou" properly speaking. The terms are used figuratively on this level.

Living on the level of subject-object, the subject has a tendency to withdraw into itself and set up an altar to itself. The subject becomes encrusted in its own self interest and self love; it seeks self-consciousness and builds up circles of self-interest and self-concern which ultimately may end up in enslaving the subject and may, paradoxically, deprive it of the freedom and self-fulfillment it seeks. In this process of internalization the "other" loses its reality, its subjectivity, and becomes merely an object or an idea of an object for the subject.

However, from the moment that the subject recognizes another and reaches out to him/her, not as object, but as other subject, the quality of life is changed. The subject becomes I, a real person, and a new level of interrelationships is opened up. These interactions are creative actions, actions that constitute me-as-person and help me to grow in being. The interactions take place on the level of "I-thou," the level of being, and celebrate the mystery and power of presence.

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[69] P.I., p. 169.

The Emergence of I-as-Person

We begin with an example. A child with a handful of flowers that he has just gathered in the meadow, runs into the house and gives them to his mother. "Look," he cries, "I picked these for you!"[70] There is a triumph in his voice. He waves the flowers in an offering gesture. The child is pointing himself out for admiration and gratitude. "_I_ picked these for you. It was _I_ and no one else."

The dynamics of this example offer many considerations. The child opens himself to another person; in the etymological sense of the word he _produces_ himself, he puts himself forward. In this act he becomes present to himself, he becomes present in the flowers he has picked and which he gives, and he becomes present to his mother. His mother, in turn, in accepting the flowers whole-heartedly, accepts him and makes him feel accepted as person. Her response affirms and seals his personhood.

Let us consider the major points of this incident carefully. The _I_ of the child is constituted when the child perceives another, not as object, but as _this_ _particular_ _person_ _whom_ _I_ "_love_": thou. The child directs his attention primarily to his mother as thou, and this difference in direction signals the transition from subject to person on the child's part. Somehow thou is discovered by the child and invoked.[71] With the positive response on the part of the mother, the I of the child is constituted. The quality of the constitution depends on the child's further interactions. What is important is the transition from subject to person--the beginning of personhood and personality through intersubjectivity and intercommunion.

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[70] This example is found in _H.V._, pp. 15-17.

The I of the child is the particular person that this child is; it is the concrete indefinable presence of the child. If we try to analyze this I, we can break it down into notions like "body," "self" and "something else," something more than either of these which evades any conceptualization at all.[72] We will call this "being."

The act constitutes the person's "being;" in it the person as I becomes. Being, existence and personality form a communion which is the person's existential existence. The presence that ensues is the interaction of "this body," "this existence," "this self," and "this being." But these concepts can only exist independently in thought; in reality they are only in the immediate presence of the I-in-act, of the I-in-relation.[73]

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[71] Invocation is an extremely important notion for "presence."

[72] Through interpersonal engagement my "self" takes on new meaning, new depth, new dimension. It is not a mere collection of concerns and possessions that result from my being subject; it is the very awareness of who I am, not merely subject, but person, me. This is the sense in which we will use the term "self" in the remainder of the paper.

We have already been confronted with the impossibility of determining just what being is or why it is. What we can say is that being manifests itself in the interpersonal relationship: the being of a being for Marcel is the being's co-esse, his/her being with. The person only becomes him/herself when s/he breaks out of him/herself and reacts to others. The being of the child is manifest in his relation with his mother. Because of his giving to her, he realizes his own being. His further interpersonal acts will increase or decrease his being.

Being, then, is something which can be experienced only in "being with." The other, as person, is necessary for this to happen. In a sense it is the other who assures this person that s/he is more than a number of successive or inconsistent appearances.[74] It is the other who assures this person that others too are more than what s/he can sense or feel of them.

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[73] The I itself is indefinable since it is only given immediately. See Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, trans. by Manya Harari (Secaucus, N. J.: The Citadel Press, 1956), p. 105; H.V., pp. 16-17.

[74] H.P., p. 180.

The "more" that being is constitutes the value that being has. For Marcel value is not an abstraction; it is experienced as a relational concept that manifests itself in existence.[75] This experience is the result of the incarnation of value in existence. Upon reflection one can distinguish three experiences: one's being existentially as gift received, one's being personally manifest in existence, and one's deep exigence for being more.[76] The being that one is provides the ground of value; the being that one seeks provides the movement outside of oneself to other beings who are, in turn, also valuable. Value is based in being, both in its gift and in its exigence; it is what ultimately gives one respect and responsibility.

Presence, or being with another, true co-esse, is a value superior to oneself and to the other.[77] Presence to another heightens and celebrates value: the more present the other is, the more valuable s/he is. Existence provides the incarnational context for value, while value heightens the worth of existence. In the above example the child, attempting to realize his own value, reaches out to another whom he sees as valuable in herself and as source of value for him, and becomes more valuable in return.

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[75] P.I., pp. 157-158. For more on value see Martha E. Williams, "Gabriel Marcel's Notion of Value," Modern Schoolman 37 (November 1959): 29-38.

[76] Marcel speaks of value in terms of the meeting-point of an aspiration of mine and of a gift to me. P.I., p. 157.

[77] "Presence" is used here in the normative Marcellian way, i.e., presence on the level of being.

With this in mind let us return to the self-transcending act of the child from the point of view of the various presences involved. The child as person-becoming-actualized, motivated by a deep exigence for being, gives flowers that he has picked to his mother and waits for her response. By her response the child as person is constituted. In this act the child is incarnationally (physically) present or embodied and personally present to himself.[78] Note that this "self presence" is accomplished in the act of breaking out of the self, not in the act of reflecting upon the self; it is accomplished in the immediacy of the act, not in the reflections of thought.[79]

In the act of giving flowers, the child-flowers assumes a presence. The flowers become mediating and mediator: they are the child's gift. The flowers become a physical presence of the child in that he possesses them on the level of subject-object and holds them to himself. They are also his personal presence in that their value in this act is more than that of being flowers: the flowers in some way share in the child's being and therefore assume something of his value, both for himself and for his mother. They become his incarnate testimony of her worth as loving thou, and his incarnate appeal to her: an appeal which demands a pre-determined mode of response.[80]

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[78] This is the first time we have used the phrase "personal presence." Personal presence is a name we will use to distinguish it from mere physical presence. It is related to physical presence as being is related to existence. Personal presence refers to presence which is based in being as opposed to physical presence which is based in existence.

[79] Self presence is an internal bond rather than a logical unity. See *J.M.*, pp. 281-282. It is an interior undividedness rather than a unity of "I" and "myself" because its center is outside itself. See *P.I.*, p. 114.

Moreover, in this act of giving the child ultimately becomes present to his mother. The mediating power of the flowers centralizes the act and sacramentalizes or signs what is taking place. In giving her flowers the child opens his incarnate self to his mother and asks her, as incarnate self, to receive him (physical presence). In this same act he opens his being, his person, to her as person and asks her to receive him (personal presence). In the mother's acceptance, both presences, or rather, the one multi-dimensional presence is manifest.

The self-transcending act, then, is what makes presence possible and what makes being (as co-esse) possible. This act testifies that one is not centered in oneself, that one only becomes oneself when one reaches out of oneself to a thou.

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[80] Ph.E., p. 101.

A Further Example

Without much reflection we realize that presence on the level of being is not an all-or-nothing option. Presence is more-or-less: it permits various degrees of depth. We began our approach to presence tracing the growth of a person from the level of pure communion (pre-reflected existence), through the level of communication (subject-object existence) to the level of lived communion, the level of being. Now, on the level of being, we can examine how a person grows in being through successive presential experiences. An example might help.

I am seated in a train filled with people.[81] Next to me is a man whom I have never seen before. He is busy reading a book. As far as I am concerned I could just as well have been alone in the car. The physical nearness of the people around me means little. They are present to me only insofar as I experience their physical proximity as a group.

Suddenly I am called out of myself. The person next to me accidentally bumps my elbow. He nods to me and apologizes. We begin talking; we exchange names, occupations and other bits of information. In my attending to him he becomes present to me, not as person, but as the one who hit me.

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[81] The example used is presented by Marcel in outline form in R.I., pp. 49-54. His analysis follows.

His presence is but a physical presence on the level of subject-object.

The fact of his bumping me calls me more deeply into myself and I begin setting up all kinds of barriers for protection. As we begin talking I remain suspicious or, at best, ill at ease. My responses are cautious and factual; I am like an information machine. As I begin asking him questions I at the same time become aware of my own self: I seek to ask him the right kind of questions, those that will make him think well of me. From his responses I make judgments on his character, while I at the same time reflect on what direction my next question will assume.

In this exchange what I have really done is become exterior to myself to the very extent that the other is exterior to me. I have become self conscious, that is, I have taken up a position as "other" with regard to myself. I am not conscious of who I am, but of what I am, i.e., what others objectively think of me.[82] This stranger interposes himself between me and my own reality; he makes me in some sense a stranger to myself. I am not really myself while I am with him.[83] The relationship is triadic in nature: I am talking with myself about him (as third party). It is almost as if he were absent. In fact, in this situation he is absent; only the idea that I have of him is present and that only as a wall between me and myself.[84] The words that flow between us are all important at this point. I grasp them as object in the sense of the French verb prendre. I try to understand what he is saying to me so that I can figure out how to respond, but in doing so I do not actually understand him, nor he me.

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[82] Troisfontaines, De L'Existence A L'Être 2: 24-25. See also idem, "La Notion de Présence chez Gabriel Marcel," Existentialisme Chrétien, présentation d'Etienne Gilson (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1947), p. 242.

[83] M.E. 1: 221.

If, however, a bond is suddenly felt between the other and myself, for instance, if I find out that we have both had the same experience of something, then the other, without ceasing to be other, enters into the circle of my being, outside of which are third parties.[85] A participation is created: the exclamation, "You too!" takes on essential importance. The other becomes thou in the measure that I open myself to his reality. This means that I cease conceiving the other as other within myself. He ceases to intervene between me and myself. What has happened is that the other has fused into a living unity with me.[86] Troisfontaines clarifies this:

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[84] R.I., p. 48.

[85] Ibid., pp. 49-51; Troisfontaines, De L'Existence A L'Être 2: 25.

[86] R.I., p. 49.

> Et simultanément, il me découvre à moi-même, puisque l'efficacité de sa présence est telle que je suis du moins lui pour moi. Mes défenses intérieures tombent en même temps que les cloisons qui me séparent d'autrui.[87]

The path leading from dialectics to love has now been opened.

"From the moment we become presentially aware of one another, we can no longer be considered as two terms external to one another. We are on the verge of becoming interior to one another."[88] My defenses begin to disappear and I relax in his presence: I am "at home" with him. I expose myself to him in my exclamation of communion: "You too!" and become penetrable and penetrating. What is important now is not what you say, but you yourself, you who sustain your words by all that you are.[89] Thus the words themselves take on an incarnate quality in the relationship. I no longer grasp them, in the sense of prendre; I welcome you incarnate in them in the sense of accueillir. The result is we. The mediating experience that evoked the "you too!" is shared in and participated in by both of us. We are more than I and thou in it.

Marcel uses the word "influx" to describe something of the feeling of presence: "Le mot influx traduit, bien que d'une façon beaucoup trop spatiale, trop physique, l'espèce d'apport interieur, d'apport par le dedans qui se réalize dès le moment ou la presence est effective."[90] The thou and I become one, not physically but spiritually. This is tempered by another way of explicitating presence: by describing it as being near or with thou.[91] The two, taken together, give us a feel for the closeness and distance which is presence.

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[87] Troisfontaines, "La Notion de Présence," p. 242. Also J.M., pp. 145-146.

[88] Marcel, "Some Reflections in Existentialism," pp. 254-255.

[89] P.I., p. 188.

Whether the experience is one of "influx" or "being with," the experience of presence is basically the experience of *we*, not of I and thou.[92] Presence is the sign of being; the essence of being is *co-esse*. Thus it is the *we* that is primary in being, the *we* that actually signifies being. How, then, does one arrive at the terms of "I" and "thou?" Marcel suggests that one objectivizes a particular aspect of the experience of intimacy and from the core of *we*, subtracts the element that is *not I* and calls it *thou*.[93] The *we* is the reality; I and thou are only objectivized terms of this reality, terms which allow one to reflect more deeply about the reality.[94] The "I" and "thou" are realizable, then, only in the relation of we. Therefore when one refers to "I" or "thou" alone to note the dynamics of giving, receiving, etc., one is in danger of concretizing an abstraction. Keeping the we of existence primary allows the "I" and "thou" to retain their proper relationship in presence.

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[90] *P.A.*, p. 81.

[91] This will be treated more fully in the next section.

[92] *E.B.H.D.*, p. 68.

[93] *J.M.*, p. 294.

[94] Pedro Adams, "Marcel: Metaphysician or Moralist," *Philosophy Today* 10 (Fall 1966): 188.

Besides the feeling of presence, the feeling of absence maintains an important place for Marcel. Absence is not merely a state of non-presence, devoid of either positive or negative value. Absence forces the person to open him/herself, to reach out for and welcome presence. It makes him/her appreciate presence for what it really is. It also heightens future presence experiences. Furthermore, the threat of absence forces one to not be satisfied with mere sensual presence, but to look more deeply and to appreciate more deeply the real heart of presence which transcends the here and now. Mature appreciation and insight are the results.

For all the verbiage expended on the experience of presence, for all the poetry and drama written to portray it and proclaim it, nothing can fully express the deep mystery that presence is. All the categories of "within" and "without," of "before," "with," "into," etc., must be transcended because they do not really offer us precise meanings.[95]

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[95] P.A., p. 81.

The why's of presence: why now and not before; why so powerfully or so weakly--these questions remain unanswered. However, in the next three sections we will consider "concrete approaches" to lasting presence. We will examine presence in love, fidelity and hope. By reflecting on what makes presence continue in these situations we may also be able to understand why presence diminishes in others.

Love as a Concrete Approach to Lasting Presence

We have all experienced presence as a spark or firework: at first here, warm and hopeful, bright and promising. Then, all of a sudden, it is no more. Presences are limited both by occasion and affectivity. The once-only occasion does not permit depth of being or continuation in absence. But if the circumstances of that first experience are such that personal contact can be continued, or if the depth of the first encounter is such that thou remains for me even in absence, then we enter into the mystery of love. Love by its nature demands enduring presence.

The notion of love for Marcel is personal rather than merely psychological. It is based in sensation although it rises above this level to the level of being. It is at once perception, emotion, knowledge and affectivity. Love varies in degree of intensity and participation and includes friendship, conjugal love and love of God. What distinguishes the variations in degree or depth is the quality of the with and the authenticity of the I and thou.

At the basis of love the sensed union of I and thou manifests itself. The degree of sensed union influences the degree of love because the sensed union embodies the essentially spiritual act which love is. In this union the categories of _myself_ and _other_ are transcended and intimacy is experienced. Thus _with_, besides possessing sensible and spiritual meaning, at once also possesses an immediacy with regard to love. Judgment of this cannot be made from within or without. Since _with_ in this context is intersubjective, it is therefore neither subjectively nor objectively verifiable.[96]

With also presupposes a _someone else_ who is _with me_. In love the experience is both of a presence and an absence. In the experience of presence I experience the _we_ as presence, the _thou_ in some way as absence. The _we_ is the sensed unity; the _thou_ is the _not me_ of the experience. Thus _with_, while denoting the sensed unity of two parties, still demands _two_ subjects, distinct and in some sense absent from the presence, to complete its meaning: someone _with_ someone else--I _with_ thou.

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[96] _Ph.E._, p. 151, also _Searchings_ (Westminster, Mass.: Newman Press, 1967), p. 95: ". . . every verification presupposes a triadic relationship, or, for that matter, the possibility that a 'You' can become a 'He.' But as long as love is free from all possessive desire, it appears to be on the level of the dyad, that is, on the level where a 'You' can _never_ be converted into a 'He.'"

The quality of "withness" is dependent upon the quality and authenticity of I and thou. In love the "I" has already presented itself, or opened itself in what Marcel calls the act of invocation. This act is grounded in the deep exigence for being that is within me. I open myself to thou by centering myself in thou rather than in myself. The more primary thou is for me, the more valuable and precious thou becomes, the stronger the invocation to thou becomes (in direction and purity), and the stronger the resulting love becomes; the less thou is primary (the more I enter into consideration), the less possible real invocation is and the less deep is love.[97] Invocation is invitation and welcoming, not possession and desire.

The experience of we presupposes not only the invocation of "I" but also the graced response of "thou." This precipitates presence, the beginning of love. But love demands endurance; it is a melody with eternal undertones which seeks the everlasting. Because it is efficacious it attempts to create what it seeks.[98]

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[97] J.M., pp. 277-278. The intervention of the "self" decomposes being-considered-in-its-plenitude. H.P., p. 49.

[98] Marcel points this out in speaking of his characters in his plays: "Moreover, in my own experience I have found that fictional characters can take shape only within a specific situation where they have to confront one another and which I would compare to the harmonic setting in music, within which a melodic theme is developed; for the melody never presents itself out of the blue ready for any harmonic setting. It is, rather, born into a particular setting--as characters into a particular situation." E.B.H.D., pp. 61-62.

In an act of creation an artist places him/herself at the disposal of "something" which, no doubt, in one sense depends upon him/her for its existence, but which at the same time appears to him/her to be beyond what s/he is and what s/he judged him/herself capable of drawing directly and immediately from him/herself.[99] It is the creative dialogue of this presence that produces the graced result. The same is true in love: as each creation of the artist reveals something more of who s/he is, so each successive creation of "we" reveals to an "I" and "thou" more and more who each of us is. "I" and "thou" create again in intercommunion; again we grow.

But there is an important element necessary for true creation and true love: freedom. Freedom, for Marcel, is the power or ability to respond without force or duress; it is a power or ability that is recognized only in intersubjective activity.[100] Freedom gives one the ability to open oneself to the invocation of another and to respond in a fully personal way to another. Freedom, therefore, is a prerequisite for presence and consequently also for love, fidelity and hope.

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[99] H.V., p. 31; P.I., pp. 133-134.

[100] In French, liberté. For a detailed study on freedom in Marcel, see Sister Mary Aloysius Schaldenbrand, Phenomenologies of Freedom: an Essay on the Philosophies of Jean Paul Sartre and Gabriel Marcel, dissertation abstract, Philosophical Studies (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1960), no. 191, abstract no. 41.

Marcel specifically relates "freedom" to "nature" when considering the essence of the truly human person. It is of the essence of the person as "nature" that s/he be ontologically exigent, in real need of being; it is of the essence of the person as "freedom" that s/he have the power to conform or not to his/her "nature," i.e., to be self-centered and self-possessed and thus not acknowledge the true nature of being (to be with) or to be other-centered, self-giving and welcoming. Thus, by "nature" one is called to be with: by "freedom" one has the power to be or not to be what one is called to be.

In the action of love, I reach out in freedom and open myself to thou. Thou, also in freedom (this is what constitutes thou as truly other) responds to me. I apprehend thou as "freedom" but in the resulting experience of "we," thou as "freedom" appears to me identical with what I am myself as "nature." Through this act I recognize myself as "nature" and "freedom." The act not only reveals me, but in a sense creates me. It not only reveals and creates me; it also reveals and creates us.

The same is not true in the act of "having" or "possessing." In "possessing" the "I" grasps "for myself." The act is not a transcending act, but a consuming act. It incorporates objects, not being. The act does not constitute my "nature" nor does it reveal "freedom" to me. As a result being is not realized.

Fidelity as a Concrete Approach to Lasting Presence

It is within the context of love that fidelity is found. For Marcel fidelity is that aspect of love that gives love its permanence, its eternal endurance, even after physical presence has ceased. Fidelity conquers time by transcending the instant while remaining involved in the temporal flow.

In true Marcellian fashion we can describe fidelity first by what it is not. Fidelity is not inert conformism or the sclerosis of habit; nor is it active conservation or constancy. The direction of each of these conserving actions is toward the self, not toward the other.[101] Fidelity is not faithfulness to a principle as principle; it is not faithfulness to an idea in the sense of keeping it like a photograph on a mantelpiece. That type of fidelity is not fidelity at all. It is idolatry, a mere "hanging on" to a lifeless object for one's own self security or fulfillment.[102]

True fidelity for Marcel is faithfulness to a *presence*, a presence which is by definition mystery, a presence which, although it has the ability to endure, can nevertheless be just as well ignored, forgotten and obliterated.[103]

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[101] *R.I.*, p. 201.

[102] *P.A.*, p. 77.

[103] Ibid., pp. 18-80; *R.I.*, pp. 198-216 for a more thorough analysis of the problem.

Fidelity is the active perpetuation of this presence, the renewal of its benefits--of its virtue which consists in a mysterious incitement to create.[104] It reveals itself creatively as it multiplies and deepens the retainment of the initial engagement.

Fidelity arises in the act of love, in the act of becoming who I am--a "we." It roots itself in the experience of presence incarnate in I-thou and it attests to this presence by participating in it. In fidelity I believe in thou and I place myself at the disposal of thou. This self-transcending act affects who I am. It is my belief in thou that creates me at the same time that it creates us. It does this again and again the more deeply I believe.

Fidelity is a free response, a free believing in thou; it is not mere obedience. "Believing," in turn, is not an opinion, not a mere impression, not even a conviction; it is not based in the objectively verifiable. Belief is an affirmation of who the other is, arising in the immediacy and spontaneity of the situation. It is at the same time an affirmation of who I am, also immediate and spontaneous.

In belief thou calls me to respond and presents him/herself as valuable to me, as precious to me, as needed by me to complete myself. It is I who value thou and seek to believe in him/her. Yet what I value does not seem to me to be purely subjective; it seems rather to possess something of an inner secret which I have somehow been called to share. In belief I am allowed to see the inner worth, the true reality of thou and I seek to become one with him/her. My response is spontaneous and pre-reflected, almost as if the truth were demanding to be acknowledged.[105] It is also respectful so as not to annihilate the very truth that seeks acknowledgment.

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[104] Troisfontaines, De L'Existence A L'Être 2: 33; "Presence," p. 226.

Because truth manifests itself in value, fidelity is not merely a personal disposition. On the other hand, we are not concerned here with "scientific truths" about beings either. Our concern is with the ontological truth of being itself. Marcel is suggesting that this truth is first encountered in presence, in believing. It is fidelity to this truth that creates and reveals.

Because valuing and believing are subject-centered, because they depend in the first place upon sensible existence, they are challenged at every turn by the very means that created them. One's feelings, one's incarnate situation, does not permit absolute love, absolute selflessness. Having and self-centeredness will always be part of life. Thus fidelity will always be beset with risks that arise from the dialectic of the self-centered--selfless: one may be deceived in the object of one's faith, the other, who may abuse one's confidence; one may deceive oneself with an idea or ideal that one may have of the other; one may not have the same feeling for the other in the future that one has for the other at the present time; the other may die and one may see him/her no more.

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[105] Value depends on the knowing subject for its worth. Truth, on the other hand, approaches me as a demand, as from without, obliging me to live within truth if I am to retain my internal worth. Clyde Oax, An Existential Approach to God: a Study of Gabriel Marcel (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 48. Thus the role of fidelity consists not in creating the indefectible principle (truth), but in dissipating the clouds which tend to overcast a presence. P.I., p. 153.

It is at this point that fidelity transcends the instant. The faithful person, when confronted with changing moods, changing feelings, changing circumstances toward another, realizes these to be just that: passing instants. Because of one's belief in thou as valuable, permanent and true, one seeks to establish that permanency in fact, not by renouncing these instants as unreal, but by transcending them. This transcending act bridges the gap between one's thinking self and one's empirical self. Because of this act one recognizes these moments as one's own, not disjointed or unrelated, but as participating in one's life, in oneself, in the vocation to which one is called: to become more, to be. One begins to see these moments as trials which can purify, strengthen, and deepen who one is. The act of fidelity creates the permanency in one's life, that is, it creates oneself as person at the same time that it creates us. "We" are; "being" is. What is more, the beloved is thou for me forever. Even the threat of death holds no power; "You are and always will be!"

The faithful person can live life deeply because s/he has entered into the eternity of being. His/her life is not swayed this way or that. The superficial, the temporary, concedes to the deep, the enduring. It is only the faithful person who can promise and not be disturbed by the contradictions his/her feelings present. It is only the faithful person who can covenant marriage without fear or frustration of the difficulties, the trials, the risks that lie ahead. It is only the faithful person who can perpetuate presence.

The perpetuation of presence is the internal dimension of fidelity, but fidelity also has an external dimension: fidelity is the witness to self and to others of the presence of thou. The posture of fidelity cannot be hidden any more than the posture of selfishness. The faithful person will touch something in every being with whom s/he comes into contact. Openness to being, in presence, will call other beings to the truth of their beings. Thus the inattentive person might be "awakened" just by meeting someone who radiates genuine faith.[106]

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[106] E.A., p. 311.

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Hope as a Concrete Approach to Lasting Presence

For Marcel the presence of faith gives hope its intelligible form at the same time that hope gives faith its motivating power. He states:

> ...l'espérance est essentiellement, pourrait-on dire, la disponibilité d'une âme assez intimement engagée dans une expérience de communion pour accomplir l'acte transcendent à l'opposition du vouloir et du connaître par lequel elle affirme la pérennité vivante dont cette expérience offre à la fois le gage et les prémices.[107]

Hope presupposes presence; it presupposes the experience of communion. But hope also implies a situation which to all appearances is not secure--one that can possibly change: it is situated in the framework of trial where the temptation to despair exists.[108] In fact, hope must have despair as a free option. In this context hope surmounts the trials and threats; it refuses to see them as necessary and final.[109] But hope does not merely wish these things away; it boldly asserts that they are not congruent with the deep experience of communion which presence is. Marcel sees hope as rooted in being as the prolongation into the unknown of an activity which is central.[110]

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[107] H.J., pp. 90-91.

[108] Ibid., pp. 48-49.

[109] E.A., pp. 115-116.

[110] P.A., p. 75.

The transcendent act of hope is one of relaxation and humility combined. The hopeful person relaxes, opens him/herself to the presence of thou and allows him/herself to be permeated by thou. *Disponibilité* is the French word used to describe this posture of the self.[111] Once assured of being, through the experience of thou, the hopeful person then surmounts the attacks that seek to destroy this prophetic assurance. S/he says: "Whatever changes may intervene in what I see before me, you and I will persist as one: the event that has occurred, and which belongs to the order of accident, cannot nullify the promise of eternity which is enclosed in our love, in our mutual pledge."[112] The response is a renewal of the affirmation *because of* the threat. The person offers no arguments for his/her action, and the experience of assurance can no more be verified than any other experience which bears on presence.

Hope is the motivating force for the perpetuation of presence. It arises from the deep call, the deep assurance within the person-in-presence that s/he is more than s/he understands, more than s/he knows. Hope's power is not found in summoning together the troops and doing conceptual battle; its power rests in relaxing in the presence of being and letting its secrets permeate life with its prophetic assurance. It is this assurance, this presence, which then does battle when it is called forth by threats; it is this assurance which comes out victorious, yet no more understandable in hope.

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[111] Marcel describes *disponibilité*: "Il suit de là qu'il est en réalite essentiel à la vie, non seulement--ce qui est évident--de se réferer à autre chose qu'elle, mais de s'articuler intérieurement à une réalité qui lui donne son sens et comme ca justification." *M.E.* 1: 178. It is a disposition and availability on the part of the person, but more than that, a real welcoming of that which transcends me, a real sympathy with it. The concept has no exact English counterpart.

[112] Ibid., 2: 155.

"Presence" of the Transcendent--God

In the last section we treated the manifestation and growth of presence in love, fidelity and hope. In this section a new harmony is introduced into the symphony of presence: the rich deep strains of the transcendent.

Presence of the Transcendent

For Marcel the transcendent does not refer to that which is so separate that one cannot experience it. Without any experience of it the transcendent would not exist, even as a concept.[113] The transcendent is rather that which one somehow experiences as apart from oneself. It is so ungraspable, unconceptualizable, unverifiable, but nevertheless real. The transcendent can be experienced as the discovery of the beyond, which, although it has some relation to oneself, still remains beyond oneself, in some way out of grasp, leaving one at once unsatisfied and uneasy.[114]

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[113] Ibid., 1: 55.

On the other hand, the transcendent is not necessarily opposed to the deep experience of the immanent, of the within. The "within" is the core, the ground, of the individual being, the experience of uneasiness, of inquietude, that calls for more being. This realization discovers one to oneself and thou to oneself, and it also discovers something deeper, something beyond I-thou, something in which both participate, something by which both have been enlightened: the presence of Being itself. In the Light and Truth of Being both discover their true value and identity. Deep within co-esse but beyond one's grasp is the presence of Absolute Being which grounds all being, enlightens all being, inspires all being in Truth and urges all being to respond in love. This is Marcel's ontological foundation for all being. Here the distinction between beyond and within fades away.

It is actually hope that leads most unambiguously to the threshold of Being. In fact hope is inconceivable except as an immediate, if implicit, appeal to the transcendent. In

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[114] Marcel states: "I am convinced that . . . we exist in such a way that the beyond has to remain beyond. . . . Only on this condition can the beyond become present, but as a mystery that we can only begin to fathom without the aid of theology." Idem, Searchings, p. 70.

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the experience of love one is confronted by despair and death. One is thereby challenged to penetrate more deeply into I-thou, and there in the light of Being one finds both the pledge and seed of immortality. One opens to Being and discovers a spiritual reality in which the infinite is revealed. Hope is created in this invocation, in this discovery of the permanency of being which is forced by the threat of despair and finally death. In opening itself to this permanency hope actually, even though implicitly, opens itself to the transcendent: to being itself and ultimately to Absolute Being. Hope is thus a response to thou-revealing-itself-as-permanent in the light of Being.

In fidelity the transcendent manifests itself in the experience of inspiration and revelation. The hope that one has for thou is formed by faith. In the act of fidelity we are created. My response creates us, reveals thou to me and me to myself. At the same time I discover in this new creation something more than I-thou--something beyond us, something in which we realize we partake. The realization does not arise from knowledge or reflection, but from an inspiration, an illumination.

In love the transcendent manifests itself in the experience of community. Marcel explains:

> ...il n'y a pas d'amour humain digne de ce nom qui ne constitue aux yeux de celui qui le pense à la fois un gage et une semence d'immortalité; mais d'autre part il n'est sans doute pas possible de menser cet amour sans découvrir qu'il ne peut pas constituer un système clos, qu'il se dépasse en tous sens, qu'il exige au

> fond, pour être pleinement lui-même, une communion universelle hors de laquelle il ne peut se satisfaire.[115]

Love is not just love of me for you, but our love in the context of something greater, something in which our love participates and to which it testifies: Being itself. Being is not abstracted from this intersubjective relationship; it is "appresented" by thou, so that while remaining integrally other, thou allows the illumination of the essence of truth and unity to appear.[116] This unity, then, is not a mere piling up or accumulation of loves; it is a real concrete organic unity at the ontological depth of being itself and grounding all love. We find ourselves now at the level of the supra-personal.[117] We find ourselves enlightened as to who we really are as we witness to this light.

In every experience of presence Absolute Being is present, not as object, but as Light; Light that allows and makes possible the experience itself. In every presence Absolute Being is present as Love, Love which grounds all loves and constantly calls them to overflow their boundaries in all directions. In every experience Absolute Being is present as Truth, Truth which gives assurance and believability to the experience.

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[115] H.J., p. 212.

[116] Rudolph J. Gerber cites Marcel in defining appresentation: "To appresent is to allow the thing to surge up before us in the guise of this or that object, but in such a fashion that the judgment lets itself be led by the thing and expresses it just as it has happened itself. It is a necessary condition of all appresentation that the appresenting being should be placed in the middle of a light that will allow something to appear of that being, to be made manifest to it." "Marcel and the Being of the 'Other'," Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 4 (1966): 192.

[117] Gabriel Marcel, Le déclin de la sagesse (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1954), pp. 55-56.

But as Marcel's dramas and his later lectures warn, Absolute Being is not always recognized and is in even greater danger now of not being recognized. At stake is the very awareness of one's true dignity and self worth; at stake is the very ability to search deeply into the roots of existence; at stake is the ability to act wisely and in truth.

Presence of God

On March 5, 1929, Marcel noted in his diary:

> Je ne doute plus. Miraculeux bonheur, ce matin. J'ai fait pour la première fois clairement l'experience de _la grâce_. Ces mots sont effrayants, mais c'est cela.
>
> J'ai eté enfin cerné par le christianisme; et je suis submersé. Bienheureuse submersion! Mais je ne veux pas écrire davantage.
>
> Et pourtant, j'en ai comme le besoin. Impression de balbutiement...c'est bien une naissance. Tout est autrement.
>
> Je vois clair aussi, maintenant, dans mes improvisations. Une autre métaphore inverse de l'autre--celle d'un monde qui était là entièrement présent et qui affleure enfin.[118]

In this experience of grace God became undeniably, infallibly present to Marcel. There could be no doubt. The experience enriched him and opened a whole new world to him. He recognized this experience as a sudden unveiling of God's presence, not merely as Light or Truth, but as loving Thou. Just how this grace experience differs from philosophical belief or from the experiences of ontological depth is never explained. From what Marcel wrote, all that we can conclude is that the grace experience left him more sure, more enlightened, not in a merely intellectual sense, but in a very profoundly personal sense. The "new order of being" that was opened to him confirmed what he believed philosophically and placed him in the realm of theological revelation. The grace experience was a rich experience of the loving assurance of God's presence, of the presence of the transcendent, more directly and profoundly than ever before.

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[118] _E.A._, p. 17.

Grace, then, is an expression of God's freedom, of absolute freedom, whereby God freely touches the person. It is a silent invitation to communion that pressures without constraining.[119] In this invitation the person is enlightened so that s/he sees her/himself as s/he is, fundamentally unworthy of this Love.[120] This uneasiness serves as a ferment or a leaven without which one could not be converted. One could perhaps describe this experience as an invocation from God himself.

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[119] Ibid., p. 310.

[120] H.P., p. 103.

The person of faith is called to witness, to testify to this revelation by being something of a light to others.[121] S/he does this most effectively not by words, but through a life of effective presence. Every approach to justice, for example, or to charity in the person of his/her neighbor is at the same time an approach to God himself; and this entails an entirely concrete but quite mysterious relation between the living God and this creature who is his/her neighbor.[122] Failure to witness, to love his/her neighbor, is failure to believe, to love God. The two go hand in hand.

Recollection, Solitude and Wonder

Prayer is nothing else than one's act of faith and love. It is one's humble, fervent way of opening oneself and of uniting oneself with God as *Thou*, not *him*.[123] But prayer is not one-sided; it is a dialogue. In prayer one opens oneself and receives a further influx of Thou. Again and again one is re-created as one becomes more deeply enlightened, more deeply aware. With or without words one's invocations are heard. In recollection and contemplation one sees and believes. In all forms of worship, then, God is given, not as idea, but as Absolute Presence.[124]

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[121] To radiate this light means to radiate it for the benefit of others remembering that we are not to put any obstacle in the way so as to blur *its* light through us. *H.H.*, p. 199.

[122] *M.E.* 1: 133.

[123] *J.M.*, p. 159.

[124] *E.A.*, p. 248. The "Absolute Presence" mentioned

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Marcel describes recollection thus:

> ...le receuillement...est tres malaisement définissable--ne serait-ce que parce qu'il transcende le dualisme de l'état et de l'acte ou plus exactement parce qu'il concilie en soi ces deux aspects antimoniques. C'est essentiellement l'acte par lequel je me ressaisis comme unité: le mot même l'indique, mais ce ressaisissement, cette reprise affecte l'aspect d'une détente, d'un abandon. *Abandon* *a*--*détente* *en* *presence* *de*--sans qu'il me soit en aucune façon possible de faire suivre ces prepositions d'un substantif qu'elles commanderaient.[125]

Recollection is the act whereby one recollects oneself. In this act one withdraws from one's life in a certain way, not as the pure subject of cognition, but as the complete person: the person which one is and which perhaps one's life is not, the person that reaches to the ontological roots of being. The unity of the person arises from this withdrawal. In this act one does not look at *something*; one merely inwardly holds, one ingathers oneself.

In this withdrawal into oneself one does not envision oneself as the intelligible unity of subject and object. One transcends all distinctions: subject-object, within-without, one's being-one's life, and thus one attains a distance by which a judgment can be made on one's living self in the name of one's real self.[126] In this distancing one

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here is really more of an ontological presence: on the level of *being*-in-existence as opposed to "absolute presence" referring to the experience of existence itself.

[125] *P.A.*, p. 63. See also pp. 61-65.

[126] Patricia Sanborn, "Gabriel Marcel's Conception of the Realized Self: A Critical Exploration," *Journal of Existentialism* 8 (1967-68): 140-141. Note that what is described above is actually a process of second reflection.

at the same time becomes aware of one's original source beyond all utterance and all conceptualization.[127] In reestablishing contact with one's ontological base, in immersing oneself in it, one returns to oneself in self presence and realizes oneself as grounded in being. One comes face to face with illumination; one becomes present to oneself and to the source of one's being in the presence of God.

Recollection is not a state of abstraction; it is a state of real being.[128] It is a state necessary for every human person. In Marcel's words: "recollection bestows upon us certain resources for the exploration within ourselves that we have to make in the direction of what I have called plenitude, or the full life.[129] Through it the deep mystery of presence becomes most manifest. Because of the recognition which it affords, we can consecrate and dedicate

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Second reflection is recollection then, in the measure in which recollection can be self-conscious. P.A., p. 66. The context in which the above discussion is presented seems to more clearly show the relation between the two. Here second reflection seems to flow from recollection. On the other hand, Donald McCarthy notes that second reflection brings about a condition of ingatheredness so that the empirical ego, by entering into the depths of itself, actually gets out of itself through a creative or transcending act. See his work, "Marcel's Absolute Thou," Philosophy Today 10 (Fall 1966): 177.

[127] E.B.H.D., p. 86.

[128] M.E., pp. 141-162.

[129] E.B.H.D., p. 88.

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our lives to real freedom and real creativity.[130]

Marcel sees recollection as necessary for maturing intersubjective relationships. Although recollection can only be done in solitude, in absence from the other, recollection and the solitude it affords have a doubly positive effect on the relationship of I-thou: it allows the development of one's own personal interior space (a true growth of self) and at the same time respects the individuality of thou and his/her personal needs, allowing for his/her personal growth.[131]

Closely related to recollection is Marcel's notion of wonder and contemplation. He describes contemplation as the ingathering of oneself in the presence of whatever is being contemplated and this in such a fashion that the reality, which itself confronts the ingatherer, becomes a factor in the ingathering.[132] An example Marcel uses is the contemplation of a landscape. In this contemplation a certain togetherness grows up between the landscape and the contemplator. The presence of the things takes root in him/her and the reality assumes a meaning which cannot reductively be assimilated to any sort of process or explanation. This wonder, for that is what it is, can deepen into certainty, and the presence of the thing can reveal its own meaning.[133] In the profound stillness of contemplation the full honesty of the human spirit comes into being. Being appears in the light of Being as an exile for whom there can be no settled abode in this life.

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[130] P.A., p. 87.

[131] E.B.H.D., p. 158.

[132] M.E., 1: 142.

Other Presences

Although Marcel's central notions of presence have been described above, several other types of presence remain to be treated: group presence, the presence of things and the presence of the dead. These too will be of service in the considerations on eucharistic theology that follow.

Group Presence

Marcel devotes some time considering the reality of the family and the presence of the family.[134] He describes the presence of the family as the presence of a group, not an individual, sort of the atmosphere a human being almost unconsciously inhales, "an essence which imperceptibly impregnates and saturates" each member's thinking, appreciation and love.[135] The abiding presence of one's family limits one's possibilities while under family influence. On the other hand, it can also add a great deal of depth and richness, of understanding and direction, to the part that each one plays in everyday family performances. The nature of this presence is never directly discussed by Marcel in his philosophical works in any detail, although the fact of this presence finds expression in his drama, much of which is centered in a family context.

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[133] Idem, "Introduction," Philosophy Today 4 (Winter 1960): 261.

[134] H.V., pp. 95-132; M.E. 1: 213-235.

[135] H.V., p. 108.

Marcel notes that other groups of people can also develop group presences. These groups must be fairly restricted in size and animated by a spirit of love. Each group takes on a corporate presence and can interrelate with other corporate presences in much the same was as individuals. It is the duty of each group to remain in a state of active expectation and availability in relation to other groups moved by different inspirations, with whom it ought to have fertilizing exchanges of views.[136]

It is only in this context that Marcel views church. For him church is a community of witnesses who share a common response in faith to the presence of God.[137] This group of believers provides the reason and atmosphere for corporate worship which celebrates communal life in God, and re-creates this life. Within itself corporate presence renews its members and supports them with its faith, hope and love. To others outside it gives a corporate witness and testimony to the

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[136] H.H., p. 203.

[137] J.M., p. 231.

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living presence of God.[138]

The Presence of Things

Early in our analysis we noted that things, considered as objects, were "scarcely" beings at all. They have no interiority in themselves and thus can scarcely be considered on an equal level with human beings, to whom the word more properly applies. However, in relation to persons, objects take on greater import. In the example of the child giving flowers to his mother, the flowers become a mediating force in the presence. They assume the interiority of the child and thus become sacrament of him. In contemplation, things contemplated become mediating forces in the process of ingathering.

Although Marcel mentions these different presences, he never really analyzes them in any depth to see just how things elicit presence. However, he has given us the concepts and dynamics with which to begin such an analysis. Marcel's notion of "possession" offers a good starting point. Although a thing as such has no interiority, a thing as mine does. When I possess something I make it a part of me, an extension of me. I do this because of some value that the thing has for me. As mine it almost becomes an extension of my body and assumes something of my own personal value to itself. I inspire it or intend it, thus giving it my interiority.

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[138] Marcel did not seem to be concerned about the "church" as a special issue.

Marcel's notion of "gift" is another notion that involves things-in-presence. In giving a gift I give something that is mine to thou as a sign and sacrament of my own self-giving. I give something that is valuable to me or valuable to thou or to us. My gift is an invocation to communion, a way of saying without words what I believe about you--perhaps a way of saying even better than words. The gift mediates my presence and our love. It, in a sense, incarnates who I am for you and who I believe you to be for me. It invites you to presence and serves as the meeting point of that encounter.

The act of creation also elicits presence. Objects, at least in deeper forms of creativity, bear not only emotive value and reality, but ontological value as well. They are the incarnation of the artist in dialogue, expressing and revealing him/herself in a way that is creative even to him/her. As products of the creative act they in turn reveal and create. Their life, their interiority is received from the artist and from that "unconceptual something else" with whom the artist is in dialogue. As "thou's" in contemplation, these created objects reveal their ultimate source, the ultimate ground of their existence in the unity of being and in the light of presence.

The wonders of creation call forth this same type of presence. These too in a proper sense are creations. Their emotive and ontological values are gifts from their creator. These too have the power of causing wonder, of inviting contemplation, because their interiority is also derived from their source. The person, enlightened by their true meaning, celebrates their sacramentality--the presence of God which they mediate and in some way incarnate.

Places that are dear to one, that are "one's own" in a sense, take on an emotive value which has the power of making one again present to the past and to all the presences of the past connected with it.[139] Places that are dear to thou whom one loves, that are part of his/her world, likewise contain the emotive power of thou, of his/her interiority, and thus can call one to presence. Cities through their past histories bear the signs of human interaction and struggle and can also call one to presence with their collective spirit.[140] Finally, anything touched and used by a person in the deep personal struggles and encounters of his/her life retains something of the interiority of the person and can call one to presence, ultimately with him/her, if one is open to it.[141]

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[139] H.V., p. 111.

[140] D.S., p. 55.

[141] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Presence of the Dead

When Marcel was young he had a great fear of death.[142] This could have been due in part to the death of his mother when he was quite young. Again and again he mentioned how deeply her death affected him, and yet, despite her absence, she somehow remained mysteriously present to him throughout his life.[143]

The infallibility of his mother's continued presence sensitized Marcel to other people's similar experiences, and laid the foundation for his future investigations. So many of his plays are concerned with the dead as yet somehow present and alive.[144] Marcel's very definitions of love, creative fidelity and hope, as we have seen, all include some relation to permanency and immortality.

Indeed, love, for Marcel, means that thou will not die. Love denies the absence of the beloved in death, a denial that arises from the very depths of one's being.[145] In the context of love the death of thou becomes only a trial. What we basically experience in the death of a loved one is a silence about that loved one. We do not know what death is veiling, what it is protecting, nor for what it is preparing. Marcel believes that the fallacy, the treason of death consists in interpreting the silence surrounding the departed thou as non-existence, as a decline into non-being.[146]

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[142] Ph.E., p. 113.

[143] Ibid., p. 112; E.B.H.D., p. 25.

[144] The most significant of Marcel's plays give an important role to the presence of the dead: La Chappelle Ardente (The Votive Candle), L'Iconoclaste, Le Fanal (The Lantern), Le Monde Casse, L'Horizon, Le Dard.

[145] P.I., p. 115.

A related fallacy of death that Marcel points out is the belief that life is the ontological counterpoise of death. He argues that life cannot be this counterpoise because it tends to unite itself so strongly with death which destroys it. He concludes:

> The ontological counterpoise can lie only in the positive use of freedom in rejecting the pernicious self-deception that induces life to transfer to death a power that it alone has a right to use. Freedom then acquires a new meaning; it becomes affirmation and love; and death is thus transcended.[147]

Freedom accepts the act of death as physical separation, but transcends the separation as but a trial or test to being. One who overcomes that trial in hope is purified. A new and deeper meaning to being is opened.

But once a loved one has died, how does s/he yet remain present and even become more present, so much so that Raymond Chaviere can say to his father, Antonin, who has just expressed his deep joy in being invited to live with his son after the death of his estranged wife (whom he still loved and who spent her last years with Raymond), "No, father--the three of us, as before . . . as always."[148] S/He does so in me. Marcel explains:

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[146] Idem, Homo Viator, p. 148.

[147] Idem, Searchings, p. 60. Stress is mine.

> On pourrait encore dire qu'une partie de moi-même reste en quelque manière affectée ou consacrée à celui qui n'est plus là en personne; c'est ce moi affectéqui s'insurge contre ce qui se présente à lui comme un sacrilege.[149]

My hope prevents the other from disappearing. Hope encourages the presence of thou to continue.

In hope the departed thou is *remembered* as a living presence. S/he is recalled, not remembered about. His/her presence is invoked: a re-creation.[150] The deceased is not grasped as a picture, as a memory to be held on to and preserved (that would be idolatry--a thinking *about*). The deceased other is thought *of*, in the same manner as an invocation. The memory of the other is not merely the persistence of the past or the past recalled, but a real *faithful memory* in which the indefectible principle of thou, created and discovered in fidelity and belief during the dead person's life, is maintained and affirmed again and again.[151] It is this indefectible principle that sustains presence and prevents the memories from becoming dead idols.[152]

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[148] Gabriel Marcel, *Le Fanal* (Paris: Librarie Stock, 1936), p. 62.

[149] *P.I.*, p. 166.

[150] Ibid., p. 52.

[151] John B. O'Malley, *The Fellowship of Being: An Essay on the Concept of Person in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 21. This indefectible principle is nothing else than the true meaning and worth of thou grasped and created in love--a meaning enlightened by Being itself that reveals thou as *permanent* and assures this revelation.

The distancing that death gives also serves the positive effect of allowing one to see thou more clearly. Familiarity brings blindness; routine erases individuality from experience. The result is that dear ones are not fully present to oneself. By removing the other, by separating him/her from oneself, one can finally see him/her where s/he can reveal him/herself. The death of thou gives one this distancing and thus also the possibility for deeper presence.[153]

However, in human living the indefectible principle that sustains presence is often shrouded. This is the human condition, the condition that makes affirmation difficult. Even though the shadow is impregnated with affection, it is still only an image of the indefectible that lies beyond. Only intermittently does one break out of this condition, does one experience the beyond, the indefectible thou, who breaks into living presence.[154] For those few moments the dead person's continued being is affirmed in true light. His/her reality becomes manifest even for that short time thus giving assurance to faithful memory which again must take over when the shadow returns.

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[152] P.I., p. 152; H.N., p. 210; P.A., pp. 78-79. More will be said of this in the final chapter.

[153] P.I., p. 140.

[154] Ibid., pp. 191-192.

Presence does not end with physical death; it does, however, end with spiritual death. This death occurs when the self forgets the departed or when the self interposes her/himself between the dialogue of her/himself and thou because of desire or want of the other. The other then becomes an object either to be attained or to be preserved. By becoming an object, thou dies, and in the death of thou, presence dies.

Critique and Conclusion

Presenting Marcel's concept of "presence" has not been an easy task. The primary difficulty that confronts anyone who attempts to systematize Marcel's thought is the author's lack of systematization. His philosophical writings seem to be but enlargements of his diaries which are filled with false starts, detours and dead ends. Early in his philosophical career Marcel attempted a systematic philosophy, but finally became convinced that this was not possible for him at the time. Again in his Gifford Lectures he attempted a more systematic presentation of his work and again he failed. For some reason, Marcel held a bias against system, a bias that lasted his entire lifetime.

Because of his sporadic treatment of topics, his vocabulary, which on one level attempts to be quite precise, on another level becomes analogous at best. The words "being," "existence," "I," "person," "self,", "object," "love," "fidelity" are used with a variety of meanings, sometimes even contradictory. Marcel's lengthy writing career further adds to the imprecision.

The sad result of all this is a lack of understanding on the part of many who would certainly appreciate his work were it more clearly presented. The paradoxical result is that his works have a tendency to build barriers to communion and thus prevent real presence with him from taking place, the very opposite of his life-long endeavor.

Marcel's notion of "presence" also poses difficulties. While the notion describes something of the mystery in which it participates, it does so only from a particular point of view. Presence can only be understood in the *intersubjective context* and then only centered in an *I*: it is the *I*'s experience of presence that makes the reality of "us" understandable. But what does an *I* know of a *thou*'s experience of presence, or how does an *I* know that s/he is really present to a *thou*? It would seem that an *I* can only know something of a *thou*'s experience of presence through how the *I* perceives the *thou* as relating, yet all this is certainly analogous at best. Marcel at times recognizes this fact, but with regard to love, fidelity and hope, he still seems to want to imply more than can validly be implied.

Preferring not to treat of the presence of evil, Marcel also limits presence to *positive* presence. Although this has made our study much easier, it does not provide adequate expression for much of what actually takes place in his dramas, nor does it seem to provide an adequate context for his ethical designs. We are thus left with an ontological value for presence that is one-sided and, in that sense, unrealistic.

But even Marcel's treatment of positive presence is incomplete. While presence, as a relational notion, is *most fully* realized in true, deep interpersonal love, when an *I* and a *thou* give fully and knowingly to each other, presence is also realized in less perfect ways and even one-sidedly. A good case in point is one-sided love, another is the presence one might experience of a charismatic figure addressing him/herself to a group with whom s/he does not realize individual presences. Marcel treats deep presence rather well, but he does not deal adequately with this fringe area. He does not treat questions like: can there be true presence in such circumstances, how can one unknowingly be personally present to another, is this presence of a different quality, if so, how can one move from one to the other?

The presence of objects also receives little concern from Marcel, yet objects play such important roles in interrelationships and in self realization. More inquiry into this area could greatly expand our awareness of the notion of presence. The fact that nothing at all is said with regard to "natural symbols" points to a lacuna the investigation of which could add much to our awareness of the ontological value of these things and to a greater, more thorough description of presence itself.

However, Marcel seems to run into some of his greatest criticism in the area of epistemology. He constantly denies the conceptualizability of "Being," "being," "love," "presence," "hope," and "fidelity," but he then proceeds in each case to conceptualize them. He downgrades knowledge and reflection only to be forced to employ both in his description of each notion. The fact is that Marcel's understanding of knowledge seems limited and reactionary. True mystery is metaproblematic, but that is not the same as saying that it is beyond the knowable.

In the area of ethics, too, some basic questions remain vague or unanswered: what is the relation of truth to presence and of these to value; from whence is truth derived; what is the relation of motivation to presence; what is the relation of truth to ontological exigence?

The most serious criticism seems to rest in Marcel's passage from phenomenology to hyperphenomenology.[155] That passage seems weak as does the related passage from the existential to the transcendent. Just how is Absolute Being recognized as Absolute Thou in beings? How is is possible to even suggest an Absolute Thou, to give to Being personal connotations which must be denied real meaning at every turn? By what method and by what validity does Marcel move to this level? In a related matter, how can he posit a "thouness" to things and find in them revelations of Being itself? Marcel's answers in this regard seem so weak, so tenuous, as if his belief has run up against the blank wall of mystery and can only mutter incoherently in its presence. Marcel believes; that is obvious. But these questions are asked, not out of disbelief, but out of a yearning to understand something more of the real depth and richness of presence.

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[155] Schaldenbrand, Phenomenologies of Freedom, p. 56.

On the other hand, Marcel has made many positive contributions to philosophy and to the enrichment of human life. As a true Socratic his method of dialogical questioning opens new doors and discovers and creates new revelations. Marcel carries on this dialogue on a larger scale between his plays and his philosophical works. His plays are the work of a creator, not a scientific builder. They capture not only his spirit and concern, but also the spirit and concern of that "something else" present in every act of creation. His characters become real and the drama that unfolds in each play is a sort of mirror of struggling human reality. Marcel's philosophical works, on the other hand, are more idealistic and contemplative. In these we glimpse something of the true worth, the true dignity of being and its possibilities and roots--something of an existential ontology. The resulting dialogue on this level produces an extremely powerful revelation of the "within" and "without" of the existential person in whom the urgency and necessity of truth in which s/he is based and in which s/he shares sees incarnation among the smoldering ruins of life devastated by self-centeredness.

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Despite his imprecisions, lacunae and unsystematic approach, Marcel's basic insights hold firm. This is because of their grounding in human experience. Although he does not say everything about "presence," what he does say makes sense and fits together within his general scheme of things. This should be obvious from the presentation above.

Moreover, Marcel gives "presence" an ontological and theological rootedness. As a deeply religious man he is but one in a long line of philosophers and theologians whose faith shines through their works. His presuppositions go unmasked and he posits them with a certain assurance; of this he is not apologetic. He creates his work in the presence of mystery and in dialogue with the "word" flowing from it. We have already noted the results of this process in our considerations on faith, love and hope.

Such rootedness evokes a wholistic approach to human existence, which Marcel carries through his writings. Truth, value and being all find the same center and flow from the same source. Love, fidelity and hope seem to have an organic and processive relationship. Presence and absence, life and death, reflection and communion all play significant roles in the growth of being.

But Marcel has more to contribute than mere general directions and approaches. His specific insights, as we have considered them, nourish the growth and understanding of the human person and, more specifically, the faith person.

Many of these, in turn, apply to the eucharistic mystery and the faith person's relation to that. We would like to list the more important of these below.

(1) In the first section of this chapter we saw the groundwork of Marcel's philosophical endeavors. His distinctions of "primary" and "secondary" reflection help us not only to analyze human experience, but also eucharistic experience in such a way as to insure our return to the wholeness and unity of the original. Marcel's distinction of "levels" points out the need for centering both human interaction and eucharistic activity in "I-thou" instead of "I-it" categories and his distinction of "problem" and "mystery" gives us a way of being "at home" with the ambiguity and lack of objectivity that results in all deeply human and religious experiences. Marcel's reflections on "experience-existence-sensation" remind us that the mystery we experience is centered in our incarnate situation and therefore necessarily involves our feelings and our bodies. Finally, his reflections on "being" describe the deeply spiritual interrelationships that exist between God, human beings, and the quality of our lives in relation.

This first section, then, raises us to new levels of awareness and prepares us to consider just how one rises to "presence." Marcel's movement from "pre-reflected community" to "conceptualization" to "communion on the level of being" underlines several important considerations: that our place is in community; that conceptualization is a positive process, but not an end in itself; that living on the level of being and growing in being requires both analysis and return to intersubjectivity. This process holds important implications for eucharistic theology also: that a unity in God is the starting point for all Christian life, as it is for all beings; that true communion or inter-communion is that to which we aspire and which we can attain only on the level of I-thou; that our attempt at understanding and explaining eucharistic presence arises out of the experience of eucharistic presence and not vice versa; that the presence achieved is centered in the fully incarnate person and cannot be objectively proven nor infallibly explained.

(2) The second section, which considered presence on the level of being, stresses the insight that true *co-esse* requires a real moving out of oneself in humble appeal, in invocation. Marcel's reflections accurately pinpoint the quality of "withness" and freedom, the authenticity of I-thou living, and the need for absence that presence requires. His treatment of love, fidelity and hope shows how presence grows, and how it dies. In these concrete approaches he not only notes some of the paradoxes in everyday life, but he is able to describe the reasons for these. It is especially here that his plays give flesh and blood to his ideals--the incarnate situation in dialogue with the ideal.

The ramifications for eucharistic theology are numerous in this section: if the eucharist is to achieve true *co-esse*, true communion, it must be person-centered, not thing-centered; it must be done freely, in the manner of invocation; it must involve a process, a coming into communion, which will involve many different levels and which will be heightened or diminished by the quality of each one's life; because of the existential incarnate situation, every eucharist involves a real struggle to become other-centered. Love, fidelity and hope, the concrete expressions of personal presence, also become the concrete expressions of Christ-ian presence and Christ-ian communion; without them there can be no true eucharist.

(3) In the next section Marcel's regard for the "transcendent" is developed. Several of his insights here are also important: the fact that Marcel describes certain human experiences as manifestations of the "transcendent" gives his ontological presuppositions some credibility (although not absolute necessity) even if his philosophical explanation of the move from phenomenology to hyperphenomenology is not that satisfactory; the fact that grace gives faith its certainty keeps religious questions out of the scientific sphere; the fact that God is Absolute Thou and not object for Marcel establishes the proper level for prayer and worship and the related value of theology.

Included in this section are Marcel's reflections on "absence," and the positive role that "absence" plays in human living: the distancing that absence effects, the full appreciation of "other" that it allows, the fidelity and hope that can arise only because of it.

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These insights too aid in understanding the eucharistic mystery. They provide a basis for sacramentality that is rooted in ontology and experienced in faith-living, while withstanding scientific investigation. They also provide a way for understanding and appreciating the absence of God, or rather, the "experienced" absence of God in the spiritual life.

(4) In the final section we describe Marcel's interest in group presences, in personal presence communicated through things and in the continued presence of the dead. Although these areas of Marcel's thought are weak in many ways, certain insights should not be overlooked. From the area of group presence the insight into the real abiding influence of a group on an individual stresses the forming power of a group (even a eucharistic community) and the relative limitations of every member within the group. The insight that things can take on personal presence when they are taken over as extensions of the human body or possessions of the person, or when they are seen as creations of an artist gives flesh and bone to the principle of sacramentality suggested above. The experience of the continued presence of the dead confirms the ontological and religious basis of "being" and substantiates the deep urgings of love, fidelity and hope. What is more, this human experience suggests a different approach to understanding the eucharistic presence of Christ, dead yet risen, absent yet present.

These are the major insights that make Marcel's work attractive for eucharistic theology today, although, to be sure, this was never Marcel's intent. These are the insights that show how powerful and expansive, how helpful and inviting his notion of "presence" can be despite its limitations. All of the above will come to bear in Chapter Four, where Marcel's insights into "presence" will be wedded with Tillich's into "religious symbol." There the major task will be to establish a contemporary understanding of eucharistic memorial and, in that context, of the manifold presence of Christ.

We have presented Marcel's thought without the eucharistic implications so that we would remain faithful to his purposes. On the other hand, we suggest that eucharistic implications can readily be made to the extent that they can be applied without strain. It was Marcel who noted the free and independent movement of his creations. It is the present ecumenical and existential situation that invokes these creations today.

CHAPTER III

PAUL TILLICH'S CONCEPT OF "RELIGIOUS SYMBOL"

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce Paul Tillich's concept of "religious symbol" into the dialogue taking shape. As was stated in the introduction, the thesis of this chapter is that Tillich's concept of "religious symbol," although primarily epistemological, possesses a religious function that is consistent and valid, even apart from any Christological consideration. It will be the task of this chapter, then, to examine Tillich's "religious symbol" in the direction of its religious function, to deal, from this perspective, with his Christological position, and finally, to focus attention on his concept of "sacrament" which derives from "religious symbol" and manifests the religious function most concretely. Since we feel that it is helpful to present Tillich in his own environment first, before comparing him with Marcel, we will try to stay faithful to his own style and form. While such an approach borders on the "dangerously disjointed," it respects the differences of persons involved, the differences in their respective styles and approaches, the different directions of their thought and the different insights obtained, and allows for a freer, richer, more truthful comparison and dialogue in the final chapter.

The chapter is therefore divided into the following sections: (1) an introduction to Tillich's thought, showing its prominent directions, methodology and presuppositions with a view toward understanding "religious symbol" and "sacrament"; (2) a description of Tillich's concept of "religious symbol"; (3) a treatment of the Christological problem as it relates to "religious symbol"; (4) an examination of the reality, necessity and functioning of "sacrament" in ambiguous life, both with regard to church and to culture; (5) a conclusion and critique.

Introduction: The Aim of Tillich's Systematic Theology

Without a doubt Paul Tillich (1889-1965) is recognized as one of this country's great Protestant theologians. This recognition comes truly deserved. His greatness lies, not in the comprehensiveness of a new *summa*, but in the evolution of a systematic theology that is expansive if not minute, logical and consistent in its aim to present living faith in answer to the questions of the existential person.

Tillich's theology has much in common with Augustine and the neo-Platonists and is primarily influenced by Schelling, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard and Heidegger.[1] His position, characterized as "belief-ful realism," is "on the boundary" between idealism and realism, between essentialism and existentialism, between liberal theology and neo-orthodoxy, between ontological self-knowledge and revelation.[2]

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[1] Paul Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, The Library of Living Theology, vol. 1 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), pp. 3-21.

The reason for this "boundary situation" derives from his several concerns and presuppositions. Tillich is concerned with existential persons, persons whose lives are permeated with experiences of finitude and estrangement, persons who ask many questions and seek positive directions to their lives, but find few answers. He is also concerned with the Christian tradition, his tradition, which he sees as holding within itself the possibility of truly serving such persons in need. The task, as Tillich understands it, is to relate the two on some common ground so that the existential questions can be answered by theology.

Tillich's presuppositions in this regard center both the level and the area on which such convergence can take place. He insists that the fundamental questions existential persons are asking are questions of ultimate concern: questions about "God," questions about their own "being." He further insists that such ontological questions can only be "asked," not "answered" outside of the theological circle, that only theology is capable of providing adequate answers.[3] But Tillich recognizes that any true answer, any answer that fulfills both human need and intellectual congruity, must involve more than a doctrinal formula; it must involve a personal encounter, a real experience of revelation. Furthermore, if such a revelation is to speak to the ontological question, it must permit ontological expression.

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[2] In German, gläubiger Realismus. Tillich uses this expression in Auf der Grenze (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1962), p. 23. It is derived from the art realm and is the key to his "Die religiöse Lage der Gegenwart (1926)," Gesammelte Werke, herausgegeben von Renate Albrecht, 10 vols. (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959-1968), vol. 10. Alexander J. McKelway sums it up by saying that Tillich stands "between the actual human situation as it is expressed in the various dimensions of man's life, and the theological situation which includes the Christian faith and its proclamation." The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, 2nd printing (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965), p. 262.

In actuality, these concerns and presuppositions are the basis for Tillich's "method of correlation." Questions of ultimate concern arise out of the existential situation, fraught with the human experiences of finitude and estrangement; answers are derived from the revelation of God's Word and Spirit in the *event* of Jesus as the Christ. The existential questions maintain a certain independence in that they arise out of the human situation; the answers of theology also maintain a certain independence in that these arise out of revelation, which is God's free revealing of Her-Himself through the meaning and power of the Word and Spirit. On the other hand, each is also dependent: human existence needs theology's answers, and theology needs human existence's questions. Yet, while theology forms its answers according to the questions, it also aids in the shaping of the questions themselves, so that the questions can be answered by it. Certainly the edge of this method is given to theology, but then Tillich admits this since he sees the method as happening within the theological circle.[4]

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[3] For Tillich, the object of theology is that which concerns us ultimately. *S.T.* 1: 12. Theology itself is the *logos* of *theos*, a "rational interpretation of the religious substance of rites, symbols, and myths." Ibid., p. 16. It is based in revelation and faith.

Tillich's task is immense. He must, first of all, hear the existential questions and discern the questions of ultimate concern from these. He must then relate these questions to the living revelation (kerygma) of the event of Jesus, the Christ. Finally, he must answer the questions in such a way as to both acknowledge the meaningfulness of the questions asked and to respect the living

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[4] Tillich states that not only does the theologian provide the answers to the philosophical questions, but that he also influences the form of the philosophical question. He notes that while the material of the existential question is taken from the whole of human experience, the form of the question is "determined by the total system and by the answers given in it," a "form determined by the theological system as a whole." S.T. 2: 15. It is just this point that gives Lewis Ford reason for his criticism. Cf. Lewis S. Ford, "The Ontological Foundation of Paul Tillich's Theory of the Religious Symbol" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1963), p. 7.

Christian tradition out of which the answers are derived.[5]

The methodology that Tillich has developed structures his Systematic Theology. Each part of his system follows the method of correlation and includes one section in which the question is developed through an analysis of human existence and existence generally and one section in which the theological answer is given on the basis of the sources (the Bible primarily, church history, the denominational tradition, and history of religion and culture), the medium (experience or existential reception) and the norm (the unique event, Jesus the Christ) of systematic theology. The correlation, according to Tillich, produces "God" as the answer to the question of being, "Jesus, the Christ as the New Being" as the answer to the question of existence, "Unambiguous Life in the Spirit" as the answer to the question of ambiguous life. Around these three central sections is one epistemological question concerning ambiguous reason which is answered by "Revelation," and one historical question regarding its ambiguities which is answered by "The Kingdom of God."

Select Concerns Toward Understanding "Religious Symbol" and "Sacrament"

Each one of the five major sections of Tillich's systematic theology contains at least one major philosophico-theological position which will help us in considering

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[5] Whether or not Tillich actually does all this effectively will be a concern in the critique at the end of this section.

"religious symbols." We shall merely describe them here to set the background for our study. Certain aspects of these "positions" will be taken up more carefully in the various sections which follow.

(1) One major stance in Tillich's system is that reason is already graced by its nature and is thus prepared for revelation and cannot be negated by it.[6] In Tillich's anthropology God, as being-itself, in His-Her freedom creates personal beings who then are grounded in Him-Her and receive their meaning and power from Her-Him.[7] These beings, created with the power of ontological and technical reason, find their power of reason flowing from the depths of that reason grounded in God. In other words, the *logos* of personal being finds its source in the divine *Logos*.

In *essence* each personal being, according to Tillich, is finite and therefore limited both as to who s/he is and as to how long s/he will be who s/he is. Should the question of finitude arise, the answer would be found in the personal being him/herself because *essentially* each personal being is of and from being-itself and therefore manifests something of being-itself. Essentially the person him/herself is revelatory and has no need for a special revelation.[8]

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[6] This stance as it is stated is not all that clear in Tillich's presentation although it is definitely implied. Unless the person's very essence is seen as graced and his/her reason is seen as graced, revelation would be so distant from the person as to not be understandable, or so conditioned by the person as to not be truly revelational. We are still left with the question of the necessity of revelation in such a situation. This will be treated later.

[7] *S.T.* 1: 252.

But, states Tillich, this is not the existential situation. The person, under the conditions of existence is not all that s/he should be. Under the conditions of existence the structural elements of reason move against each other, and the depth of reason is no longer transparent. "The character of existence is that man asks the question of his finitude without receiving an answer."[9] Yet, even the ability to ask the question under the conditions of existence points to a certain rootedness in being-itself that still remains in existential being.[10]

It is here that special revelation becomes necessary. This revelation, for Tillich, is simply the manifestation of the ground of being for human knowledge. It "removes the veil from something which is hidden in a special and extraordinary way."[11] In revelation the ground of being is revealed as mystery. But revelation does not dissolve this mystery into ordinary knowledge even though it contains cognitive elements by the very fact that the reality revealed has become a matter of experience and one's relation to it has also become a matter of experience.[12] Revelation belongs to a different dimension of knowledge which neither adds anything to nor contradicts ordinary knowledge. It is graced knowledge, freely given.

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[8] Thus Tillich can state that the essence of reason "is identical with the content of revelation." Ibid., p. 74.

[9] Ibid., p. 252.

[10] While this makes sense to Tillich, it is at this point that the system is challengeable. The difficulties with this approach will become more manifest in Tillich's Christology.

[11] Ibid., p. 108.

This, briefly, is the objective side of revelation. The subjective side is "ecstasy." Tillich describes ecstasy as "the state of mind in which reason is beyond itself, that is, beyond its subject-object structure."[13] Ecstasy, like revelation, is not a negation of the existential; it is the state of mind in which reason transcends itself and becomes "ecstatic reason," reason which is aware of the depth of reason, reason which has entered into communion with being-itself.

But if revelation is to be received, then the revelatory experience must also include some concrete content, some revelational object, in and through which that ultimate concern is expressed.[14] This is demanded by the very nature of the human person, by his/her logos structure. It is this fact that ultimately explains the role of Tillich's notions of "miracle," "religious symbol," and sacrament.[15]

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[12] Ibid., p. 109.

[13] Ibid., p. 112.

[14] Gene Arthur Reeves, "Our Knowledge of God and the Nature of God in the Philosophies of Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich," (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1963), p. 172.

For revelation to be truly revelatory, then, it must at once be (1) free gift from the divine Logos, (2) addressed to the human person, (3) through some concrete content that is understood by that person. Revelation must be reasonable even though it is beyond human reason; it must conform itself to the logos of the person involved, otherwise it will not be able to be received; it must conform itself to the logos of the person involved so as not to cause essential contradiction between Logos and logos.

Behind this concept of revelation and indeed, behind Tillich's whole understanding of religious symbols stands gläubiger Realismus (belief-ful realism).[16] Tillich distinguishes this type of realism from technological and mystical realisms which do not focus on concrete existence in order to discover the power of things. Historical realism, on the other hand, seeks the power of being in the depth of the historical situation itself. It presupposes that concrete reality manifests something of the ultimate power of meaning and ground of being, no matter how distorted or interrupted. But historical realism in itself cannot reach the depth that it seeks; it needs the help of faith. This is Tillich's position, and it is here that revelation plays the key role.

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[15] A "miracle" for Tillich is the transformation of reality in revelation; it is a "sign event" which gives the mystery of revelation and creates astonishment. S.T. 1: 115-117. The notions will be treated in detail later.

[16] Cf. two articles by that title, G.W. 4, 77-106.

(2) A second major position of Tillich's theology is that God cannot be conceptualized because S-He is being-itself. God in Her-His reality is outside all theological systems and beyond ontological structures. S/He is beyond the distinctions of being and non-being, of subject and object, of dynamic and form, of individualization and participation, of freedom and destiny. God as being-itself is beyond every being, but also beyond the totality of all being. S-He is furthermore, the ground of everything personal and the source of meaning and power.

God, therefore, cannot be conceptualized without causing a distortion, e.g., by applying some particular "being" to Him-Her. However, since God is the ground of being S-He must be able to be known in some way; as ground S-He has relationship to all beings essentially. Furthermore, something of God has to be known even to make the assertion of His-Her unconceptualizability possible. Tillich recognizes two different sorts of experiences by which God can be "known" on this level. The first type of experience is almost a non-experience, in that it is the experience of "nothingness": it can be either the experience of the ontological shock of one's own existence as finite, the experience of ultimate concern for the purpose and meaning of finite being, or, more positively, the experience of courage that one has even in the face of one's own finitude. Both shock and courage are, according to Tillich, experiences of "God" as absent or as absolutely transcendent. The second type of experience of God is more positive: it is the experience of God as present and holy.[17] Tillich borrows directly from Rudolf Otto here, but with one caution: that the doctrine of God must contain in it both the meaning of the divine and of the holy.[18] This second type of experience is therefore the experience of God as mystery, as transcending subject-object, and of God as numinous, as inviting presence.

Tillich's second type of God experience makes revelation more understandable. From this perspective revelation becomes the experience of mystery which conveys, not some objective new knowledge about God, but rather the very presence of God, and the "holy" that is communicated explains the ecstatic quality of the receiver. Alternately, Tillich's notion of revelation makes the experience of the holy more understandable also. Revelation reveals that the holy can only become real through holy "objects," which in turn convey the holiness of being itself.[19] It is only in this sense that objects can be said to "contain" something of holiness: because of their grounding in being-itself and because of their pointing to the reality of transcendent mystery which is neither conceptualizable nor containable.

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[17] S.T. 1: 215.

[18] The holy must be interpreted in the sphere of the divine if the holy is not to be transformed into something aesthetic-emotional. Ibid.

[19] Ibid., p. 216.

The experience of the holy allows one to speak about God who has been experienced, but only in symbolic language.[20] Because God is beyond conceptualization, no concept may be properly attributed to Him-Her, but because God is the ground of all being, one may speak about Him-Her analogously.[21] As revelatory, however, the experience of the holy also *demands* communication.

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[20] This statement must be clarified. Tillich at first held that all knowledge of God has symbolic character. When Wilbur Urban took exception to this, Tillich admitted that symbolic knowledge presupposes some basis of non-symbolic knowledge. See Wilbur M. Urban, "A Critique of Professor Tillich's Theory of the Religious Symbol," The Journal of Liberal Religion 2, no. 1 (1940): 35-36. Tillich's response: "Symbol and Knowledge: A Response," The Journal of Liberal Religion 2, no. 4 (1941): 203. In S.T. Tillich states that "God as being-itself is a non-symbolic statement." (238) While he later reinterprets this statement and clarifies it, there can be no doubt that his subsequent writings all see a need for a non-symbolic referent, and at least some elements of non-symbolic language. Needless to say, this very point has been the source of much debate and critique. His final word on the matter is this: "...there is an element in the term 'God,' namely, the fact that he is being-itself, which can become a concept if analytically separated, and...there is an element in the term 'being-itself' which can become a symbol if analytically separated. In the first case it is the answer to the question 'What does it mean that God 'is'?' which drives to the concept of being-itself.

In the second case it is the element of mystery in the experience of being (in the sense of the negation of non-being) that enables it to become a symbol. This however, is an implication of the proposition that 'God is being-itself' and not dependent on who pronounces the statement and in which context." Paul Tillich, "Rejoinder," The Journal of Religion 46 (January 1966): 184-185.

One can begin to see why "religious symbols" are so important for Tillich. They say something positively and negatively: they are the *yes* of the experience of ultimate concern and the *no* that this concern is *some thing*; they affirm the *that* of God and deny the *what* of God. Religious symbols have the *power* to function in this way because of their grounding in being-itself and because of their rootedness in the power of being. They allow one to communicate ultimate concern without properly conceptualizing the unconceptualizable, and they preserve God's transcendence while attesting to His-Her immanence. God is thus realized, experienced and communicated without being confined and distorted.

(3) A third major position of Tillich's with regard to religious symbols is that *the condition of existence is an estrangement from essence*. Tillich describes

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[21] What Tillich means by analogy and how this differs from Thomas is also the source of much discussion. See, for example, Ford, "The Ontological Foundation;" Donald J. Keefe, *Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971); David J. Kelsey, *The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Thought* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967); Klaus-Dieter Nörenberg, *Analogia Imaginis* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1966); Jean Richard, "Symbolisme et analogie chez Paul Tillich," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 32 (Février 1976): 43-74, 33 (Février et Juin 1977): 39-60, 183-202; Reeves, "Knowledge of God;" William L. Rowe, *Religious Symbols of God* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968).

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"essence" as that which a being ought to be or that which a being is ontologically: the source of meaning and the source of power of the being. In trying to clarify the relationship between essence and existence, Tillich, using Genesis-symbolism, characterizes essence as the "state of dreaming innocence" or the state before the Fall.[22] In this state of pure potentiality essence remains grounded in being-itself, but one must remember that this is not the actual state of anything.

The movement from potency to existence initiates the actual state, however this is a movement into estrangement. For Tillich, existence involves a "standing out" from being-itself which is accomplished through finite freedom and through the power of being situated in the essence itself. This movement is neither logical nor rational; it is, in fact, irrational. The result is estrangement from the source of one's being, which in turn, causes distorted meaning, confused reasoning, lack of proper centeredness, etc. In Genesis-symbolism, existence is the Fall; it is sin and the source of evil in the world.[23]

However, Tillich also gives existence a positive value, although this is far outweighed by the negative. Existence, after all, is actualization, real coming to being, real beginning of life. Even though existence is a "standing out" from being-itself, it is not a complete "cutting off"; being, under the conditions of existence, still maintains some relationship and contact with being-itself. Thus neither pure essence nor existence is the perfect condition: pure essence, while maintaining groundedness, lacks actuality; existence, in gaining actuality, loses clear groundedness.

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[22] S.T. 2: 33.

[23] Ibid., pp. 29, 36.

It should be pointed out here that Tillich's description of existence is ontological; existence is described in terms of being. While both essence and existence have positive and negative qualities, essence is viewed more positively and more primarily than is existence. This is further confirmed by Tillich's eventual use of the term "essentialization" toward the end of his systematic theology--a term used to signify the ultimate direction of the entire life movement.[24]

By distinguishing essence from existence and by considering essence primary, Tillich is able to define and describe human potential in essential terms first, and then in terms of essence "under the conditions of existence." The difference in descriptions keeps essence in the central place, takes the real situation seriously, and allows for an eventual return to essence in the notion of essentialization.

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[24] Ibid., 3: 400, 401.

A balance is thus achieved. The only danger is in thinking that beings which are merely in a state of "dreaming innocence" can be apart from existence.[25]

From a theological point of view, Tillich's distinction between essence and existence allows for "good" to be situated in the ground of being, while "evil" and "sin" can be seen as the result of finite freedom and the cause of further estrangement. "Salvation," then, in terms of this estrangement, means healing or reconciling, and is ultimately achieved through the manifestation, under the conditions of existence, of the one who in that condition conquers actual estrangement and lives as the New Being.

Tillich states that in the event of Jesus as the Christ this manifestation is most powerfully made. Through his death on the cross, whereby he stripped away everything that could opaque the revelation of being itself, Jesus conquered the conditions of existence and opened the way to full healing and reconciliation. Through this final act he is recognized as the Christ, the New Being, essential Godmanhood. Without becoming God he achieves the reunion between God and persons.[26]

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[25] One could make a stronger argument for the positive role of existence in the process toward essentialization, but this would seem to run contrary to the way Tillich had earlier described existence: in terms of irrationality and lack of necessity. Ibid., 2: 29.

[26] The question as to whether Tillich remains faithful to the Christological tradition in this regard will be treated below.

(4) A fourth position follows from the third: *all life is ambiguous and therefore stands in need of salvation*. Tillich also describes "life" ontologically: it is the actuality of being.[27] As actuality, life is the mixture of essential and existential elements which results in a situation that is not completely estranged and not completely grounded; it is ambiguous. The processes of life--self-integration, self-creation and self-transcendence--are dependent on the polarities which, in the living situation, are not in balance. What is more, the entire process is seen as being threatened by existential estrangement. In life, the positive power and meaning of being seeks to actualize itself over against its own non-being (*me-on*) and the threat of complete non-being (*ouk-on*). Since beings in ambiguous life have limited power to accomplish this, they are in need of salvation.

It is in this context that Tillich introduces the symbol, "Spiritual Presence." "Spiritual Presence" is a symbol that expresses *un*ambiguous life achieved through the conquest of the ambiguities of life under the dimension of the spirit.[28] "Spiritual Presence" is Tillich's way of saying that the divine Spirit is "in" the spirit of the person, that the ground of being is manifest through her/him.[29] Subjectively, it is an ecstatic experience: "presence" emphasizes the wholeness, the unity of the presence in itself and its consequent working within the individual and community. As the spirit is the life-source and integrating principle in the individual, so is the Spirit of being-itself. The "Spiritual Presence" then, grasps and inspires the individual and the community, driving them out of themselves and opening them to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life even under the conditions of existence. However, because of the condition of existence, life under the "Spiritual Presence," while unambiguous, is interrupted.

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[27] Ibid., 3: 11.

[28] Ibid., 107.

While Tillich's Christology emphasizes revelation through Jesus the Christ, his Pneumatology emphasizes totality and wholeness through the "Spiritual Presence." It is the same reality that effects salvation, but this reality is viewed from a different aspect. The emphasis here is not toward the past and the effecting of the past event into the present; the emphasis here is on the present, although dependent on the past event of Jesus the Christ as the historical source of its presence (at least for the Christian communities). The emphasis here is on transformation, regeneration and sanctification. Faith and love form the "content" of the "Spiritual Presence."

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[29] McKelway, Systematic Theology, p. 198.

According to theological tradition Word and the sacraments effect this "Spiritual Presence."[30] Tillich examines this tradition, but in accepting it, expands the basic meaning of both terms. His concern is that attention constantly revert to the reality beyond the spoken, read or printed word and performed sacrament. This is the only way to prevent idolization.

Word and the sacraments in turn constitute the church. For Tillich the unambiguous center of the church, unambiguous yet interrupted, in which the "Spiritual Presence" is manifest, is the "Spiritual Community." This community is the essence of church; it is the faith community of those who have been opened up by the Spiritual Presence and who await final participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life.

But the notion of "church" for Tillich also includes existential elements. Under the conditions of existence the Spiritual Community is often hidden and invisible. What one experiences is an ambiguous whole. The existential church is therefore faced with the same difficulties that confront the existential person: of recognizing the true source of its power and of manifesting that power to others so that they too might experience New Being.

(5) The final position that bears on "religious symbols" and "sacraments" is this: history is moving toward

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[30] S.T. 3: 120.

final fulfillment, symbolized in the "Kingdom of God" and "Eternal Life." The symbol, "Kingdom of God," has a double character for Tillich: it has an inner-historical and a transhistorical side.[31] The symbol is used to answer the ambiguities of history and to answer the ambiguities of life universal. It is, in both respects, revealing and saving.

As inner-historical, the "Kingdom of God" participates in the dynamics of history. It answers the questions of the ambiguities of life under the dimension of history and in so doing, establishes a "history of salvation" or salvation history. While world history and salvation history cannot be identified, they do not necessarily stand in opposition to each other either. Salvation history breaks through world history in much the same way that revelation breaks through natural reason, that revelation of the New Being in Jesus the Christ breaks through the situation of existence, that "Spiritual Presence" breaks through the ambiguities of life in general. None of these "breakthroughs" is destructive of human reality; all are revealing and healing, all are salvational: all are salvation manifest and effective. The symbol "Kingdom of God" in its inner-historical sense merely manifests the true nature and power of all of history. Salvation history, in this sense, is part of universal history, but it also manifests something that is not from that history; through its self-transcending character it strives toward ultimate fulfillment.[32]

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[31] Ibid., p. 357.

For Tillich salvation history is centered in the event of Jesus the Christ. This event most clearly manifests the "Kingdom of God;" it ultimately fulfills history and becomes the criterion for everything succeeding. Tillich calls this event the "great *kairos*" and calls succeeding re-experiences of this event "*kairoi*."[33] In all these events the "Kingdom of God" manifests itself clearly but interruptedly because history in its existential reality remains ambiguous.

The fact that Tillich also views the "Kingdom of God" as the "Spiritual Presence" manifest under the dimension of history suggests the proper relation of the church to the Kingdom. Since the church is essentially related to the Spiritual Presence, it ought to manifest the "Kingdom of God" in its historical dimension. This it does when the Spiritual Community is allowed to manifest itself through the ambiguous life that is also part of the church. To the extent that this is accomplished the "Kingdom of God" is manifest; to the extent that the church itself stands in the way, the "Kingdom of God" remains hidden.

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[32] Ibid., p. 363.

[33] Ibid., pp. 369-370.

Yet even the fullest expression of the Spiritual Community does not exhaust the notion of "Kingdom of God," because the latter embraces all realms of being under the perspective of their ultimate concern.[34] It is here that the notion of sacramentality is re-introduced. Tillich suggests that those churches which emphasize the sacramental presence of the divine represent the "Kingdom of God" more fully, i.e., in its all-embracing character, than do the churches which do not. Through sacramental emphasis the church draws the realms preceding spirit and history, i.e., the inorganic and organic universe, into itself, and in doing so reveals the Kingdom most powerfully.[35]

However, despite all attempts, the "Kingdom of God" will never be fully revealed under the conditions of ambiguous life. Since it must remain under the conditions of existence, it will manifest itself interruptedly at best and always under the threat of distortion and error. What Tillich emphasizes again and again through the notion of symbol is the yes and no of the situations: Yes, the Kingdom of God is present; no, it is not fully present.

But the symbol "Kingdom of God" also has a trans-historical side. In this dimension it answers the questions implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of history. World history has no necessary element of "progress" about it;

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[34] Ibid., p. 375.

[35] Ibid., p. 377.

neither does salvation history beyond the revelation of Jesus the Christ. But salvation history does have movement toward the fulfillment of that central manifestation; the "yes" and "no" of the Kingdom of God under the conditions of existence demands a final "yes!" The end of history is "Eternal Life," the fulfillment of the "Kingdom of God."

The end of history, however, does not mean the end of the physical possibility of history. It refers to the inner aim of history, an aim recognized not in world history, but only in salvation history. In this sense "Eternal Life" is already manifest, although interruptedly. Still, the movement, the direction is definitely future oriented: to the time of complete fulfillment.

This time of fulfillment is not a negation of history either. It is an elevation of the temporal into eternity and includes the positive content of history fulfilled in its potentialities. In fact, nothing, in so far as it is, can be excluded from eternity.[36] Tillich borrows Schelling's term, "essentialization," to describe the final state of beings, yet he gives it his own meaning:

> ...that the new which has been actualized in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the "New Being," not fragmentarily as in temporal life, but wholly as a contribution to the Kingdom of God in its fulfillment.[37]

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[36] Ibid., p. 399.

[37] Ibid., pp. 400-401.

Eternal Life is identical with the Kingdom of God in its fulfillment. In this state of final perfection non-being (*ouk on*) is no longer a threat; the fragmented, distorted and estranged situation of ambiguous life has been conquered. What remains are essentialized beings and an essentialized situation: beings reflecting the ground of their beings without distortion, without interruption. In this state there are no more specific religious symbols because every being is religiously symbolic; there are no more specific sacraments, because every being is sacramental.[38] Religion too comes to an end because the gap between the secular and the religious is overcome.[39]

Tillich's Concept of "Symbol"

The introductory remarks above should serve as a basic grounding for Tillich's concept of "religious symbol." The brief outline of his systematic theology provides a general structure in which to view his specific insights into the religious function of these symbols. This too should become clearer as one enters into the heart of the question under consideration here, because Tillich's entire system is so tightly interwoven and interrelated. Each new insight brings with it new relationships and adds new levels of understanding to the areas summarily introduced above.

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[38] While Tillich does not state this specifically, it seems to be clearly implied.

[39] Ibid., p. 403. Religion, for Tillich, is the

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The focus of this section is a general understanding and appreciation of Tillich's concept of "religious symbol." It is divided into three sub-sections, one comparative, the other two descriptive. The task is, first of all, to distinguish between "sign" and "symbol," then to describe "symbol" in more detail, and, finally, to describe that group of symbols which is recognized as specifically religious.

"Sign" and "Symbol"

Tillich uses the distinction between "sign" and "symbol" as a means for trying to understand the "power" that symbols seem to have. He then applies the results of this analysis to his central concern, the meaning and power of specifically "religious symbols." What he says, therefore, about "signs" or even about "symbols" in general is preliminary to his main focus and should be understood from that perspective.

The Similarities of "Sign" and "Symbol"

In Tillich's earliest article on religious symbols there is no mention of "signs."[40] However, two of the

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consequence of the estrangement of the person from the ground of his/her being and of his/her attempts to return to it.

[40] "Das religiöse Symbol" first appeared as a paper in *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie* I, no. 4 (1928) and was reprinted in *Religiöse Verwircklichung* (Berlin: Furche-Berlag GmbH, 1930), pp. 88-109. It was then translated into English and first appeared in *The Journal of Liberal Religion* 2 (Summer 1940): 13-33 and was slightly re-edited and published in *Daedalus* 87 (Summer 1958): 3-21 and reprinted in *Symbolism*

characteristics of "symbols" mentioned in this article apply equally to what he later ascribes to "signs." These characteristics are: Uneigentlichkeit and Anschaulichkeit.

Uneigentlichkeit refers to the non-literal or figurative quality of signs and symbols.[41] The functional implications of this characteristic were first clearly stated several years later: symbols and signs point beyond themselves to something else.[42] What is central to both is not themselves, but that to which they point. The symbol and sign are merely the means, the media, of those things which are symbolized or pointed to. Thus, for example, the red light at the street corner points beyond its own redness to summon a driver to stop his car.[43] In the same way, devotion to the crucifix points to the action on Calvary which in turn points to the redemptive action of God, which itself is a

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in Religion and Literature, ed. by Rollo May (New York: 1960), pp. 75-98. It was later published as an appendix to Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook (London: Oliver and Boyd, Ltd., 1961), pp. 301-321 and was again published in G.W. 5: 196-212. Our references will be from the last named source.

[41] G.W. 5: 196.

[42] Paul Tillich, "Theology and Symbolism," Religious Symbolism, ed. by F. Ernest Johnson, Religion and Civilization Series (New York: The Institute for Religion and Social Studies, 1955), p. 108; Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," The Christian Scholar 38 (September 1955): 189; Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, Harper Torchbook 1958), p. 41; Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," Religious Experience, ed. by Hook, p. 4.

[43] Tillich, "Theology and Symbolism," p. 108.

symbolic expression for an experience of that which concerns us ultimately.

The second characteristic of the symbol and also of the sign is Anschaulichkeit: clarity, vividness, perceptibility.[44] Symbols and signs need perceptible elements whereby they can be given objectivity. It is only because of this that the symbol can be a medium for the intrinsically invisible, ideal or transcendent.

In his later writings Tillich seems to have combined these two characteristics into his notion of "symbolic material."[45] The notion indicates both movements: the ability of the material to be symbolic, to point beyond itself; the ability of the material to concretely express what it symbolizes.

Tillich's work on signs and symbols has, from the first, been a matter of much discussion and critique. One point of contention is the rather limiting notion that Tillich attaches to "symbol." He disagrees with many mathematicians, linguists and philosophers today who have a larger understanding of what symbol is or who are willing to view more realities as "real symbols."[46] This leads into a second, although related, point of contention: some people disagree with Tillich's understanding of "participation" in his sign-symbol differentiation: that "signs" do not participate in any way in the reality and power of that to which they point, while symbols do.[47] For example, Tillich considers mathematical operational designations "signs," but mathematicians call them "symbols," because mathematicians recognize the deep participation that exists between the visible figures and the operations they signify. Something similar is true with regard to the relationship between "words" and "meaning": Tillich refuses to call all words "symbolic" while linguists do because of the intimate relationship established between the formed word and the elusive personal intention. In both cases the charge is that either Tillich's personal understanding of mathematical functions and words, for example, is too limited, or that his notion of "participation" is more specific than he leads people to believe. The matter is further complicated because, in fact, Tillich uses the notion of "participation" in various ways throughout his writings and never describes precisely what he means.[48] Whether these criticisms are true or not from our own perspective will be considered below.

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[44] G.W. 5: 196.

[45] "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

[46] "R.S.K.G.," p. 190.

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[47] Ibid., pp. 189-190.

[48] Cf. Richard, "Symbolisme," 33 (1976): 56; Rowe, Religious Symbols, pp. 112-116; Lewis S. Ford, "The Three Strands of Tillich's Theory of Religious Symbols," The Journal of Religion 46 (January 1966): 118-124; Donald Dreisbach, "Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Religious Symbols," Encounter 37 (Autumn 1976): 331.

For whatever reasons, Tillich in his later writings seems to have finally accepted the word "symbol" in the breadth in which it is commonly used in scholarly circles today, but in order to distinguish this meaning from the one he intends, he adds the adjective "representative" in those instances.[49] While such a move satisfies the sensitivities of many, it leaves the basic contentions unclarified.

The Differences Between "Sign" and "Symbol"

In 1961 Tillich first limited the realms in which true symbols appear: language and history, the arts and religion.[50] He then distinguished symbols from signs in these realms by their referents: the symbol points to something that cannot be grasped directly:

> This "something" can be the connotations of a word which transcend the empirical reality of this person, or it can be a dimension of reality which is not open to an ordinary encounter with reality as the artistic forms, or it can be ultimate reality...[51]

In Tillich's first article on religious symbols he spoke about the symbol's Selbstmächtigkeit, its innate power.[52]

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[49] "M.J.R.S.," p. 3. For the sake of clarity we will continue to use the word "sign" instead of "symbol" in its larger meaning. We will also continue to use the word "symbol" in its narrower meaning of "representative symbol."

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., p. 4.

[52] G.W. 5: 196.

What he sought to insure by Selbstmächtigkeit was a depth and reality which mere signs do not possess, but which symbols do. By this he also sought to explain why symbols could not be created or manufactured at will or even by convention. Therefore, in his earliest writings he described symbols as having a special inner power, or better, Notwendigkeit, inner necessity, thereby recognizing the natural process of a symbol's rising and dying.[53]

Examples of this power and necessity are found in "Natur und Sakrament."[54] Water, light, colors, trees, certain animals, configurations of nature, certain recurring events and words are, through a realistic interpretation of nature, so bound together that they become bearers of transcendent power and meaning. Through this symbolic-romantic interpretation of nature, nature is given back its qualitative character, its depth, its meaningfulness.[55]

But such an explanation could tend to make the symbol almost magical and cancel out the symbol's Uneigentlichkeit. This was not Tillich's intent; while he does not want to view symbols magically, he does not want to consider them conventionally either. The point is to establish some balance, some relationship, and so Tillich responded to Edwin Aubrey's criticism:

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[53] Ibid.

[54] This article appeared in Religiöse Verwirklichung. Our source is Symbol und Wirklichkeit (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 49-70.

[55] Ibid., p. 57.

> Symbols are nearer to the reality expressed in them. Their direct, immediate, non-symbolic nature must have an original affinity to the symbolic content they represent.[56]

In other words, the natural qualities of the symbol make it "adequate" to its symbolic use. Lewis Ford calls this a "natural affinity" or an "intrinsic affinity" to the symbolic content.[57]

In Tillich's more recent works, however, he no longer speaks of "inner power" but of "participation." Perhaps the former approach seemed too dangerous or too easily misunderstood. At any rate, what distinguishes symbols from signs in his later works is the element of participation.[58] While both signs and symbols point beyond themselves to something else, signs do not participate in any way in the reality and power of that to which they point; symbols, on the other hand, do, although they are not identical with that which they symbolize.[59]

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[56] Tillich, "Symbol and Knowledge," p. 204.

[57] Ford, "Three Strands," p. 120.

[58] Ibid., p. 121. This approach is found in "Religion and Secular Culture," The Protestant Era, trans. by James Luther Adams, abridged edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948; Phoenix Books, 1957), pp. 55-65; "Theology and Symbolism;" "R.S.K.G.;" D.F.; "M.J.R.S.;" S.T.: 2.

[59] Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert Kimball (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 54; D.F., p. 42; S.T. 1: 177; "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

Once again we run into the question of participation. Lewis Ford analyzed Tillich's statement in Systematic Theology where he describes the functions of participation.[60] Ford's conclusion is to the point:

> Symbolic participation means nothing more than that the symbol bears associative overtones which the sign does not possess and that it possibly bears natural resemblances with that which is symbolized.[61]

With this Tillich takes issue. He responds:

> The reason for my use of the term "participation" is the desire to make the difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and, at the same time, to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis, namely, to show a positive point of identity.[62]

Thus we see that Tillich's use of the notion is for a twofold purpose: to sharply distinguish symbol from sign and to show a positive point of identity between the symbol and the thing symbolized.

We must agree with Ford and Rowe that Tillich has not made enough distinctions in his notion of participation. He seems to too simplistically exclude sign from any sort of participation. Something that "points to" does, in a certain sense, "participate," even if this participation is achieved through a first agreement or convention. This seems to some extent to be implied in Tillich's Uneigentlichkeit. If, for example, knowledge requires participation between the subject and the object, all the concepts or images involved play some sort of mediating role in the process; they somehow participate in the truth.[63] Similarly, while the "red light" is not the danger itself, its meaningful existence depends on the existing danger and calls attention to the danger by communicating "danger!" Now this is, in some sense, participation in the danger. The very forming of words and functioning of language is, to some extent, arbitrary, but words once agreed upon and structure once formed in turn inform and thus participate in structuring knowledge for the individual and the community.

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[60] S.T. 1: 177.

[61] Ford, "Three Strands," p. 124.

[62] Tillich, "Rejoinder," p. 188.

Admittedly, the words "sign" and "symbol" are not exactly identical, although they are sometimes used interchangeably. Tillich wants to address himself to the power that symbols have, a power which signs do not seem to have, a power which is derived from somewhere or, as Tillich says, through participation in that which is signified. He wants to say that symbolic participation is more than epistemological, i.e., knowledge understood in its ordinary dimension. Tillich himself notes many levels of symbolic participation: ontological, psychological, social, historical and personal. A better approach, although not completely fulfilling his purpose, might be to view "sign" and "symbol" on a continuum: that which is strictly sign on one end, that which is fully symbol on the other. The movement from sign to symbol would then indicate participation in any combination of dimensions not given to mere signs and would draw the whole person into closest communion with it. More on this will be said later.

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[63] In S.T. 1: 177 Tillich acknowledges that the knower participates in the known.

Tillich's other reason for using the term "participation" has to do with establishing a positive point of identity between the symbol and that which is symbolized or pointed to. The trouble with his earlier notion of "inherent power" is that properly inherent power is not identical with anything else; it does not solve the quest for identity. The word "participation" itself does not allow for total identity either, but it does demand some common ground on which participation can take place, and it does preserve something of Tillich's former insight regarding inner power, that is, the power of being which grounds both subjectivity and objectivity. While no thing "owns" the power of being as its own, every thing does participate in it. In this ontological sense, the notion of participation is valid.

Other dimensions of life, however, can also ground symbols. A person's actions in so far as they incarnate his/her person, symbolize the person in his/her personal dimension. In this case, the person's actions participate in the person's being and actually inform it. The point of identity is the person. In a similar way the flag too can participate in the self-expression of a particular social or political community. The point of identity is in the social or political dimension of the community and rests in the group image.

In the above instances two functions of symbols are implied: one as representative, the other as illuminating. "The symbol represents something which is not itself, for which it stands and in the power and meaning of which it participates."[64] The statement has a negative and a positive side. The symbol is not that for which it stands. On the other hand, it participates in the power and meaning of that for which it stands. What is more, through its presence the symbol makes that for which it stands known because that for which it stands cannot be directly known.[65] In other words, the symbol is necessary for knowledge in the specific dimension of that for which it stands. It is in this sense that we can speak of Notwendigkeit, not because of innate power and not necessarily even because of natural affinity (although this is not ruled out), but because of suitability or "fittingness" in some dimension. Such an approach frees us from idolatry and magic and retains the ground for Uneigentlichkeit and Anschaulichkeit.

The notion of participation, then, can be helpful in distinguishing sign from symbol, but it needs clearer precision. Whether this notion is ultimately helpful with regard to religious symbols will be taken up later.

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[64] T.C., p. 56; "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

[65] "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

Other Characteristics of "Symbol"

The other function of "symbol," the illuminating function, has more to do with the person or group who experiences the symbol than with the symbolic referent. Tillich calls this the main function of the symbol: "the opening up of the levels of reality which otherwise are hidden and cannot be grasped in any other way."[66] As an example of this function Tillich uses artistic symbols, poetry, the visual arts and music. These symbols not only open reality, they also open the soul so that a deeper level of communion can take place.[67] The history of religions gives endless examples of the elevating, recollecting, and stabilizing power of symbols as well as of their destructive and disquieting powers.[68]

In the process of illuminating, the specific symbolic material opens the soul in a specific direction or in a specific dimension that is dependent upon the specific symbol used, and in a way that only it can do. It can function this way because it grows out of the individual or collective unconscious, and it can only function in the manner in which it is accepted by that unconscious dimension of being.[69] That is why a symbol cannot be invented or manufactured, why it is not conventional or intentional. Once again we return to the symbol's "necessity," its Notwendigkeit, but this time from the point of view of the relationship between recipient and symbolic material.

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[66] T.C., p. 56; D.F., p. 42; "M.J.R.S.," pp. 4-5.

[67] D.F., p. 42. In this article the opening up of the dimension of the soul is seen as a separate characteristic. See also "M.J.R.S.," p. 5.

[68] This integrating and disintegrating power of symbols refers both to individuals and groups. "M.J.R.S.," p. 5.

The fact that symbols grow out of the individual or collective unconscious indirectly leads us to Tillich's fourth characteristic of the symbol as found in his "Das religiöse Symbol," Anerkanntheit, that quality that allows a symbol to be recognized or accepted by a group as symbolic.[70] For Tillich the act by which a symbol is created is a social act; without social acceptance there can be no symbol. Even though a symbol might arise out of the individual unconscious, it still requires social rootedness and social support.[71] Anerkanntheit, then, refers to the symbol's ability to appeal to a group of people and to be supported by them. In a way, our final questions have already been answered: Why don't symbols exist continually? Why do they metaphorically "die?" We already know that a symbol needs to participate in the individual or collective unconscious and that it needs to be able to be accepted by the community. If it no longer does this, it is no longer a symbol, but merely a vestige of a symbol. Similarly, when a symbol no longer "uncovers reality" or represents reality for the soul or community, it is no longer a symbol either. Symbols therefore die when either the inner situation of the human group is no longer manifest by the symbol or when the symbol no longer manifests the depth of reality in a specific dimension. Since "life" keeps changing and since human relationships in ambiguous life keep changing, symbols too will change.

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[69] D.F., p. 43; "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

[70] G.W. 5: 197; "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

[71] G.W. 5: 197; "M.J.R.S.," p. 4.

Religious Symbols

With the distinctions between "sign" and "symbol" and the characteristics of symbols-in-general before us, we can turn to those symbols which are called "religious symbols." The religious symbol is a special type of symbol in that its proper concern is with the religious dimension of life which, for Tillich, is the depth dimension of life. Religious symbols are involved in revelation, in theology and in religion; what distinguishes them from all other types of symbols is their referent: God, being itself, ultimate concern. Only religious symbols point to and represent this depth of reality.

What was said above concerning symbols in general must also apply to religious symbols: these too must point beyond themselves and contain something of that to which they point; they must possess Anschaulichkeit, Uneigentlichkeit, Notwendigkeit and Anerkanntheit. The major difference between religious symbols and all others rests in the fact that that to which these symbols point, ultimate reality, transcends everything in the world: every object and every conceptualization.

The nature of religious symbols makes them attractive for theology's purposes; in fact, theology could not function without them. It needs religious symbols to speak of God, His-Her attributes, and His-Her manifestations; it needs religious symbols to fashion its creeds and, most importantly, to answer the ultimate questions of the existential person. But religious symbols are also the very "stuff" of revelation for Tillich, and the dwelling place of the Holy; they are the means whereby one can enter into communion with God and experience salvation.

The Classification of Religious Symbols

In several articles on the subject Tillich has variously classified religious symbols. In "Das religiöse Symbol" and "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols" the classifications compare. In these articles the categories seem to arise out of a history-of-religions perspective. What distinguishes the two articles are the names used for the two different types of symbols mentioned and the ontological presuppositions behind those name choices; the basic description of the two types of symbols, however, is the same. The first type of symbols, those that symbolize

God, His-Her attributes and actions, and natural and historical holy objects are called Gegenstandssymbols or primary symbols respectively.[72] The second type of symbols, those that support the first type because they do not have or no longer enjoy any independent status, are called Hinweissymbols or secondary symbols respectively.[73] Gegenstandssymbols and Hinweissymbols presuppose an ontological structure that centers symbolic "power" in the symbols themselves; primary and secondary symbols presuppose a structure that emphasizes "participation."

In "Theology and Symbolism" and "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God" the classification is different. Here the distinction seems more theological and phenomenological and symbols are classified according to levels. The highest level in both articles is the transcendent level on which is found the symbols of God, His-Her attributes and actions.[74] The next level is variously called the sacramental or immanent level on which is found incarnations of the divine and other realities that are bearers of the holy.[75] Finally on the liturgical level or third element of the immanent level are found the "sign-symbols," signs which have become symbols.[76]

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[72] G.W. 5: 206; "M.J.R.S.," pp. 8-9.

[73] G.W. 5: 209-210; "M.J.R.S.," p. 9.

[74] "Theology and Symbolism," pp. 113-114; "R.S.K.G.," pp. 193-194.

[75] "Theology and Symbolism," pp. 114-115; "R.S.K.G.," p. 195. In "Theology and Symbolism" incarnations and sacraments are all put together and the entire level is called sacramental. In "R.S.K.G." incarnations are considered first and then follows the "sacramental."

From this brief description one can see that the major area of diversity in the classifications is the area of the incarnations of the divine and the natural holiness of certain objects. This area will be considered in the section on "Sacrament."

The Religious Dimension and Religious Symbols

Religious symbols have to do with the religious dimension, the religious depth of all life. This dimension is not a separate and distinct dimension for Tillich, but rather includes all other dimensions of life while being qualitatively different. The religious dimension reaches through all dimensions of life to the depth of reality itself, to that which is of ultimate concern.

> Religion opens up the depth of man's spiritual life which is usually covered by the dust of our daily life and the noise of our secular work. It gives us the experience of the Holy, of something which is untouchable, awe-inspiring, an ultimate meaning, the source of ultimate courage.[77]

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[76] "Theology and Symbolism," p. 115; "R.S.K.G.," p. 196.

[77] T.C., p. 9. Since Barth's early attacks upon religion and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's plea for a "religionless Christianity," theologians have maintained a cautious attitude toward it. One specific reason seems to be so that Christian revelation might be preserved from the humanity of religion; another reason seems to be so that people would accept the full responsibilities of life in society rather than escaping into religion. In either case, religion was viewed negatively. Tillich, on the other hand, takes a more

The religious dimension essentially, then, is the dimension of the "holy" as it manifests the true meaning and power of all that exists.

However, religion only "exists" because of our tragic estrangement from true being.[78] Because of the existential situation religion is only one dimension of life, although the depth dimension. Because of this situation religion can make itself the ultimate and cut itself off from the secular realm. This means that the religious dimension in existence is capable at once of manifesting and distorting true being; it also means that religious symbols bear this same capability.

But religious symbols also exist in the theological circle within the religious dimension. Theology, on the boundary between philosophy and religion, seeks to correlate the revelation of the depth of being with the questions from the structure of being; it seeks to correlate revelation and existential ontology, and to do this it uses religious symbols. Thus religious symbols, as noted by Ford, have two closely allied functions: one religious and one metaphysical, depending on their orientation: toward the religious dimension of the person, or toward

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positive, although realistic attitude toward religion, one that is also non-polemical. The subject will be taken up again later in this chapter.

[78] Ibid.

ontological theology.[79]

The Religious Function of Religious Symbols

To fulfill Tillich's religious function, the symbol must be capable of representing that which ultimately concerns us.

> It must serve as a vehicle for our commitment and devotion, receiving its full meaning only within this context. It must also protect us from idolatry, that is, from substituting a proximate and finite reality for that which is ultimate.[80]

Whether the symbol has this possibility is the concern of this section.

To begin with the person and the person's ultimate concern would be to begin in the wrong place; we begin, instead, with revelation. Since God is transcendent, the only way that one can know God is if God chooses to reveal Her-Himself. However, for Tillich no human knowledge is transmitted in revelation; revelation rather reveals the mystery that God is and how we are in relation to God.

In the revelatory action three different viewpoints can be distinguished: (1) that of the giftedness of the "holy," (2) that of the receivedness of the person, and (3) that of the symbolic material itself. We will briefly examine each.

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[79] Ford, "The Ontological Foundation," p. 145.

[80] Ibid., p. 144.

(1) If God, who is transcendent, who is ground of being, wishes to manifest Him-Herself, S-He can only do so through created being, and then only when the being involved is translucent to God's power. However, even when the created being is open to God there is danger of demonization because what is revealed might be misunderstood: that which is the medium for the revelation might be mistaken as the source. Were that to happen, true revelation would be in jeopardy.

(2) The person, for his/her part, must be able to receive this revelation. Tillich describes this openness as the "immediate awareness" of the Unconditioned:

> Awareness...is used as the most neutral term, avoiding the connotations of the terms intuition, experience, knowledge. Awareness of the Unconditioned has not the character of "intuition," for the Unconditioned does not appear in this awareness as a "Gestalt" to be intuited, but as an element, a power, a demand.[81]

The power of the Unconditioned is experienced as that which sustains the quest for a more adequate appreciation and understanding of that which is ultimate.[82] The "demand" of the Unconditioned elicits from the person the responsibility to seek the most adequate expression of itself; it gives the person a basis from which to judge, but it provides no expressions of the Unconditioned. In a sense, immediate awareness is "blank": it is nothing more than a point which

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[81] T.C., pp. 22-23. What Tillich means by "element" escapes us.

[82] Ford, "The Ontological Foundation," p. 78.

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is empty but unconditionally certain.[83] It does, however, provide for the possibility of receiving revelation.

The person must also be able to understand the revelation. This is possible because, as we have said above, for Tillich the essence of reason is identical with the content of revelation, and the logos of the person has its source in the divine Logos. Furthermore, the material used in the revelation comes from creation.

(3) This moves us to our third and major concern: the symbolic material used in the revelation. For Tillich anything in reality can ideally become the symbolic medium because everything participates in being-itself.[84] However, the symbolic medium itself is important:

> Although nothing has become the bearer of revelation by its outstanding qualities, these qualities determine the direction in which a thing or event expresses our ultimate concern and our relation to the mystery of being.[85]

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[83] Paul Tillich, "The Problem of Theological Method II," Journal of Religion 27 (January 1947): 23. Tillich prefers this notion to one of receptivity because the danger of implying some "content" is greater when the latter notion is used. Through the use of the notion "immediate awareness" Tillich steers a course between Barth and Thomas Aquinas. Revelation has some preparation and expectation in human existence, but it is not manifest through some sort of natural theology. This last point, however, might be argued. Ford does this in "The Ontological Foundation," pp. 72-85.

[84] S.T. 1: 118. This includes principles, categories, essences and values. Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 22-23.

[85] S.T. 1: 118.

The symbolic material itself must be suitable to the dimensions of the soul it is opening, besides being suitable in itself to the depth of the reality that it is revealing. It has Notwendigkeit in both directions: necessity for this revelation--to this specific person or group at this specific time and under these specific circumstances.[86]

What is the relationship between the holy-itself and the symbolic material of revelation? Tillich approaches this relationship in three ways: through (1) a dialectic of affirmation-negation, (2) an extended use of the metaphor of the "transparency" of the symbolic medium and (3) a theory of participation.[87]

(1) The dialectic of affirmation-negation applies best to linguistic symbols. Since this is not our main emphasis we will merely describe the process in general terms. Tillich says that every religious symbol negates itself in its literal meaning, but affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning.[88] Through negating itself, the symbol avoids equivocity, but through affirming itself it avoids univocity. It is only in this way that the symbol can point to something else and yet contain something of that to which it points, and it is in seeking this middle ground

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[86] The Uneigentlichkeit, Anschaulichkeit and Anerkanntheit of the symbol could also be mentioned here in this regard.

[87] Ford, "Three Strands," p. 106.

[88] S.T. 1: 9.

between identity and difference that Tillich sees a similarity with the analogia entis.[89]

(2) By transparency Tillich means the symbol's ability to manifest the "holy."[90] The religious symbol must reveal something of the holy-itself and at the same time mediate the experience of holiness for the person or group.[91] If the holy is to be able to take hold of the symbolic material and manifest itself through it, the symbolic material must give up its own proper meaning. To the extent that the symbolic material is transparent, the ultimate is visible and the symbolic power of the medium is affirmed.

Tillich further explains the notion of transparency through a dialectic of affirmation-negation:

> The segment of finite reality which becomes the vehicle of a concrete assertion about God is affirmed and negated at the same time. It becomes a symbol, for a symbolic expression is one whose proper meaning is negated by that to which it points. And yet it also is affirmed by it, and this affirmation gives the symbolic expression an adequate basis for pointing beyond itself.[92]

The object therefore denies its own proper meaning and in so doing is affirmed by the "holy" and manifests the "holy" through itself.

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[89] Tillich, "Rejoinder," p. 188.

[90] S.T. 1: 80, 120, 134, 151; P.E., pp. 78, 109; D.F., p. 60.

[91] "M.J.R.S.," p. 5.

[92] S.T. 1: 239.

through itself.

Ford criticized Tillich's notion of "transparency" on several different levels and Tillich accepted this criticism using a different term to clarify his meaning:

> What I intended had to be called translucent, which does not allow that things are clearly seen through it (e.g., stained window). The light shines through the stained window, but the window contributes something, the manifoldness, diverse intensity, and interrelation of colors.[93]

The word "translucency" makes Tillich's meaning more apparent: the symbolic material itself is extremely important for the referent: it not only makes the referent manifest, but it makes the referent manifest _in the dimension possible through this particular symbolic material_. The "necessity" of the symbolic material becomes more obvious through this conceptual change, but so do the dangers of demonization which now have greater opportunity for mistaking the symbolic material for the "holy" itself.

(3) The third way that Tillich relates the symbolic material to the "holy" is through a theory of _participation_. Since all beings, by their nature, participate in the power of being, all beings _can_ become religious symbols, i.e., they can share in the power of being and, at the same time, manifest that power. The term "participation" at once guarantees proper grounding and proper distancing for revelation: the symbolic material both reveals the referent in

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[93] Ford, "Three Strands," pp. 113-117; Tillich, "Rejoinder," p. 187.

whom it participates and denies that it itself is identical with that revelation. "Participation" also distinguishes the primary or ground reality from the secondary realities that manifest the ground, each in their own proper way.

"Participation" and "translucency" share much in common: both refer to the symbolic material in relation to the referent and both presuppose a grounding referent. Both also serve Tillich's phenomenological description of the "holy:" "participation" by focusing on symbolic material's "shared life" with the "holy," "translucency" by focusing on the "holy" manifesting itself through the symbolic material. What distinguishes them, is this very difference of focus: "participation" points to the grounding referent, "translucency" points to the receiver.

Religious symbols, then, are the adequate and necessary means of representing that which ultimately concerns us and there can be little doubt as to their capability. Whether they actually fulfill this function must be judged in each instance. "The measure of their truth is the measure of their self-negation with respect to what they point to, the Holy-Itself, the ultimate power of being and meaning."[94]

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[94] "M.J.R.S.," p. 11. Tillich's ontological function of religious symbols deals with his concern for philosophical language concerning God. He wants the religious symbol to be capable of designating being-itself. His main method, affirmation-negation, is basically applied to linguistic religious symbols. But the pursuit of this question would take us far

The Religious Symbol of "Jesus the Christ as the New Being"

Up to this point we have been describing religious symbols in general with a focus on non-linguistic symbols. We did this through describing Tillich's notion of revelation. In the following paragraphs we will look at the most powerful symbol of all, the symbol centered in Jesus, the symbol of "Jesus the Christ as the New Being." This symbol is central for Tillich for a number of reasons: it is the focus of the transcendent and the immanent; at the same time it is the highest form of earthly symbol: it is personal; it is the most powerful symbol, bringing redemption and salvation through it; it is the most unambiguous symbol, overcoming the conditions of existence; it is the final revelation and telos of all religious history. From an examination of this symbol we will be able to more clearly understand what "religious symbol" means at its deepest level to Tillich, and we shall thus be better able to critique this notion. The question around which our discussion will be based is: "Does the symbolic phrase 'Jesus Christ as the New Being' fulfill the religious function?"

Our remarks will be confined to the following areas: Tillich's understanding of "New Being"; the relation of Jesus of Nazareth to Jesus, the Christ; the relation of "the

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afield from our concern, which is primarily non-linguistic religious symbols.

Christ" to "New Being"; a critique of Tillich's Christological position based on the symbol "Jesus the Christ as the New Being."

Tillich's Understanding of "New Being"

New Being for Tillich is that being which has overcome the self-estrangement of existence and brought with it reconciliation and reunion, meaning and hope.[95] It is "essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence."[96] New Being is _new_ in that it is the _undistorted_ manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence. It is also new in that it is _actualized_ essential being and not merely the essential being-in-potency.[97]

The notion of "New Being" in _Systematic Theology_ is difficult to define. At one point Tillich admits that "New Being" is a term of his own invention for that reality "in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome."[98] In another place he calls "New Being" a _theological term_, but one with many connotations:

> Being carries connotations of a metaphysical and logical character; it has metaphysical implications when used in relation to God as being-itself. "New" in connection

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[95] _S.T._ 1: 49.

[96] Ibid., 2: 118-119.

[97] Ibid., p. 119.

[98] Ibid., 1: 49.

> with "Being" has connotations of creativity, regeneration, eschatology. These elements of meaning always are present when a term like "New Being" appears.[99]

In a third place, however, he calls "New Being" a religious symbol:

> But it is only for those who receive him as the final revelation, namely, as the Messiah of Christ, the Man-from-above, the Son of God, the Spirit, the Logos-who became-flesh--the New Being. All these terms are symbolic variations of the theme first enunciated by Peter...[100]

The reality of the quest for "New Being" is a universal one, according to Tillich, "because of the human predicament."[101] But the quest itself is a consequence of universal revelation, and, in fact, appears in all religions.[102] This implies that the reality of "New Being" arises out of the religious dimension of the person through a revelatory experience that contrasts with the person's existential condition. While the revelation has no concrete content that can be "named" as such, it nevertheless has some positive content. The certainty of the content is based on the religious experience and the revelation of that experience: how God is in relation to the person. It is because of this experience that one can quest for "New Being."

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[99] Ibid., p. 55.

[100] Ibid., p. 136.

[101] Ibid., 2: 86.

[102] Ibid., pp. 86, 89.

By description "New Being" answers the questions raised by the existential condition of the person: it is the reality that overcomes the self-estrangement of existence. Based on Tillich's ontology, "New Being" is everything essential being is and more: it is actualized without the estrangement of existence. What beings cannot achieve by their own power is achieved in "New Being."

But is "New Being" truly a religious symbol? Certainly the reality to which it points needs some type of symbolic conceptualization. In fact, Tillich mentions that different religions have called it by various names and described it differently.[103] But does "New Being" participate in this reality to which it points? Is the mention of those words strong enough to open up levels of reality and convey the urgency of the quest? I think not. The words, "New Being," while they are conceptually universal, are not even generally symbolic, let alone religiously symbolic. True, they suggest an ontological basis and thus have a theological appeal in a system of correlation such as Tillich's, but they are also an invention of his to show the universality of the quest and the universality of the final revelation accomplished in Jesus the Christ.[104] "New Being" is not a "religious" name in itself nor is it "holy" or special in any religious tradition. It does not open up levels of reality in people, nor is it socially recognized as a religious symbol. At most it seems to refer to a religious symbol, Jesus the Christ.

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[103] Ibid., pp. 86-88.

[104] Ibid., 1: 49.

The Relation of "Jesus of Nazareth" to "Jesus the Christ"

The next step in our analysis is to determine what Tillich holds as regards the relationship between Jesus of Nazareth and "the Christ," but in order to do this, we must first of all determine the meaning of "the Christ." Tillich says that "Christ" is a symbol that transcends Christianity and Judaism.[105] The "Christ" is the anointed one, the king who was to conquer the enemies and establish peace and justice, the "Messiah" who would transform historical existence. At the time of Jesus of Nazareth this title did not suggest elements of divinity; it was only through the reflection of the early church on the "Easter experience" that Jesus became "the Christ" and that "Jesus the Christ" became the church's central religious symbol, rich in meaning and importance, subsuming most other titles of Jesus under it.

Tillich, influenced by the whole "life-of-Jesus-controversy" and especially by Bultmann, distinguishes the

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[105] Ibid., 2: 88. In a later discussion Tillich qualifies what he means by "Christ" as symbol. "Christ," as the imagery connected with the term is only symbolic, not symbol. It is symbol only when related to Jesus. Paul Tillich, Ultimate Concern, ed. by Mackenzie Brown (London: SCM Press, 1966), p. 146.

"Jesus of history" from the "Christ of faith." However, he seems to derive the meaning of "the Christ" from the meaning of "New Being," thereby extending the meaning of "the Christ" beyond its New Testament base. Tillich argues that this is what the Christian tradition has done, but some would perhaps take exception to the way that Tillich himself proceeds.[106] If their criticisms are valid, then Tillich seems to be ascribing his own meaning to "the Christ" to fit the questions of today, but lacking historical perspective and consistency. One thing is sure: it is the living revelation of "Jesus the Christ," the faith-picture of Jesus the Christ that becomes Tillich's "New Being."

But what about "Jesus of Nazareth?" Tillich uses this phrase to point to the historical person, Jesus. What is of extreme importance to him is that Jesus of Nazareth is the historical base for Jesus the Christ. What is important is the that of Jesus' existence because it bases the manifestation of New Being in one concrete personal life.[107] But it is here that Tillich makes other distinctions. Because he realizes that there is a remote possibility of the nonexistence of the historical Jesus of the Gospel stories, and because he realizes that a much deeper gap can be seen between the historical event and its Pauline interpretation, Tillich is not willing to base his Christological section on historical evidence.[108] Christian faith, for him, does not guarantee the historicity of the man named "Jesus" who came from Nazareth, although it affirms this. However, Christian faith does guarantee that the scriptural picture is an expression of the bearer of the Spirit, who, through this picture, creates and recreates human beings spiritually.[109] It is not, therefore, that history is unimportant, but that scholarship with regard to historical data is insufficient.

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[106] This is the conclusion of Kenan Osborn's work, New Being (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).

[107] S.T. 2: 98, 154.

Consequently the Jesus that we find in the scriptures is the Jesus of faith, Jesus the Christ. It is he who points to God and contains something of God, and it is he who bears the "holy," the actual and final revelation of God.[110] That the Jesus of scripture is the medium of revelation makes revelation concrete and gives it definite content. However, if this revelation in Jesus is to be final, then Jesus must surrender his finitude and become universal. This, for Tillich, is accomplished in the symbol of the Cross, which signifies not only the actual death of Jesus, but his whole life of self-offering.[111] Through his willingness to give up everything about himself that was finite, he could become completely translucent to the mystery that he reveals.[112] "Jesus became the Christ by conquering the demonic forces which tried to make him demonic by tempting him to claim ultimacy for his finite nature."[113] His death on the cross was the ultimate moment of his translucency because it showed the complete termination of his historical existence.

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[108] Tillich, "Rejoinder," p. 193.

[109] Ibid., p. 192; U.C., pp. 146-147.

[110] S.T. 1: 132-137.

But the resurrection is the other side of death.

> The Cross of the Christ is the Cross of the one who has conquered the death of existential estrangement... And the Resurrection of the Christ is the Resurrection of the one who, as the Christ, subjected himself to the death of existential estrangement.[114]

If one, then, wishes to examine the "content" of the revelation that is manifest in Jesus the Christ, one would look through the picture of Jesus in the Scriptures to the clearest manifestation: that of the resurrected Christ. It is under the symbol of the Resurrection that the true content of the revelation through Jesus the Christ is manifest. Moreover, through this event the certainty of our own victory over the death of existential estrangement is also manifest.[115]

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[111] One can see Tillich's Lutheran Christological background at work here, i.e., a strong "theology of the cross."

[112] Ibid., p. 134. We apply Tillich's corrective here.

[113] Ibid., p. 133.

[114] Ibid., 2: 153.

Does "Jesus the Christ" fulfill the religious function of the religious symbol? The power of the name "Jesus Christ" is attested to in all of Christendom. This power, together with its self-negating emphasis, makes "Jesus the Christ" a true religious symbol.

The Relation of "The Christ" to "New Being"

If "Jesus the Christ" is religiously symbolic in and of himself, what then does "New Being" add? It is obvious that Tillich wishes to give a notion of finality and universality to "Jesus the Christ." The notion of finality is accomplished by calling the revelation of Jesus the Christ the final revelation and by showing that in this revelation Jesus the Christ, through his death, becomes completely translucent. The notion of universality is affirmed by calling Jesus the Christ the "New Being."

"New Being" is actually the larger term, the more universal and existentially meaningful term for Tillich's theology. The power of the "New Being" is what is present in every revelation, not specifically Jesus the Christ. Tillich argues:

> If then, the salvation to eternal life is made dependent upon the encounter of Jesus as the Christ and the acceptance of his saving power, only a small number of human beings will ever reach salvation... Only if salvation

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[115] Ibid., p. 155.

> is understood as healing and saving power through the New Being in all history is the problem put on another level. In some degree all men participate in the healing power of the New Being.[116]

What about Jesus the Christ? He becomes the "ultimate criterion of the healing and saving process" in whom the healing quality is complete and unlimited.[117]

"New Being," then, is the absolute saving term, the universal revealing term for Tillich, while "Jesus the Christ" is the clearest and most concrete manifestation of that term. By uniting the two in the statement, "Jesus the Christ is the New Being," Tillich believes he discovers a religious symbol that is most concrete and most universal at the same time. But what, in effect, happens is that Jesus the Christ becomes the symbol of New Being: Jesus the Christ points to New Being and contains something of that to which it points! However, "Jesus the Christ" is not equal to "New Being;" it is, rather, the "concrete content," the "final medium" of "New Being."

Some Hesitations

Tillich's Christology leaves us with several hesitations. We should simply like to list and explain them here, without offering a full critique. (1) Tillich uses the term "New Being" as a religious symbol although it is only a sign. This leads to three conclusions.

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[116] Ibid., p. 167.

[117] Ibid., p. 168.

(a) Tillich fails to consider two of the characteristics necessary for symbols: their Notwedigkeit and Anerkanntheit. While it is true that "New Being" has logical, metaphysical and theological connotations and serves as an adequate theological concept, "New Being" has no "necessity" of itself: it does not open up levels in people that would otherwise remain closed, nor is it even recognized by people as symbol. The term is merely Tillich's personal invention.

(b) "New Being" is used as a religious symbol on the strength of the power of the reality to which it points, but this in itself does not make it a religious symbol. Even if we agreed with Tillich that there is a "concrete reality" symbolized by "Jesus the Christ" that "New Being" names, it ("New Being") would not thereby become a symbol on that account; it would remain merely a sign of that reality. Yet, in relation to Spiritual Presence, Tillich seems to ascribe a fuller, richer relation to "New Being" than to "Jesus the Christ."[118] The result is conceptual confusion in his Christology.

(c) If "Jesus the Christ" is the final and most concrete revelation, but is not symbolic of the entire dimension of the universal, and if "New Being" is only a universal construct pointing to a universal content, then might there not be a revelation in the future that is more universal than Jesus the Christ? This possibility seems logical in Tillich's Christology, but it is unthinkable for Christianity.

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[118] Ibid., 3: 138, 144.

(2) Tillich's symbol, "Jesus the Christ," does not seem to have proper historical grounding. "Jesus the Christ" is based on the Scriptural picture and is connected to history only by a thin line: the _that_ of _a_ personal reality behind the Gospel story (which does not even include the historical reality of the name "Jesus").[119] Such an historical connection is at best tenuous and, without concrete specificity, thus seems to be no real historical connection at all. This has several consequences.

(a) While it is hypothetically possible to have a religious symbol, "Jesus the Christ," who is never truly manifest _in_ historical reality _as_ _concrete_ _person_, the truth of such a symbol (the power it has to accomplish its religious function) is at best questionable within traditional Christianity. If revelation is basically manifest in the _picture_ of "Jesus the Christ," how can Tillich say that the event on which Christianity is based is, on one side, "the fact which is called 'Jesus of Nazareth'?"[120] Does the mere fact that *someone*, who might have been named "Jesus of Nazareth," is the historical reality behind the scriptural image of "Jesus the Christ" provide a credible and substantial enough grounding for Christian faith? This is certainly not the position of the tradition itself, nor would such a minimal grounding be sufficient for it.

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[119] _U.C._, pp. 146-147. See also Kelsey, _Paul Tillich's Theology_, pp. 89-96.

[120] See _S.T._ 2: 97-113, 148, 151.

The fact that Tillich argues from an *analogia imaginis* brings him no closer to historical grounding and offers no correspondence to his notion of the "translucency" of Jesus.[121] *Analogia imaginis* merely implies some *general* historical grounding while translucency requires a much clearer historical reality. If "Jesus the Christ" is truly a religious symbol based on the fact of "Jesus of Nazareth," then "Jesus the Christ" is the result of "New Being" manifesting itself *through* "Jesus of Nazareth." This implies that there *is* "Jesus of Nazareth." Conversely, without

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[121] *Analogia imaginis* implies "an analogy between the picture and the actual personal life from which it has arisen." Ibid., pp. 114-115. This, however, seems to contradict Tillich's other statements in that it guarantees too much. Kelsey explains the passage this way: "The picture is analogous to its subject, but not because its details correspond in any way with what 'actually happened.' The analogy is purely one of function in revelatory occurrences. The clear implication is that the historical accuracy of the historical picture is a matter of complete indifference to theology." Kelsey, *Paul Tillich's Theology*. p. 97.

The notion of "translucency" is adapted from Tillich's corrective remarks with regard to "transparency." The fact that he generally applied "transparency" to Jesus of Nazareth (through the event of the Cross Jesus became transparent to the Christ) allows us to use this corrective here.

"Jesus of Nazareth" there is no adequate symbolic medium based in historical reality for "Jesus the Christ." If this reasoning is correct, then Tillich's "Jesus the Christ" cannot really be based in "Jesus of Nazareth;" the only other alternative seems to be that "Jesus the Christ" is born out of the unconscious desires of a group of people and continues to have power because of the needs of other people, but this would make the symbol more subjective, less revelational, and ultimately less powerful.

(b) If Tillich does not return to the historical level, to "Jesus of Nazareth," it is difficult to see how he can conceive of "Jesus the Christ" as the end of history. In that case saving power would never break into history or work through history, and the history of salvation would not be a part of universal history, at least not in the way that Tillich conceives it.[122] To return to the early church's picture of Jesus in history does not seem a satisfactory substitute, either. Only if "Jesus the Christ" is positively related to "Jesus of Nazareth" can any positive historical remarks be made.

(c) Furthermore, if Tillich does not return to the historical level,if "New Being" does not appear in a real personal life, it is difficult to see how all creation can be saved through him.[123] New Being's appearance in a personal life opens that possibility to all creation through Tillich's principle of universal participation, but if there is no personal life, then there can be no salvation through it.

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[122] S.T. 3: 363.

If this non-historical stance of Tillich's were rectified, however, most of the above criticisms would fade away. The fact that Tillich in several places refers positively to "Jesus of Nazareth" allows us to suggest a possible relationship between "Jesus of Nazareth" and "Jesus the Christ."[124] If the historical reality of "Jesus of Nazareth" were affirmed, and if this reality were seen as important for "Jesus the Christ," then "Jesus of Nazareth" would be the symbolic material of the religious symbol "Jesus the Christ," and, conversely, "Jesus the Christ" would be the reality to which "Jesus of Nazareth" points and in which he shares. This reality of "Jesus the Christ" would then subsequently become symbolized in the scriptural picture of "Jesus the Christ" and in the very name of Jesus. Thus the historical person, the scriptural picture, and the very name of Jesus the Christ would all be seen as being the symbolic materials of the reality of "Jesus the Christ," but each in its own proper dimension. Such an approach would provide a strong basis for understanding the continued power that Jesus the Christ has over those who come to believe in him without ever having seen him.

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[124] Especially Ibid., pp. 97-98. Our approach would be consistent with what Tillich says about Jesus of Nazareth in The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 98-100. See also S.T. 2: 153-155.

(3) Even if this last point is rectified, however, Tillich's Christology would still not sufficiently handle the question of the universal meaningfulness of Jesus the Christ. The only way this could possibly be achieved in Tillich's system would be through some sort of an extension of Christ's power so that all manifestations of the holy would somehow imply a manifestation of Jesus the Christ even if the symbol for that reality were not known. Still, while this move might speak positively to Christians, it would certainly be offensive to believers of other religions.

In conclusion, one can only wish that Tillich would have taken the need for the concrete, personal existence of Jesus the Christ more seriously into account and that he would have used "New Being" less symbolically. This would have afforded him a richer, more consistent view of Jesus the Christ and a clearer Christological position on the whole.

Tillich's Notion of "Sacrament"

Our analysis has brought us to the last topic to be investigated, Tillich's notion of "sacrament." Our procedure in the following paragraphs will be to, first of all, determine what Tillich means by "sacrament," and then to summarize the sacramental role in revelation and in the religious dimension of ambiguous life, paying special attention to Tillich's notion of the role of "sacrament" in Christianity. In this context, we will examine the relation of "Word" and "Sacrament," the specific sacraments of Baptism and Eucharist, and the question of a sacramental reality. Our final considerations will be in three related topics: Jesus the Christ as the *Ur-Sakrament*, the church as sacrament, and the relationship of sacraments to eschatology.

Tillich's Description of "Sacrament"

For Tillich sacraments are important because they are the concrete material necessary for all revelation, for all religious experience and for the foundation of religion and the church.[125] He distinguishes between three interrelated senses of the word:

> The largest sense of the term denotes everything in which the Spiritual Presence has been experienced; in a narrower sense, it denotes particular objects and acts in which a Spiritual Community experiences the Spiritual Presence; and in the narrowest sense, it merely refers to some "great" sacraments in the performance of which the Spiritual Community actualizes itself.[126]

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[125] *S.T.* 3: 120, 122; "M.J.R.S.," p. 9; Paul Tillich, "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian," *The Future of Religions*, ed. by Jerald Brauer (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 87.

[126] *S.T.* 3: 121.

This viewpoint is based on a wholistic notion of reality, i.e., in Tillich's belief-ful realism, and is consistent with what he has written about religious symbols in general.

In the largest sense, sacraments and religious symbols are synonymous.[127] As is true of religious symbols, anything at least essentially, can be sacramental matter in the largest sense of the term; anything, at least essentially, can manifest the Spiritual Presence. Because of the estrangement of existence, however, only certain things actually do manifest this presence and thereby become sacraments.

In a narrower sense sacraments for Tillich are properly non-linguistic objects which bear something of the "holy," whether this be called "New Being," "Spiritual Presence," or revelation, and which point to the holy manifested through them. Because they share the pointing and participating function of religious symbols, they are recognized as religious symbols, but only as part of the entire spectrum of religious symbols.[128]

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[127] Ulrich Reetz reaches this same conclusion. Every symbol has a sacramental character in which the Unconditional is transparent and conversely, every sacramental reality is also symbolic since it points to the Unconditional. Das Sakramentale in der Theologie Paul Tillichs (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1974), p. 83.

[128] "R.S.K.G.," p. 195.

In Tillich's classification of religious symbols he treats sacraments (in this narrower sense) after those linguistic symbols which refer to God and His-Her attributes.[129] He distinguishes two levels of sacramental symbols. On the first level are those concrete things, persons and actions which are the most powerful bearers of the "holy;" on the second level are what he calls "sign-symbols" or supporting symbols, things that become related to the primary sacramental symbols and enter into sacramental power through participation in these symbols.[130]

Revelation and Sacraments

"Any revelatory experience transforms the medium of revelation into a sacramental object, whether it is an object of nature, a human being, a historical event, or a sacred text."[131] The object becomes sacramental through participation in the "holy," i.e., in letting the "holy" manifest itself through it, in being translucent to the "holy." Therefore, a mutual dependency is acknowledged: revelation needs to be manifest through sacramental objects, and sacramental objects, in their turn, must manifest revelation, if they are to remain sacramental in their proper

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[129] Tillich, "Theology and Symbolism," pp. 114-115; "R.S.K.G.," pp. 195-196; "M.J.R.S.," p. 9.

[130] Only in "R.S.K.G." does Tillich distinguish "incarnations" from the sacramental level. P. 195.

[131] S.T. 1: 139.

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sense. What has already been said about revelation and religious symbols holds true here, but with one addition. In the context of religion in ambiguous life the sacramental object itself and the reception of that object distort the revelation. Why this happens will be described below; that this happens merely underlines the distorting and demonic power of sacramental objects.

Sacraments and the Religious Function in Ambiguous Life

Life in its essential nature is multidimensional for Tillich and it can be conceived in the dimensions of the spirit (dimensions proper only to humans): morality, culture and religion in their essential unity.[132] But under the conditions of existence life doesn't remain that way; separation and ambiguity are the results.

It is because of the conditions of existence that concrete religion itself exists. Essentially there should be no such thing as religion, because religion essentially is the self-transcending function of the dimension of the spirit. But under the conditions of existence concrete religion, or rather, a variety of religions, do exist in all their self-transcending, profanizing and demonizing ambiguities. In fact, religion and religions are necessary in ambiguous life. Tillich states, "The spirit requires

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[132] For this section see Tillich, "Religionsphilosophie," G.W. I, 297-364; S.T. 3: 11-111; T.C., pp. 3-9.

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embodiment in order to become real and effective."[133] Moreover, it is only when religion is embodied that religion's self-transcending function can operate, and it is only then that the real depth and substance of life can be reached.[134]

Religions are built around sacraments, which are the specific basis for the experience of the "holy" within the finite.[135] They are taken from nature and culture and thus exist under the conditions of ambiguous life, yet at the same time they are recognized as manifesting the "holy." As sacramental "materials" in ambiguous life, however, they are open to profanization and demonization: they can be institutionalized and reduced, or raised to levels of inherent holiness. In either of these situations, the true translucency of the sacramental material is not recognized. This can be prevented from happening if religion would realize the self-negating function of sacraments, the function by which the sacraments themselves are transcended.

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[133] Tillich, "Significance of the History of Religions," p. 82. Tillich gives an example of this self-negating function in popular form: "The reformers were right when they said that every day is the Lord's Day and, therefore, they devaluated the sacredness of the seventh day. But in order to say this, there must have been a Lord's Day, and that not only once upon a time but continuously in counterbalance against the overwhelming weight of the secular." (P. 83).

[134] "The way is to penetrate into the depth of one's own religion, in devotion, thought and action. In the depth of every living religion there is a point at which the religion itself loses its importance, and that to which it points breaks through its particularity, elevating it to spiritual freedom and with it to a vision of the spiritual presence in other expressions of the ultimate meaning of man's existence." Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 97.

[135] Tillich, "Significance of the History of Religions," p. 86.

The struggle in religion, then, is to maintain the concrete and self-transcending sides of the sacramental in such a way that the "holy" can continue to manifest itself even under the conditions of existence. But religion has another struggle also, since it must constantly push beyond its own limited reality, its own limited "sacraments" if it is to be fully true to its religious function. Religion must transcend itself also.

The Role of the Sacramental in Christianity

In order to understand Tillich's view of Christianity we cannot approach it as we might other religions. According to him, there is a major difference between Christianity and the other religions: Christianity has the principle of reformation and critique within itself.[136] While the Spiritual Presence, the experience of the "holy" under the dimension of the Spirit, is manifest in the whole of the history of religions, it is only in Jesus as the Christ that it is present without distortion.[137] Thus Jesus as the

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[136] S.T. 3: 153, 168.

[137] Ibid., pp. 141-144.

Christ is the central criterion for every manifestation of the Spiritual Presence. The Spiritual Community, established through the experience of the Spiritual Presence, is therefore, also determined by the appearance of Jesus as the Christ. The other religions, in so far as they only represent the Spiritual Community in its latency, lack the ultimate criterion of the faith and love they have; they lack the transcendent union of unambiguous life as it is manifest in the faith and love of Jesus the Christ. Without this ultimate principal of resistance these religions are open to profanization and demonization. Christianity, on the other hand, through the faith in Jesus the Christ manifest in the Spiritual Community, has this principal of resistance in itself and is able to apply it self-critically.[138]

However, as we have already noted above, the "Spiritual Community" and the "church" are not the same for Tillich. The Spiritual Community is the essence of the church, but "church" also implies the social and cultural existential reality.[139] This is the paradox of the church:

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[138] Ibid., p. 154. The principle of resistance derives from Christ's victory in the cross. The cross serves as the symbol of complete participation in existence and the conquering of the forces of estrangement. It is also the symbol of negation of any demonic claim. Ibid., 2: 123; Tillich, "Significance of the History of Religions," p. 89; D.F., p. 97.

[139] The Spiritual Community is not, however, a group existing beside other groups, but rather the power and structure inherent in the existing religious community.

that it participates, on the one hand, in the ambiguities of life in general and of the religious life in particular and, on the other hand, in the unambiguous life of the Spiritual Community.[140] Through the principle of resistance inside of it, the church must recognize and reject the ambiguities of life and religion without rejecting these constituting elements themselves.

The Sacramental Function

Tillich never systematically describes the role that sacramental material plays in his concept of church, but he does give some indications, and from these, inferences can be made. He states that sacramental elements serve as media for the Spiritual Presence.[141] What he seems to mean, however, is that they serve as media in such a way that the faith and love of the transcendent union are manifest *as flowing through Jesus the Christ*. This specifying phrase is derived from some of the requirements he sets for sacramental media: the sacramental act must be subject to the criterion of Jesus the Christ as the New Being; it must refer to the *historical* and *doctrinal* symbols in which revelatory experiences leading to the central revelation have been expressed.[142]

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[140] *S.T.* 3: 165.

[141] Ibid., p. 120.

[142] Ibid., p. 123. Within these limits all symbols which are adequate and which possess symbolic power can be

If the church would exist according to its nature and essence, there would be no need for specific sacraments of any kind, because, according to Tillich, all creation is essentially, although not existentially, symbolic of the Spiritual Presence.[143] However, since the church does exist in ambiguous life, in existential reality, there is a need for specific sacramental things and actions. Exactly what the role of the sacraments is can be determined by examining the basic functions of the church, as Tillich describes them.

Three groups of functions are seen as deriving immediately and necessarily from the nature of the church: constituting functions, expanding functions and constructing functions.[144] Each of these groups is, in turn, divided into various specific functions. The role of specific sacraments, therefore, will be determined by how the sacraments (in general) relate to the various functions. We will suggest that all of these functions involve sacramental material to some extent.

Sacramental material (in the largest sense) plays a central role in the constituting functions of the church: it fulfills the "receiving function" by providing the

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used. Ibid., pp. 123-124. Cf. also S.W., p. 66.

[143] S.T., 3: 158.

[144] Ibid., pp. 182-216.

medium (word and sacrament) for the Spiritual Presence; it fulfills the "worship function" by providing the central material (myth and ritual) that the community uses in its response to the Spiritual Presence in praise and thanksgiving, prayer and contemplation.[145]

Moreover, since word and sacrament are the central content of myth and ritual for Tillich, an essential relationship is established between them. It is because of this relationship that two seemingly opposed statements can be understood: that the church is founded on Word and sacrament, and that the church constitutes itself through ritual symbols and interprets itself in mythical ones.[146]

Sacramental material (in the largest sense) also seems to play some role in the *expanding functions* of the church.[147] Since Tillich sees the "mission function" of the church as the "actualization of the Spiritual Community

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[145] Ibid., pp. 189-192; 1: 139-140. With regard to worship Tillich states: "It is the function of the priest to conserve the sacramental object and to *keep alive the power of original revelation* by making new individuals, new groups and new generations enter the revelatory situation. The symbolic material used, transformed, and increased by every later revelation, and also by the final revelation, grows out of the priestly conservation and continuation of revelatory events." (Italics are mine.).

[146] Ibid., 3: 120; *D.F.*, pp. 117-118. Myth and ritual are also interdependent: "what is practical in the cult is imagined in the myth, and conversely."

[147] *S.T.* 3: 193-196.

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within the concrete churches all over the world," he seems to be indicating some role for sacramental material which, by description, is that through which the Spiritual Presence is actualized.[148] In the "education function" which introduces people "into the reality of the Spiritual Community, into its faith and into its love," sacramental material again provides the medium. Since the "evangelical function" calls for "mission toward the non-Christians within a Christian culture," sacramental material is once more of service.

Finally, the constructing functions, through which the church builds its life by using and transcending the functions of human life under the dimension of the spirit, also employ sacramental material (in the largest sense).[149] Architectural space, liturgical music and language, pictorial and sculptural representations, ritual gestures, etc., in that they manifest the Spiritual Presence, are sacraments and fulfill Tillich's "aesthetic function" by being such.[150] Moreover, since sacramental material, by definition, must manifest the "holy," it is also essential to the church's "communal" and "personal functions."[151]

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[148] Ibid., p. 193.

[149] Ibid., pp. 196-204.

[150] Ibid., p. 198.

[151] Ibid., pp. 204-212.

In fact, conversion, regeneration and sanctification must all employ sacramental material (in its largest sense) because this is the only media of the "holy."

These, then, are the ways that sacramental materials generally function in the church according to the functions of the church itself. But Tillich describes two other functions of sacramental materials in the church: a self-criticizing function and historico-religious function.

The _self-criticizing_ or _self-negating function_ of sacramental materials derives from the premise that Christianity has within it a principle of resistance: Jesus the Christ, the New Being, who has rejected the ambiguities of life and religion. Since the sacramental material manifests Jesus the Christ within Christianity, the sacraments too must have a _self-criticizing_ or _self-negating function_.[152] While they manifest the power and life of Jesus the Christ for us, they also deny that this power and life are centered in the sacramental material itself, no more than the power of Jesus the Christ is centered in himself. Furthermore they deny that this power and life are limited to this particular sacramental element as opposed to others. As long as the sacraments share in the power of the New Being in Jesus the Christ, they share in his self-transcendence and to this extent are true sacraments of Jesus the Christ.

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[152] _D.F._, p. 97; cf. also _S.W._, p. 66; _S.T._ 3: 254.

It is precisely for this reason that we believe Tillich sees the need for a sacramental connection with the historical tradition. Historical tradition and dogma are nothing else than the religio-cultural realities of the interaction of the Christ-experience and cultural form. If the Christ-centeredness, the principle of resistance is to be preserved, then some concrete reality of the Christ-experience must be preserved.[153] Without this concrete manifestation, no matter how inadequate, the central manifestation of Jesus the Christ would be lost. For the negating or self-transcending function of the Christian sacrament to be possible, then, it seems that concrete Christological material is necessary. This is accomplished by what one might call the *historico-religious function* of the sacrament.

All of the above can be related to the need that Tillich sees for Protestantism to have a sacramental dimension. Without a sacramental basis a religious group would become an "association of moral clubs."[154] He explains:

> The Protestant protest has rightfully destroyed the magical elements in Catholic sacramentalism but has wrongly brought to the verge of disappearance the sacramental foundation of Christianity and with it the religious foundation of the protest itself.[155]

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[153] *S.W.*, p. 67.

[154] Tillich, "Significance of the History of Religions," p. 87.

[155] Intro. to *P.E.*, p. xix. See also *S.W.* pp. 66-70.

Thus the "Protestant principle," the experience of the conquest of religion by the Spiritual Presence, needs the "Catholic substance," the concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Presence.[156] Only then can this principle be the experience of the victory of the Spirit over religion.

The Relation of Word and Sacrament

We have already seen how Tillich uses the notion of sacrament in different senses. He does the same with "Word," i.e., he distinguishes between "the Word" (meaning the entire context of words), words (which have special meaning or power to communicate), and the words found in scripture.[157] What is essential for Word is that it reveal, because, for Tillich, the "Word" is a medium for revelation, the Spirit's most important medium.[158] The Word does not inform someone about something as words commonly do, it rather reveals reality to those whom it touches. Therefore those words that communicate the Spiritual Presence become the Word for Tillich, and those that do not, even if they be scriptural words, remain outside the Word.[159]

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[156] S.T. 3: 245.

[157] R.V., p. 85.

[158] S.T. 3: 124.

[159] Ibid., p. 120. The Word does not ground itself in the Bible; the Bible grounds itself in the Word.

The Word is revelatory in that it breaks into the human reality, grasps the individual in an ecstatic experience and makes the Spiritual Presence present. Moreover, the Word is not only a "powerful Word," partaking in the power of the reality to which it points, it is also a "contemporaneous Word," fitted and appealing to contemporaneous situations.[160] It is therefore an "addressed Word": its reality beyond is addressed to us.[161] In Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality Tillich relates this Word to the person of Jesus the Christ, the final Word.[162]

What, then, is the relation between Word and sacrament (in their largest sense)? The two designate the two modes of communication in relation to the Spiritual Presence. Tillich sees the concept of sacrament as "older" than the Word in the sense that the objective sign precedes the subjective.[163] However, he sees the word as implicit in the completely silent sacramental material because any experience of sacramental reality belongs to the dimension of the spirit and concretely to its religious function.[164] When

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[160] R.V., p. 85.

[161] Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[162] Tillich, Biblical Religion, pp. 37-38.

[163] S.T. 3: 120.

[164] Ibid., p. 121.

Tillich emphasizes the quantitative possibilities of revelation, the Word is subsumed by sacrament; when he emphasizes the qualitative manner of revelation, sacraments are subsumed in Word.[165] Both are sacramental material for revelation; both are revelatory Word.

Two Special Sacraments: Baptism and the Lord's Supper

In "Natur und Sakrament" Tillich treats the relationship of Word and sacrament through two examples, the special sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper.[166] In both of these the Word is seen as having Naturmächtigkeit which becomes the necessary bearer of the Sinnmächtigkeit.[167] Naturmächtigkeit is connected with the spoken word in such a way that the speaking of the words reveals the words as bearers of transcendent power. This is not to be perceived as some type of magic, however, because the words are merely revealing their deepest reality. The key to understanding this natural power of the Word is found, we believe, in Tillich's more specific explanations of water, bread and wine.

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[165] For primacy of sacrament over Word see Tillich, Biblical Religion, pp. 22-23; S.W., p. 53. For primacy of Word over sacrament, see Tillich, Biblical Religion, pp. 23-25, 35, 79.

[166] S.W., pp. 50-53.

[167] Ibid., p. 54.

For Tillich water too has Naturmächtigkeit. It is not merely a conventional sign or an accidental symbol made "holy" by the command of Christ alone. Water has a natural power that makes it suited to become a bearer of the holy, suited to become a sacramental element. In Das Gottesjahr 1932 Tillich describes some of this "natural power" further.[168] He cites the mythical overtones, the chaotic qualities, the positive valuations with regard to life, the depth significance in the person's psyche, the purifying power that water has. He goes on to suggest that water is one of those sacramental elements in the world which, of its nature, has its own sacramental significance.

With the Lord's Supper the situation is slightly different. Here there are two perceptible elements, neither natural, which together represent the sacramental body of Christ (which is beyond nature).[169] For Tillich the meaning of the Lord's Supper as sacrament is that it is "die sakramentale Aneignung des erhöhten Leiben Christi."[170] Since the body of Christ as risen is accessible, yet without perceptibility, bread and wine are called upon to provide the perception. As substances that naturally nourish the body, bread and wine call attention to the body and participate in it through the nourishment they give; this is their Naturmächtigkeit. As sacramental elements bread and wine point to the presence of the spiritual power in the natural grounding of all spiritual life and to the spiritual life itself; they also represent the body and the power of nature that is summed up in it.[171]

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[168] Wilhelm Stählin (ed.), Das Gottesjahr 1932 (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1931), pp. 65-68. The article appears in English under the title "Water," in James Luther Adams, Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), pp. 62-64.

[169] S.W., p. 51.

[170] Ibid., p. 51.

Tillich wants to make two related statements here: (1) that the Word, water, bread and wine have a natural inner power about them that makes them suitable bearers of the holy; (2) that as bearers of the holy the transcendent is perceived to be present through them. The necessity of certain specific sacramental material derives from its general suitability, its particular suitability in a given dimension, and its actual adaptation on the historical level. For example, water maintains a general suitability as a religious symbol because it ranks among the primary elements of creation and fits many purposes. Its specific suitability is described quite nicely in Tillich's article on water cited above. But the necessity of water for baptism is experienced only when baptism is done by water and with the Word in the context of the Christian community. When this selection occurs the essential relationship is established.

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[171] "Die realistische Deutung andererseits kann Brot und Wein als sie Repräsentanten des Leibes und der in ihm zusammengefassten Mächtigkeit der Natur überhaupt erklären. Sie deuten ebensosehr auf die Gegenwart der göttlichen Heilsmacht in der natürlichen Grundlage alles geistigen Lebens wie auf das geistige Leben selber hin." Ibid., p. 53.

For Christianity this selection is not determined purely naturally, but always in relation to the New Being in Christ.[172] Tillich at times refers to this selection as one of historical fate (Schicksal), but by this he does not mean that sacraments are created arbitrarily.[173] While sacramental realities are dependent upon specific traditions which can neither be abandoned or exchanged, they are also born out of a Naturmächtigkeit that permits their conception.

In a much later discussion that bears on the question of selection, Tillich briefly returns to Baptism and the Lord's Supper. In answer to a question on "real presence" he situates his position in a more refined manner. He no longer speaks about "the transcendent body" of Christ, but rather about the "Christ Spirit" or "Christ the Spirit," who is present through the symbols given in the sacrament.[174] He speaks about the necessity of the specific symbolic material in terms of acceptance "by the collective unconscious of the Christian Church under the effort of the divine presence."[175] This clause contains both essential elements of Christian sacraments: inner natural power and historical selection in relation to Jesus the Christ; it also speaks to the question of the arbitrary nature of sacramental selection.

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[172] Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[173] Ibid., p. 69.

[174] Paul Tillich, "Paul Tillich in Conversation: Culture and Religion," ed. by James B. Ashbrook, Foundations 14 (1971): 112. The phrase "body and blood" specifies the referent of the sacrament, not the flesh substance but the historical reality of Jesus the Christ.

The Ontological Reality of Sacraments

Up to this point we have skirted the question of participation and the ontological reality of sacraments. We are now ready to examine this issue further.

In trying to understand Tillich in this matter, one must not begin by analyzing his "participation statements" side by side, but rather in relation to that which is the heart of the matter. Since Tillich uses the ontological notion of participation to describe the power of religious symbols, it is with these that we must begin.

Phenomenologically stated, religious symbols point to the "holy" and participate in the reality of the "holy." Theologically and ontologically stated, religious symbols point to the ground and power of being and participate in that ground and power. However, this last sentence applies to all beings, in that all beings *essentially* do this, even as existents. Obviously, this type of participation does not determine what is religious symbol; it only provides for the possibility of religious symbols actually existing.

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[175] Ibid.

What Tillich seems to mean by religious symbol, however, is that the symbol is seen, is recognized, as pointing to this ground and power and is recognized as participating in it. For a symbol to be a religious symbol, it must be received as such. Tillich states this again and again, but what he seems to fail to do is to carry this through his entire analysis.

If this is the case, and we believe it is, then perceptibility is much more central to Tillich's notion of religious symbol than is generally acknowledged.[176] All kinds of things cloud perception: estrangement, lack of attention, the confusion caused by human interaction, pride, etc. But in certain instances, created reality manifests an inner power and expresses more than it generally does. When this fact is recognized, then there is real symbol.

The final revelation is, of course, Jesus the Christ as the New Being. In this revelation Jesus the Christ must be recognized as revealing being perfectly at one with the power of being, with his essence. Here ontological participation and recognized participation meet; the result is rich, deep religious symbol, rich, deep sacrament.

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[176] Perceptibility, however, cannot be limited to the conscious functions of the person; it must also include the subconscious. S.W., p. 69; P.E., introduction, pp. xix-xx; S.T. 3: 121-122.

In Tillich's belief-ful realism perceptibility and ontological reality go hand in hand. A thing is perceptible only because it has reality, and only to the extent that it has reality. Conversely, without reality perceptibility is also impossible.

But the ability to be perceived and the actual perception can be different and often are different. In the existential condition what determines whether a thing is a symbol or not is ultimately the extent to which the thing is perceived as manifesting "more" than its normal meaning; what determines whether a thing is a religious symbol or not is ultimately the extent to which the thing is perceived as manifesting the ground and power of being.

Our conclusions therefore, are these. Tillich is correct in using the notion of "participation" with regard to symbols. However, when he uses the term ontologically, he fails to make distinctions between objective participation in being and the subjective perception of that participation. The fact that he does make similar distinctions in other sections of his sacramental presentation gives this critique validity.[177]

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[177] The critiques of Ford, Rowe and Richard played an important part in the development of my own position. Cf. the bibliography.

Three Related Questions (by way of conclusion)

Jesus the Christ as the Ur-Sakrament

In "Die Judenfrage - ein christliches und ein deutschen Problem," Tillich states: "Christus kann das Ursakrament des Christentums genannt werden. Er ist die Quelle alles Sakramentalen in der Kirche."[178] Tillich seldom speaks of Christ in this way, but there can be no doubt that this is how Jesus the Christ functions. To say that Jesus the Christ is the final revelation and that he reveals God most fully is to say that he is the fullest, clearest sacrament of God. Through his death he conquered the death of existential estrangement so that through his resurrection the true content of revelation might be made manifest.

As final and full revelation Jesus the Christ becomes the criterion for all revelation, and through conquering ambiguous life he becomes the criterion for all sacraments. He is the source of power and meaning for their power and meaning, and he is the principle of resistance against the forces of ambiguous life. He is, therefore, Mediator and Savior. It is also because of him and through him that the church is founded and it is because of him and through him that the church sees the need to transcend itself. For all of these reasons, then, Christ is _the_ sacrament of God for the individual and the church. He is thus _Ursakrament_.

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[178] This article appears in G.W. 3. The quotation is from p. 158.

The Church as Sacrament

For Tillich the church too functions sacramentally although more ambiguously.

One could say that in its _essence_ the church is (a) the sacrament _of_ the Spiritual Community, (b) _through_ Jesus the Christ. The Spiritual Community created by the Spiritual Presence and manifesting unambiguous life, derives its power and meaning from the Spiritual Presence.[179] However, this Spiritual Community itself is only the _power_ and _structure_ inherent in the church which needs the church to manifest itself, to realize its essence. From this perspective the church _in its essence_ is the sacrament of the Spiritual Presence; in its concreteness it manifests the Spiritual Community.

The church, however, even in its essence, is not identical with the Spiritual Community, since this community extends beyond the churches in all directions. The church is but a concrete manifestation of this Spiritual Community and in this sense too, it is sacrament.

But the church is sacrament of the Spiritual Community _through Jesus the Christ_. He is the one who grounds the Spiritual Presence and gathers the Spiritual Community.

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[179] _S.T._ 3: 150.

He is the one who manifests final revelation and serves as the criterion for all sacraments. Through him the Spiritual Community experiences the Spiritual Presence in its fullness; through him the church can manifest this to the world. The church is called to be sacrament in the power of the Ursakrament.

However, in reality the church is ambiguous and must constantly struggle to be sacrament. The church is, after all, both the actualization or representation and the distortion of the Spiritual Community, since it participates in both the Spiritual Community, and in ambiguous life.[180] In this sense the church shares the same reality as its own sacraments, revealing the power and structure of being, sometimes more, sometimes less, sometimes distorted, sometimes not, but always interruptedly, always under the conditions of ambiguous life.[181]

Eschatology and Sacrament

For Tillich the Kingdom of God is already-but-not-yet-fully. Christianity claims that the central manifestation of the Kingdom has already occurred--in the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, that through his coming the Kingdom of God is already here, but interruptedly and still under the conditions of ambiguous life.[182]

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[180] Ibid., pp. 155, 246.

[181] Ibid., pp. 165, 172-173.

It is in this aspect that the church and sacraments play a role. The church, in relationship to the Kingdom of God, is not a religious community in its essence, but the anticipatory representative of a new reality, the New Being as community.[183] The church is the sacrament of the New Being as community; it is the manifestation of the Kingdom of God, but interruptedly. However, the church also exists under the conditions of ambiguous life and therefore not only distorts the manifestation, but also conceals it at times. It consequently participates in a real, yet often ambiguous way in the Kingdom.

The same is true of the sacraments in the church. Every sacramental event has the power to reveal the Kingdom of God, although interruptedly. But under the conditions of ambiguous life this very sacramental event, as we have already noted, can distort or even conceal the Kingdom in the same way that it can distort or conceal the Spiritual Presence. Yet as finite creatures under the conditions of ambiguous life, we have no other choice: we can only experience the Kingdom of God present now through these sacramental structures and events. They are our grace and our frustration.

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[182] Ibid., p. 364.

[183] Ibid., p. 243.

There is, however, one other function that sacraments have with regard to the Kingdom:

> The sacramental consecration of elements of all of life shows the presence of the ultimately sublime in everything and points to the unity of everything in its creative ground and final fulfillment.[184]

The sacraments are called upon to take on cosmic significance so that eucharistic bread and wine, for example, would represent all bread and wine, all created things, all organic and inorganic life. Sacraments are called upon, then, not only to manifest revelation, but also to manifest all creation, so that through their mediation the ground and power of being is once more wedded to creation itself. When this is accomplished, then and only then will the Kingdom itself be manifest.

Critique

Without a doubt Tillich has greatly contributed to the area of religious symbolism. He has employed his position skillfully and presented a system that plays a vital role in his theology. Even the questions which his critics raise keep the level of concern and interest in the field high.

The critique that we offer is based on the material under consideration and is divided into negative and positive statements with short explanations of each.

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[184] Ibid., p. 377.

Negative Statements

There are, to be sure, areas in Tillich's position that need clarification and expansion. There are also other areas that remain confusing and insufficient. We shall list the major ones here.

(1) Tillich's symbol of "Jesus the Christ" and the traditional view of Jesus the Christ do not seem to be equivalent. The symbolic content of "Jesus the Christ" as Tillich sees it is more "suited" for his own theological system than it is for the content of traditional faith. A central question of Tillich's critics in this regard rests with the divinity of Christ: whether "Jesus the Christ" is more than merely the most perfect human being.[185] Tillich's lack of an affirmative answer causes him to reinterpret the symbols deriving from Christ's "divinity" so that they express something, but not everything, of the traditional content. In the words of Alexander McKelway:

> If the saving Word of God which confronts us in Jesus Christ had been allowed to confront us in all its objectivity and truth as a reality which must in no case be adjusted to our experience, but one in terms of which all our expressions and presuppositions must be

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[185] For example, Osborne, New Being (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 152-157, 198-199; A. T. Mollegen, "Christology and Biblical Criticism in Tillich," Theology of Tillich, ed. by Kegley, p. 243; McKelway, Systematic Theology, pp. 174-188, 259-262; Avery Dulles, "Paul Tillich and the Bible," Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. by Thomas F. O'Meara and Donald W. Weisser, Forward by J. Heywood Thomas, Afterword by Paul Tillich (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Image Books, 1969),

> adjusted, and if this divine subject who allows us to hold him as our object had been the systematic starting place of Tillich's theology, then there would have been no distortion of Christ's being, nor would there have been a shifting of focus away from him, but he would have been seen as both the author and finisher of our faith.[186]

Tillich's position seems to flow from two points: (a) wanting to consider "Jesus the Christ" as fully human; (b) wanting to take "existence" seriously. Because Jesus was fully human for Tillich he could not be divine: the distance between essence and existence in his system is just too great. On the other hand, God could not become an existential person either, for the same reasons. The closest God could ever come to us would be through some created thing, which would at the same time manifest something of Her-Himself. This for Tillich is accomplished most fully in Jesus the Christ, and it is for this reason that Tillich's Christology is labeled "adoptionist."

The ramifications are many: Christ is only one way that God reveals Her-Himself, even if he is the final and clearest way; Christ's life and death lose something of their universal import; Christ-centeredness is viewed only in terms of an absolute criterion for revelation. In all these cases

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pp. 171-172; George Tavard, "Christology as Symbol," Tillich in Catholic Thought, pp. 282-283.

[186] McKelway, Systematic Theology, p. 268.

the Christ-event, while important for Christianity, loses its central place, its central reality. It merely becomes the revelation of a much more central notion, "New Being," which has universal significance for Tillich, and which plays the more enveloping role.

Tillich sees Jesus as essential manhood, but he does not really examine the "power" of Jesus in this regard. If no one before him could overcome the conditions of existence, why could he? By what power could he do this? Does that make him different, and if so, in what way?

The seriousness of Tillich's lack of a divine "side" to Jesus the Christ is underlined when he asserts that all revelation in the church must be faithful to the traditional symbols and dogmas concerning Jesus the Christ. Certainly this has to mean more than merely using the same symbolic word, but does this principle not then contradict what Tillich does in his own system?

(2) Tillich's symbol, "Spiritual Presence," seems only distantly related to "Jesus the Christ." If this "presence" is really manifest through "Jesus the Christ," why is the Spirit not seen as flowing from the relationship of Jesus the Christ and the Father? "Spiritual Presence" for Tillich is rather more centrally related to "New Being" than it is to "Jesus the Christ." Because of this essential difference, it is impossible to develop a pneumatology that is faithful to the traditional Christian position.

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(3) Furthermore, Tillich's "Jesus the Christ" is not firmly grounded in the concrete historical situation either. We have already noted that Tillich's historical concern rests in his grounding _a_ _personal_ _historical_ _existence_ behind the New Testament picture of "Jesus the Christ" and that whether or not this _person_ was Jesus of Nazareth does not matter. We have already suggested that such a relationship to the historical situation is in reality no relationship at all. The importance of this point is further underlined by the knowledge that there are "myths" in the history of religion which have no concrete historical references. Tillich's constant reference to the "fact" of this or that event in the _picture_ of Jesus the Christ seems to be but a slight step from this latter position.

(4) Tillich's concept of "New Being" takes on the appearance and functioning of a religious symbol, although in reality it is merely a concept. This is because "New Being" has a richer, deeper, more universally significant function than does "Jesus the Christ." In fact, there are several places in Tillich's theology where this conceptual abstraction takes on symbolic reality. We merely restate this point by way of conclusion, since we have treated this matter more fully in the context of the chapter.

(5) When we consider Tillich's theory of religious symbolism in particular we note that his notion of "participation" is obscure with regard to the ontological foundation of religious symbols. We have already noted

this point too, but we repeat it in summary form. Tillich is correct in grounding all symbols in the power of being, and he is correct in positing the essential possibility of anything being religiously symbolic through this same power. He is not correct, however, in excluding all signs from ontological participation since all signs participate, by their very being, in some way in that power. On the other hand, if by "participation" Tillich means "perceived participation," then his remarks about signs and symbols are correct in this respect: signs are not seen as participating, symbols are.

Tillich does not deny ontological participation to anything that exists, but he does deny that everything is "perceived" as participating. Undoubtedly he would posit a greater degree of participation (ontological) for those things perceived as participating on a deeper level. But what about the others? Because they do not *seem* to be participating at this level, does that mean that they do not, in fact, have a greater degree of ontological participation? The matter is confused even more if one group perceives a specific thing as religiously symbolic and another group does not. Tillich does not distinguish phenomenological participation from ontological participation, nor does he address himself to the possibility mentioned above. Degrees of participation go unmentioned as do the qualitative differences between different types of symbols. It is not that Tillich lacks the insights for these distinctions;

it is rather that he does not apply his insights in this regard.

These are the basic criticisms we have of Tillich's system with regard to religious symbols, but they should in no way undermine the major positive contributions that he has made to this rapidly expanding field of interest. As with the negative statements, we would merely like to list these below.

Positive Statements

(1) Tillich's notion of "religious symbols" is supported by his own extensive knowledge of various fields. He arrived at the notion of "belief-ful realism" from observations in the artistic realm, and the history of philosophy, theology, and depth psychology have all made numerous contributions to this position. His work in the philosophy of religion and his knowledge of the history of religions builds a framework for his religious position that is at once universal and ecumenical, challenging and realistic.

(2) Tillich's position is consistent in its major dynamic: a dialectic of the infinite-finite is at work here together with a tension caused by the existential situation. This results in an affirmation-negation, a "yes - no" process which is complicated by the demonizing, profanizing and distorting tendencies of ambiguous life. The desired result is to make the Unconditioned manifest, but this is possible at

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best interruptedly, at worst ambiguously or distortedly or not at all. The combined effect is felt in every created being, in every historical event.

(3) Tillich seeks to understand Christianity from a universal and ecumenical point of view. He situates Christianity within the context of the world religions with one major difference: that it has the principle of resistance to ambiguity within itself. Tillich minimizes neither the similarities of the religious dimension of the various religions nor the power and value that each of them possesses. Through his concept of "New Being" and "Spiritual Community" he seeks to show the underlying unity of all religions both with regard to their essence and to their religious function. At the same time he aims to establish the uniqueness of Christianity and the special power inherent in it through the final revelation of Jesus as the Christ.

In addition, Tillich understands the ecumenical drive of the churches as from the very essence of the church itself. He sees this drive as centered in the holiness, the oneness, and the universality of the church. What keeps the churches separated, then, is existential reality, the condition of sinfulness and not some positive content. Were this point adequately recognized, the ecumenical movement would certainly grow in strength.

(4) Tillich's sacramental-prophetic approach to Christianity seeks a healthy balance and respect for both Protestantism and Catholicism. In the existential situation the church needs both sacramentality and prophetic criticism if it is to keep itself open to the manifestations of the Spiritual Presence and not turn these sacramental events and things into objects of worship themselves. The fact that the "Protestant principle" needs the "Catholic substance" at once acknowledges the positive contributions that both traditions have made throughout the history of Christianity. This boundary approach would free the sacramental churches from tendencies toward magic and superstition that naturally develop from a one-sided emphasis on the sacramental, and would expand the reality of the Protestant churches by providing a richness and depth of religious experience as well as a cosmic meaningfulness to their ecclesial worship.

(5) Tillich acknowledges the importance of symbolic material in reality through the way he treats religious symbols in his system. Religious symbols are involved in his theory of religious knowledge, his notion of revelation, his answering theology, in the very existence of the churches and of all world religions, and even in the task of working toward the Kingdom. While any one or the other area might be attacked, the over-all importance of some sacramental life, some religious symbolism in the life of the churches,

cannot be denied.

(6) Tillich's concern for the reality, necessity and functioning of sacramental material in Christianity provides the means whereby the interrelationship between Jesus the Christ, the church and the churches, the Word, the special sacraments, and the general pansacramental reality can be seen. The ontological structure of all these "realities" is guaranteed through the presuppositions of his belief-ful realism. The manifesting power of each is seen as ultimately resting in God, and the interrelationship of these realities is based in the reality and functioning of "Jesus the Christ" as the final revelation (Ursakrament) and criterion for all other manifestations. Thus the church, the churches, the Word, the sacraments, and pansacramental elements are all essentially related to Jesus the Christ; he becomes the manifest form of the religious experiences celebrated. The Word and the sacraments themselves are seen as binding forces because, in essence, they are but two modes of manifesting revelation; they are also the central core of the church's myths and cult.

(7) Tillich's insight into the nature of sacramental material itself provides a key for better understanding the dynamics of the religious situation in ambiguous life. The fact that individuals and groups are subconsciously affected by symbolic material provides evidence for his position on the natural objective power of the

symbolic material itself; the fact that certain material "appears" to have special power underlines the interrelationship that must occur between the symbolic material and the receiving subject; the fact that symbols die and rise stresses the importance of the existential situation of the receiving subject. When these dynamics are applied to the religious situation the appearance of the "holy" can be described in analogous ways. In fact, Tillich's notion of "dimensions of life" provides the underlying identity that makes analogy possible.

However, the system would have been too clear, too perfect, had not the element of "ambiguous life" been interjected. Through this notion even the true dynamics of the religious situation are veiled. This explains the possibility of a subject seeing too little (profanization) or too much (demonization) in the "holy object." It is this element of "ambiguous life" that adds tension and reality to the religious situation, a tension and reality that gives Tillich's theory such dynamic force.

(8) Although Tillich does not focus on the eucharist, he does provide the structure for a contemporary understanding of an expanded notion of eucharist and of the specific areas of eucharistic presence, eucharistic sacrifice, and the eschatological dimensions of the eucharist. Just what these implications are and how this is accomplished will be taken up in the next section.

(9) Finally, Tillich's position can form the church's concerns in the following areas: (a) a respect for the "receiving side" of revelation.

This means that the revelation must be so informed that it is suitable to the needs and values of the subject. When applied to the liturgical or doctrinal levels, this leads to the need for constant renewal and critique.

(b) a respect for the mythological element in the tradition.

Tillich's emphasis is on the true depth and worth of the Christian story and symbols and not on the destruction of them. Demythologizing has its place in Christianity, but it is not the sole methodology.

(c) a respect for the "concrete" word, the image-filled word, the depth-filled word.

This is a key to effective preaching and catechesis, to mission, evangelization and education as Tillich conceives them.

(d) a respect for the mystery involved in the sacramental material.

The "why" of everything cannot be simply explained, especially with regard to religious experience; it eludes us. Yet the "suitability" of a phrase, a color, of a piece of music, of a gesture, of an atmosphere is definitely experienced.

(e) a respect for sacramental experiences beyond the "special sacraments."

For the sacramental churches this requires a broader understanding of the recognized sacraments as well as an acceptance of "grace" wherever it is manifest; for the prophetic churches this requires a new appreciation of sacramental elements in general.

Conclusion

All of this leads to the final conclusion: Tillich's structure of religious symbols is adequate to its religious function and has a basis in ontological reality, even if the referents of those symbols in Christianity only partially fulfill the demands of the theological tradition. By this statement we do not mean to judge the adequacy of Tillich's symbols within his own system. We rather seek to evaluate the adequacy of his system for our own purposes. For our purposes, Tillich's concept of "religious symbols" offers a sound ontological foundation, a keen appreciation of ambiguous life, and an excellent insight into the functioning of religious symbols within reality, and his manner of presentation points out many interrelationships between various theological questions and various human-religious experiences alike. As a result, Tillich's concept of "religious symbol" seems viable and realistic, and will be of great value in considering the specific eucharistic questions of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

GABRIEL MARCEL'S "PRESENCE" AND PAUL TILLICH'S "RELIGIOUS SYMBOL": TOWARD A DEEPER CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF EUCHARIST

Introduction

We began this dissertation with a description of the changing atmosphere of eucharistic thought in our own century. From there we moved to a closer examination of Gabriel Marcel's notion of "presence" and a critique of that notion. Then we considered Paul Tillich's concept of "religious symbol," and we saw how this concept functioned in his system. Our next move was to combine "presence" and "religious symbol" and to apply them to our contemporary eucharistic situation. It is our thesis that Marcel's notion of "presence" and Tillich's notion of "religious symbol," taken together, contribute a great deal to the ecumenical discussions on the importance of the eucharist, especially with regard to the areas of "anamnesis" and the "manifold presence of Christ."

The purpose of this final chapter is to substantiate and explain this thesis. To substantiate it, we must show that Marcel's basic philosophy and Tillich's basic theological system are compatible and complementary. (This presupposes

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that neither term is inclusive in all dimensions.) To explain our thesis we will first of all focus on the term "anamnesis," as it has been traditionally applied in eucharistic discussions, and show how the combined notions of "presence-religious symbol" sufficiently explain this reality in several respects. Secondly, we will examine the doctrine of the "real presence of Christ in the eucharist" from the viewpoint of what has come to be called "the manifold presence of Christ," once again by applying the combined notions of "presence-religious symbol." It is our conviction that both eucharistic questions, "anamnesis" and "manifold presence," offer a fresh, less volatile groundwork on which new ecumenical dialogues can take place and new consensus can be achieved.

This chapter will therefore be divided into five sections: (1) the compatibility of the thought of Marcel and Tillich; (2) the compatibility and complementarity of "presence" and "religious symbol;" (3) the question of "anamnesis;" (4) the question of the "manifold eucharistic presence of Christ;" (5) concluding remarks.

In this way we hope to show the real value of Marcel and Tillich for the ecumenically theological endeavor. Ultimately it is our hope that these concepts will be useful in the continuing dialogue on the meaning and importance of the eucharist for the individual churches themselves and for the entire church of Jesus Christ.

The Compatibility of the Thought of Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich

We have not, up to this point, compared the thought of Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich. We felt that more could be gained by letting each man speak in his own way, since their methodologies are so different. However, it is our conviction that the two are basically compatible in many respects, and we will point this out through a brief comparison of central notions in the two systems. We recognize the difficulty of such a comparison due to Marcel's lack of systematic approach, and to our own need to be brief. We, therefore, rely heavily on the work already done by Gene Reeves.[1]

Tillich, born in 1886, and Marcel, born in 1889, were close contemporaries. Even though one was a German Protestant and the other a French Roman Catholic, they were nevertheless both philosophical theologians (consciously wedding philosophy and theology) and both influenced by idealism--the thought of Schelling, Hegel and Hocking in the case of Tillich; Royce and Hocking in the case of Marcel. It is interesting to note that both wrote dissertations on Schelling in their early years.

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[1] Gene Arthur Reeves, "Our Knowledge of God and the Nature of God in the Philosophies of Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich" (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1963).

Marcel and Tillich were concerned with ontology: Marcel with the quest for being and the rootedness of all human persons in Absolute Being; Tillich with the primacy of essence and the relation of that to being-itself. These respective concerns became central foci in their systems. To be more, to be with, or to be what one ought are the motivating concerns for a full, rich life.

God is conceived by both men in ontological-theological terms. For Marcel God is Absolute Being, Absolute Thou; for Tillich S-He is being-itself. Yet they both agree that God is the ground of all beings who manifests Him-Herself through all beings; that S-He is at once transcendent and immanent; that S-He is personal in some sense, but not as a person among persons, and surely not as object; and that S-He is beyond the subject-object distinction. But Tillich's concern is less on the personal in God than is Marcel's; indeed, Marcel's phenomenological approach is based on the personalness of God; Tillich, instead, emphasizes the ontological relation of God. Gene Reeves, however, goes to far as to show that Marcel's notion of God seems to imply the same balance of ontological polarities that Tillich suggests in his approach.[2] While this conclusion would stress the compatibility of the two, we can only accept it with probability, because such a conclusion seems to have been beyond Marcel's purposes or intentions.

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[2] Ibid., pp. 297-301. Reeves suggests that Marcel's position actually provides a more balanced approach with regard to the ontological elements than does Tillich's.

The concern of both men, however, is not with God Her-Himself, but with our relation to God and how this relation affects our human living. Both men, in rejecting natural theology, turn to theological epistemology to ground this relationship. Ontologically they ground the possibility of experiencing God in the belief that God is immanent and incarnate in the world; phenomenologically they ground the same possibility in the experience of the "immediate awareness" of the ultimate. Marcel calls this "blind intuition," "immediate consciousness;" Tillich calls it the "immediate awareness of the unconditional." But both men also describe negative experiences of immediate awareness--negative in the sense of lacking fullness: for Marcel it is the "exigence of being," for Tillich it is the experience of "finitude." In either experience, however, this "awareness" is the locus of identity between the finite and the infinite, the point where God is immediately present and the point where we participate in being-itself.[3]

Furthermore, Marcel's understanding of grace and Tillich's doctrine of revelation stress the divine initiative in our positive experiences of God and thereby preserve the "objectivity" of these experiences.[4] Both realize that God cannot be objectified (comprehended as object), but neither wants the experience of God to be reduced to pure subjectivity either. For both true knowledge of God (knowledge which is not like ordinary knowledge) involves the vital participation of the person; human openness and availability are necessary if the divine initiative is to be accepted and welcomed.

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[3] Marcel uses the term "absolute presence" to note the immediate presence of God; Tillich refers to ontological participation in being-itself to convey a similar meaning. Cf. Ibid., pp. 157-186 for a full comparison.

It is in this context that the methodological differences between Marcel and Tillich appear. Marcel turns to a phenomenological analysis of concrete approaches, concrete human experiences, to show the relationship between God and human beings; Tillich uses ontological analysis for these same ends. The two approaches, in turn, lead Marcel and Tillich in different directions. From the different directions flow different insights and different concerns, and it is precisely this point which will be taken up in the next section.

Marcel and Tillich also appear to differ in their understanding of existence. Although both share existential concerns, Marcel's philosophical position on existence is much more positive. He begins with existence and considers a mode of being that brings life and the possibility of

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[4] Ibid., pp. 131-156.

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continued "growth in being" with it. Tillich, on the other hand, views existence as estrangement which produces ambiguous life, and so he begins with essence. Life for him is spent in trying to conquer existence's estrangement and its ambiguities.

But Marcel also reflects this negative side of existence, especially in his plays. These regularly deal with the condition of estrangement and the ambiguities of life; with situations in which people feel trapped and powerless, with situations which hold a glimmer of hope inside themselves, but with no hope actualized. If this side of Marcel's thought is combined with his philosophical position (a move that Marcel himself recognizes as necessary), then many apparent differences between himself and Tillich vanish.[5] What remains is a certain impulse, a certain "drive to conquer" the estrangement. This theme, stressed again and again by Marcel, gives his works a positive nuance.

One other point needs to be stressed: the person-centeredness of both approaches. Marcel and Tillich offer person-centered philosophies rather than philosophies of nature. Their focal point is the human person in the

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[5] However, several differences still remain. For Marcel existence has a primacy that is not present in Tillich. It is the ground from which thought moves and to which (through secondary reflection) thought returns. For Tillich existence is merely the present reality, the situation in which we must work. Primacy for him belongs to essence.

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existential situation. While Marcel sees the person as the one most able to grow in being and as the only one who can enter into human and divine relationships, Tillich sees the person as the microcosm of the world, as the only being in the world who is properly able to act in the dimension of the spirit. Because of such approaches, God must appear as personal in both systems and must even become Absolute Thou for Marcel.

Objects (as opposed to persons), on the other hand, are not fully "beings" for either man. Their role in both philosophical theologies is only supportive and their ontological reality analogous. The only way objects grow in importance is through participation--either in the situations in which they are used in interpersonal or grace bestowing events (Marcel), or in which they become symbolic material for revelation (Tillich). Here, however, Tillich has a slightly larger view, especially with regard to the cosmic importance of reality.

From this basic description one can see that the philosophies of Marcel and Tillich have many similarities. The concerns of both are ontological and theological and their focus is on the relationship of God and the human person in the existential community. Their purpose is to offer the existential person hope and salvation in the midst of estrangement and ambiguous life, a hope and salvation accomplished through grace-filled religious-human experiences. What is different are the analyses used in describing these realities and the conclusions and insights derived from them. What is also different are the respective non-systematic and systematic approaches of the two men.

From the comparison thus far we would conclude that the philosophies of Marcel and Tillich are compatible, at least in the areas we have treated. We at the same time acknowledge that our comparison could only be made at certain concrete points, and thus we cannot be assured of compatibility on other points. The major difficulties in this regard are Marcel's lack of system, his discontinuity and his imprecise language.

"Presence" and "Religious Symbol:" Compatibility and Complementarity

Our task in this second section is (1) to show the compatibility of Marcel's notion of "presence" and Tillich's concept of "religious symbol;" (2) to show the complementarity of the terms. We will approach this two-fold task through an analysis of the terms from ontological, religious, theological, phenomenological, interpersonal and historical perspectives.

The Ontological Reality of "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

Marcel's "Presence"

Marcel "discovers" ontological reality through a series of second reflections based on phenomenological analysis.

The reflections provide some conceptual grasp of the reality itself and the relationship of that reality to individual beings within it. However, one must be careful to always relate these reflections to the immediate reality itself.

"Presence" (to be with) is one way that Marcel conceives of the mystery of ontological reality. It is the reality of every existential being and the reality of the whole at the same time. The key to understanding presence is Marcel's basic ontological statement: being is co-esse, being is presence.

More specifically, presence is the ontological reality of every existential being in two respects: from the point of view of existence and from that of being. From the point of view of existence, presence is the ontological reality of existing in the concrete situation--being with the "world."[6] It is the pre-condition for thought and for awareness of being, and it is the existential situation needed for experiencing the certainty of existence and the exigence of being and for growing in being.

From the point of view of being, presence is the ontological reality of being-in-the-concrete-situation in the sense that "being with" is the reality that grounds the formation of the person, human interactions, one's "life," and growth in love, fidelity and hope.[7] Presence is also the ontological necessity of one's individual being. Since there is no *esse* without *co-esse*, presence grounds the reality of the individual being in relation to other beings; moreover it also grounds the reality of all individual beings taken as a whole. In this way presence serves as a unifying, ontological principle.

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[6] See pp. 60-62, 76-79 of the chapter on Marcel.

But presence suggests more than the *that* of my being; it also reflects the *quality* of my being. In so far as *I am*, I am present (in a pre-reflected way). In so far as I *am who I am*, I am present *in a particular way* to a constellation of other beings (and also to Absolute Being). Relationships constitute the quality of my being as well as the fact of it.

For Marcel the quality of being is, in some respects, more important than the mere fact of it. *Co-esse* can be participated in consciously and unconsciously, but *co-esse* participated in consciously is more truly *co-esse*, since it fulfills the meaning of *co-esse*. However, exactly what the relationship is and what the difference is between this conscious participation and unconscious participation is never adequately described. Yet, one thing is sure: for Marcel conscious *co-esse* is the central meaning of

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[7] See pp. 68-72, 87-111 of the chapter on Marcel.

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co-esse and absolute co-esse serves as ground for this.

Through secondary reflection Marcel reaches the depth of the ontological mystery, the depth of presence, and conceptualizes it as "Absolute Being."[8] Absolute Being functions as a unifying principle, but it is also more than that: it is the ground of ontological reality in which every being participates and of which every being manifests something. This is the reality that establishes the I, grounds the quality of the I, and benefits from this quality; it is the reality which is manifest whenever there is "we," "being," "co-esse," or "presence."

Tillich's "Religious Symbol"

Tillich establishes the ontological reality of the possibility of religious symbols through the symbolic material's relationship to the ground and power of being.[9] Since the symbolic material is in existence, however, it has both relation to and estrangement from its essence, its power of being. It is only in that the symbolic material shares in the power of being (and every existing being must do this in some way), that it has the possibility of revealing the source of that power, i.e., of becoming a religious symbol.

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[8] See pp. 64-67 of the chapter on Marcel.

[9] See pp. 226-228 of the chapter on Tillich.

But for religious symbol to be religious symbol, it must reveal something of the ultimate to a concrete person or group.[10] Ontologically, this means that the religious symbol must manifest something of the ground and power of being to some one or some group. In doing so the religious symbol shows its own relationship (as symbolic material in the existential situation)to the power and ground of its being.

The reason this manifestation can be understood by one or a group of people is that persons are also grounded in the same power.[11] Both person and symbolic material participate in the power and meaning of being in such a way that their relationship is understandable or comprehensible; both have a logos structure through which being-itself is manifest.

Consequently, specific symbolic material becomes concrete religious symbol when it actually does manifest something of the ground and power of being to specific persons. Tillich in fact, points out some material that seems to "normally" manifest something of that ground and power more readily: certain words, objects, gestures, etc.[12] This seems to be due to the "natural power" of the material in itself (to its "own" symbolic power) and to the material's relation (its fittingness and appeal) to the specific group. Tillich seems to imply that both positions can change, although he is not at all clear here.

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[10] See pp. 177-179 of the chapter on Tillich.

[11] See pp. 147-151 of the chapter on Tillich.

[12] S.W., pp. 50-69.

In some places, however, Tillich describes symbolic material as being "empowered" from beyond itself. He speaks, for instance, about symbolic material being "grasped" by revelation.[13] Does he mean that the naturally religiously symbolic material assumes greater power or greater clarity than it normally has? Does he mean that through this "grasp" naturally symbolic material becomes religiously symbolic material (symbolic at a deeper level or in a deeper dimension)? Tillich addresses himself to none of these questions directly, however, he does state that no being in existence, other than Jesus the Christ, has ever conquered the estrangement of existence and clearly manifested the ground and power of being. Yet, even here, the "why" and "how" of this revelation are never really enunciated.

Compatibility and Complementarity

From what has been said by way of summary here and from what has been presented in this dissertation, one can see that "religious symbol" and "presence" are ontologically compatible in several respects. Both terms are relational: they involve the interrelation of ontological realities with themselves and in relation to their ground. For Marcel this primarily involves persons and Absolute Being; for Tillich it involves symbolic material, persons, and the ground or power of being. In both cases the _ultimate value_ of the terms rests in the ontological ground: the value of presence derives from Absolute Being; the value of religious symbol from the power of being. In both cases also, what is most deeply _manifest_ is the ontological ground: Absolute Being in presence, the power of being in religious symbol.

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[13] S.T. 1: 139.

The two terms are also _existential_: presence is ontological reality _in_ the existential condition, neither prior to it, nor in spite of it, but because of it; religious symbol, a term arising out of the existential situation, refers to ontological manifestation under the conditions of existence and in the reality of ambiguous life. What is more, the two terms unite the ontological and existential levels each in its own respect: presence shows the ontological importance of being in existence; religious symbol establishes ontological importance in the existential situation.

The two terms are _personal_: presence and religious symbol refer primarily to beings as "persons," that is, beings-in-the-fullest-sense-of-the-term. Presence deals with the interrelationship of these beings, religious symbol deals with being's link with his/her center and the possibility of conquering estrangement. As personal terms, the reality of both presence and religious symbol depend to some extent at least on the "availability," the "openness" of the persons involved. This in part provides for greater or lesser presence and for the rise and decline of religious symbols.

Finally, the two terms require transcendence of some sort: for presence to happen the subject must transcend him/herself and greet the other as "thou," as center of his/her life; for religious symbol to remain religious symbol the "proper" meaning of the symbolic material must also be transcended. Here too the center changes: from the material itself to that to which the material points.[14]

However, not only are presence and religious symbol ontologically compatible; they are also ontologically complementary. Presence basically emphasizes the immediacy and certainty of the ground of being in interpersonal relationships; religious symbol emphasizes the possibility and reality of the ground of being through symbolic manifestation. While the two terms do not provide a complete ontological base, together they do provide a broader base, covering possibility, immediacy, reality and certainty on

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[14] There are further similarities if one were to compare the quality of the transcendence between human presence and symbol or between divine presence and religious symbol. The purpose of the above is merely to note the fact of transcendence necessary for both presence in general and for religious symbol.

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the one hand, and the relations between persons and between persons and symbolic objects on the other. Presence manifests the continuity of the ground of being in relation to the person and the manifestation of that ground as "with" the person in specific concrete instances. Religious symbol manifests the power of that ground in relation to the person and to a group of persons in specific concrete instances.

A further evidence for complementarity can be seen in the joint use of the notions of "participation" and "presence." Marcel's use of "participation" to describe the relation between the person and Absolute Being corresponds to Tillich's use of the term in referring to the relation between all beings and being-itself. In turn, Tillich's use of "presence," because it is a category of revelation that includes the "universal" and the "individual" as well as mystical, vital and personal elements, corresponds to Marcel's use of the term, only in a more limited way.[15] For Marcel's purposes "presence" is the more useful and thus the more widely used of the terms; for

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[15] J. E. Skinner states: "...the category of presence conserves what Tillich wants to protect in his concept of being-itself, i.e., the ground for everything personal, but it also affirms the primacy of the personal dimension and protects the uniqueness of personality from being swallowed up in an ontological category." J. E. Skinner, "Being, Selfhood and Presence," The Lutheran Quarterly 12 (November 1960): 302.

Tillich "participation" is the more useful and more widely used. The terms are used in the same basic ways to describe the same basic ontological reality.

The Religious Dimension of "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

Distinct, although not separate, from ontological reality is the religious dimension. The religious dimension moves beyond ontology through faith and "names" Absolute Being or the ground of being "God," (at least in the Christian tradition). It does not do this on its own, but through the power and grace of Him-Her who is named. This step modifies ontology and re-centers it, since one can only view reality in its religious dimension, its depth dimension, from an attached position, i.e., from the viewpoint of having been personally grasped by God. No "objective" observation is possible.

Marcel's "Presence"

In the religious dimension of Marcel's thought Absolute Being is God, not as third person, but as Absolute Thou.[16] S-He is the absolute presence who grounds all life and is present through all life. As creator God is present in and through all His-Her creatures as ground of our being and as the pre-condition for faith, even without our recognizing Him-Her. His-Her presence is free gift--grace--the ground of our personal experience of grace.

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[16] See pp. 72-74 of the chapter on Marcel.

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It is also as grace that God is consciously experienced.[17] In the experience of wonder and contemplation S-He is present as creator, and in recollection S-He is experienced as "within," as the depth of being, and also as transcendent, as "beyond" every being.

Marcel uses intersubjective descriptions to capture the quality of God's presence, because for him God cannot be present as "S-He," as object, but only as "Thou." More precisely, God is present in the experience of "we," in the experience of "being with."[18] It is this quality of presence which expresses the immediacy and personal closeness of the grace experience; it is this quality which expresses concern and love.

Thus presence, in the sense of absolute, establishes the possibility of the religious dimension, while presence, in the sense of interpersonal, describes the reality of that dimension and defines the conditions under which that reality can be experienced.

Tillich's "Religious Symbol"

For Tillich the primary reality in the religious symbol is the religious belief of being-itself. In the religious dimension being-itself manifests its presence through the religious symbol. Being-itself is "God," who is the source of all essences and who provides the power of being of everything, who grounds all life and manifests something of Him-Herself in all beings.[19] S-He it is who is the pre-condition, the possibility of religious symbols.

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[17] See pp. 115-117 of the chapter on Marcel.

[18] "Thou" is nothing more than the abstraction of "I" from the experience.

The religious symbol is religious symbol, then, simply because God uses it to manifest that S-He is and how S-He is in relation to those who receive the revelation. It is the meaning and power of God that is manifest, and this through the symbolic material. The material, as it were, illuminates God's presence to the receiver in the dimension possible for the symbolic material. Through the religious symbol the receiver experiences something of the power and presence and relation of God in him/herself; in other words, s/he is moved by the experience to true knowledge of God (in the sense of "receiving knowledge"). The religious symbol mediates that experience for the person or group, and the experience in turn, strengthens faith.

This is seen most forcefully in Tillich's Spiritual Community, which is formed by the Spiritual Presence and effected by Word and sacrament.[20] It is religious symbol which is at work here, forming the individual and the community of individuals in faith, and keeping them in existence. However, this does not happen through the power of the religious symbol itself, but through the power and presence of God mediated by Jesus the Christ through it.

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[19] We wish to remain faithful to Tillich's position that "God" is symbol for being-itself.

[20] See pp. 158-160, 212-220 of the chapter on Tillich.

Compatibility and Complementarity

Once again compatibility and complementarity are in evidence. Marcel and Tillich both understand the importance of the religious dimension for human living. Both distinguish between this and ontology, both explain the differences in terms of detachment or attachment, both seek to show the relation between them. Presence and religious symbol are both grounded in God and both notions seek to describe God-manifest, although in different directions. Both terms, furthermore, attempt to point out something of the unity of the experience itself, and both distinguish the principals involved in the experience.

On the one hand, presence emphasizes the immediacy, the lastingness, and the richness of the God-experience for persons. It does this through a phenomenological analysis of rich interpersonal relationships, of object-person relationships in contemplation, and of person-self recollection. Presence, moreover, shows the interrelatedness of these God-experiences and how these combine to benefit the human person's spiritual growth.

Presence also emphasizes the personalness of the God-experience: it centers on the person, the reality of God as personal, rather than on the mode of expression of that reality. Therefore, God is experienced as "personal"; S-He is "welcomed in" and responded to as a person.

Religious symbol, on the other hand, emphasizes the pan-sacramentality of all creation but as with presence, always in the direction of the person. Religious symbol takes the holiness manifest in the world seriously; it offers a way of understanding how God can manifest Her-Himself at all and why S-He needs sacramental material to do so. Religious symbol also offers a way of understanding how the sacramental object contains or bears holiness without becoming magical.

These two terms, then, presence and religious symbol, work hand in hand. Presence centers on the interpersonal, religious symbol on the sacramental but always in the direction of the person. Both terms require participation on the personal level for their reality and ultimately relate the person or persons to the source of their personhood. In doing so, both terms also work against "magical" notions. Finally, both terms move far beyond the "religious sphere" as normally conceived; they touch all of reality in their respective dimensions.

The Theological Implications of "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

Marcel's "Presence"

Marcel shows little interest in his writings for specifically theological concerns in relation to presence, and he describes no theological method. Yet, there are theological implications to his works: one of them has to do with freedom, the other with God.

Marcel stresses the role of freedom in relation to presence.[21] For true "presence," freedom on the part of "I" and "thou" is necessary; one can only give oneself freely and one can only respond freely if true presence is to happen. Without this freedom one quickly returns to the level of "having," and the possession that follows is far from the detachment necessary for any conscious presence.[22]

Presence also figures in Marcel's notion of God. Marcel has often been labeled a "pantheist," but without adequate reason. God is more than the sum of all possible beings for Marcel, although he admits that something of God is manifest in each of them. Likewise, whenever Marcel uses the notion of "Absolute Being," he is careful not to equate this with the "totality of beings." Neither does presence ever mean "identity" for him; on the contrary, it always implies difference and "being with"; in the "we" of religious experience the "I" is always conceptually separable from "thou." God thus never becomes all-consuming and never becomes all-consumed in being; S-He is at once "with" and "other."

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[21] See pp. 102-103 of the chapter on Marcel.

[22] See pp. 79-85 of the chapter on Marcel.

Tillich's "Religious Symbol"

Tillich's notion of religious symbol, on the other hand, is centrally theological. Religious symbol is the manner in which Tillich can speak meaningfully of God without distorting the reality of God.[23] This is because religious symbol is an analogous term which combines something of identity and something of differentiation in its meaning. Through the resulting "participation" God can be manifest through, yet different from, the symbolic material. This is especially meaningful for Tillich since his central symbol, "God," is just that, symbol; for him the reality that God is, is beyond the symbol of "God."

Tillich employs religious symbol in his theology in two respects: (a) he uses it in his theological epistemology to provide theology with a means of speaking of God, His-Her attributes and actions, which at once overcomes ontological difficulties and provides the ground for his (Tillich's) method of correlation; (b) he also uses religious symbol to describe the religious function of theology: to transmit the reality of God-present.

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[23] This is Tillich's claim. Many of his critics have taken issue on this point, however.

Comparison

Marcel and Tillich seem to differ most completely in this area, since Marcel's work is not a strict theology, while Tillich's is. Yet, implicit or explained, presence and religious symbol are theological terms: both are used for the theological purpose of speaking about God and His-Her relationship to persons and to all creation.

Phenomenological Analysis of "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

Marcel's "Presence"

Marcel's analysis of presence is basically phenomenological. His secondary reflection is based on the phenomenological analysis of immediate experiences, experiences on the level of mystery, such as the experience of existence, of one's incarnate situation, of "being," of faith, hope and love, etc.

Through phenomenological analysis presence is viewed as a "being with," not, however, on the level of objective reality, but on the level of person. Marcel examines the quality of presence through the analyses of deep interpersonal experiences. He examines growth in being and presence from his analysis of very human incidents (a child offering his mother flowers, two people meeting on a train), of musical experiences (playing an instrument in a symphony) and from artistic experiences (creating a fictional character or a work of art).[24] Marcel also examines the experience of continued presence in spite of physical absence through reflections based on thinking of a loved one, the memory of a gift, telepathic experiences.[25]

Through this type of analysis Marcel can explain the role of freedom, of relaxation, of availability and of welcoming, in the process of coming to presence. He can examine the role of spontaneity and of second-person communication in the process of responding to presence. Finally, he can examine the role of love, of creative fidelity, and of hope in the strengthening of presence now and forever.

Through these analyses the dangers to presence can also be experienced: selfishness, possessiveness, pride, poor self-image, fear. When Marcel is finished one can see what is necessary for true presence and what stands in its way. Yet when all is said and done, one must still acknowledge the act of presence, the coming to presence, as a free gift, a grace. Nothing can force it; nothing can make it happen.

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[24] See pp.87-99 of the chapter on Marcel.

[25] See pp. 99-104, 126-130 of the chapter on Marcel.

Tillich's "Religious Symbol"

Tillich uses phenomenological analysis to describe the manifestation and experience of the "holy" in human life and the role of the religious symbol in that experience. The symbol is seen as the necessary mediator or vehicle of the manifestation of the "holy." As vehicle of the "holy" something of the power of the "holy" is manifest through the symbolic material so that the material becomes translucent to it. When this happens, the symbolic material itself is experienced as "holy object."

This is the religious symbol's glory: that the "holy" is manifest; this is also its idolization in that the "holy" might be perceived as identical with the symbolic material rather than as radiating through that material. In that the symbolic material would become "holy" in itself, it would no longer be religious symbol but "idol."

Compatibility and Complementarity

Phenomenological analysis "fleshes out" presence and religious symbol as perceived phenomena, and it identifies the principals in both together with the quality and direction of their respective relationships. Through such analysis several similarities appear. Both presence and religious symbol are seen as specific "moments" of interrelation: both involve God in the depth of the interrelation, and both involve people. Both recognize some

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"concrete center" for the relationship: for presence, it is the body, for religious symbol it is the symbolic material. Both recognize the unique role this concrete center plays: to be essentially involved in the relation, yet not containing the relation (the relation being incarnate yet transcending the incarnating material).

In both presence and religious symbol the incarnating material is treated in a special manner, not as object to be possessed, but almost as "thou," because of quality of the relation that takes place through it.[26] Freedom is acknowledged as necessary in all respects of the experience: freedom is necessary both for God and for the persons involved.

But presence and religious symbol are not phenomenologically identical. Presence suggests closeness nearing identity; religious symbol suggests relatedness but at a distance. Presence moves toward incarnation, religious symbol toward participation. Presence refers to the "we" of "I" and "thou;" it emphasizes the more intimate relationship, and its reference is generally toward the individual or toward a smaller group of people. Religious symbol refers to the mediation between, the vehicle for, the relation of "I" and "thou;" it establishes the possibility by which being-itself can manifest itself to individuals but within a community context. Religious symbol is also concerned with the role of the community and with the nature of the symbolic material in that regard. Its reference therefore extends from the individual through the large community.

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[26] See pp. 79-85 of the chapter on Marcel. See also Tillich, Biblical Religion, pp. 23-28.

On the other hand, neither presence nor religious symbol denies the emphasis of the other term in its own meaning. Presence acknowledges the difference between "I," "thou" and "my body." It also acknowledges the positive roles of absence and distance in its reality.[27] Religious symbol for its part, includes the "presence" of being-itself and the ecstatic experience of closeness in its meaning. The two terms merely point in different directions and emphasize different aspects of the holy experience.

The Interpersonal Dimension of "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

Marcel's "Presence"

The interpersonal dimension plays a significant role in Marcel's notion of presence, because being is situated in this dimension. In this dimension God is perceived as person, as Absolute Thou, whose presence is a result of His-Her freedom and grace. In this dimension God is accessible as personal presence to be addressed in dialogue, to be loved and worshipped.

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[27] See pp. 98,129 of the chapter on Marcel.

But the interpersonal dimension is also the dimension of deeply human interactivity on the level of being. This dimension provides for the possibility of "we," of true co-esse, of rich human presence. The experience of "we" preserves both the immediacy and intimacy of such presence in that it establishes the "we" as the primary reality, the experienced reality, of which "I" and "thou" are merely abstractions. Since the experience of "we" incarnates itself in both terms of the relationship, it is beyond the full reality of either term. This, in turn, allows for the real presence of "we" to be experienced even in cases of bodily absence.

Tillich's "Religious Symbol"

For Tillich, too, the interpersonal level holds significance. Tillich recognizes the necessity of symbolizing being-itself in personal terms. He argues that since the person is seen as microcosm of the world, the way God reveals Her-Himself most clearly and fully is as personal or supra-personal.[28] But Tillich does not use "I" - "thou" language; instead he uses the notion of revelation to convey

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[28] This is why the Word plays such a significant role for Tillich. The Word is properly addressed to persons. See pp. 220-222 of the chapter on Tillich. Revelation too is a personal notion. See pp. 147-152, 186-187 of the chapter on Tillich. And Christ can only be final revelation because he is personal. See pp. 191-192 of the chapter on Tillich.

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his point.

Revelation preserves the freedom of God, for Tillich, since revelation is always initiated by God. Revelation suggests some type of "receiving knowledge," which has an ecstatic side to it, a type of knowledge open only to persons. Thus revelation itself is seen as an experience of presence, of closeness, in an inter-personal dimension. In fact, even the mediating object is perceived by Tillich in personalistic terms: like a person, in the manner of a person.[29]

For Tillich, revelation through Word and sacraments is what establishes the Spiritual Community.[30] Once again revelation is seen as personal, but now in the dimension of a community of persons. Through the Spiritual Presence effected by Word and sacrament a faith community is formed. Word and sacrament are thus not only the singularly personal Word, but are also the communal Word which binds a people to its referent and also to each other.

Compatibility and Complementarity

The interpersonal dimension preserves both Marcel's presence and Tillich's religious symbol from misunderstanding. It changes the focus from objects to persons, from the objective level to the intersubjective level and it preserves both terms from magical conceptions or idolatry. On the other hand, the interpersonal level also preserves both terms from being conceived purely subjectively: presence is not simply a matter of one's imagination, invention or suggestion; religious symbol is not merely private or illusory. On the contrary, both presence and religious symbol have intersubjective referents.

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[29] Tillich, Biblical Religion, pp. 23-28

[30] See pp. 158-160, 212-220 of the chapter on Tillich.

But presence and religious symbol move in different directions in this dimension too. Presence involves a twofold relationship: the "we" of "I" and "thou" and the "we" of "I" and "Thou." Religious symbol also involves a twofold but different relationship; the "we" of the ecstatic experience but also the "we" of a human community of persons. The directions are different, but complementary.

The Historical Dimension of "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

Marcel's "Presence"

Marcel does not mention history as such when dealing with presence, but in his examples he does deal with the historical dimension.

In considering creative fidelity Marcel reflects on the notion of "continuity" of response; in discussing hope he extends this continuity beyond death. In considering love he finds the force behind both.[31] Marcel recognizes that at some point presence is no longer tied to the concrete person as object, that at some point in the love experience the beloved can be present without physical presence. This reality is projected even through death; the presence of "thou" persists through my own particular being in the world, yet, not as an object to be kept, rather, as a living force. Presence in this respect is based on the reality of the "we," which is part of each of us and which extends beyond the incarnate body in presence.

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[31] See pp. 104-108 of the chapter on Marcel.

Marcel offers two types of examples of continued presence: of a living "thou" who is experienced as present without being physically present, and of one who is dead, but still experienced as present. He sees these presences as mediated through the incarnate "I," through gifts given and received, through some particular possession of "thou," that in some way extends "thou" through people whose lives witness to the presence of "thou," through the "I's" deep love for "thou," through places that retain the presence of the "thou." In each example the mediating elements are part of the historical condition.

Time serves as the test of this fidelity. Marcel admits that mostly time clouds the reality of such continued presence and therefore calls into question fidelity and hope. Time admits of the possibility of faded images, but it is also revealing, especially in those moments when the "indefectible principle," the infallible assurance of the continued presence of the beloved shines out clearly.

Tillich's Religious Symbol

Tillich treats the historical dimension more directly because it is a major concern for him. Tillich's religious symbol is a vehicle for carrying religious importance and religious reality through history. Put another way, his religious symbol is a means whereby salvation history breaks into chronological time. Tillich's religious symbol shows ontological reality and historical continuity, and it carries that religious reality through every new moment until that time when it becomes ineffective. For religious symbols that arise out of some historical event, the historical dimension is even more central. In that case the religious symbol's relation to the historical moment takes on essential importance.

This last point is exemplified by Christianity. Since Tillich sees Jesus the Christ as the final criterion for all further revelations, religious symbols in Christianity must always have relation to Jesus the Christ. Christian symbols, therefore, are not only manifestations of salvation history, but are such in relation to Jesus the Christ and in accord with the Christian tradition. Christian religious symbols, therefore, have explicit historical dimensions, and must maintain reference to the experience of Jesus the Christ and to the tradition that followed that experience. Moreover, because of Jesus the Christ's self-negating nature, Christian religious symbols also manifest historical transcendence and therefore contain something of the "Kingdom of God" and the _telos_ of all history.

The concreteness of the religious symbol assures the historical continuation of both final revelation and the church. Furthermore, the continuous presence of the concrete religious symbol assures history of the presence of salvation history even if at the present moment it is not clearly recognized as _kairos_. It also assures history of its ultimate fulfillment.

Compatibility and Complementarity

Although the historical dimension of Tillich's "religious symbol" is more worked out than is that of Marcel's "presence," the two retain some complementarity in this dimension. Presence emphasizes continuity of effectiveness and continuity of grace-giving experiences in the _personal_ dimension. Religious symbol emphasizes those same continuities as well as a continuity of the symbolic referent, a certain continuity of the symbolic material itself, and continuity of its self-negating principle, its final criterion (Jesus the Christ), but in the _communal_ dimension.

Conclusion

Though our analysis of the ontological, religious, theological, phenomenological, interpersonal and historical dimensions of "presence" and "religious symbol" we have seen a remarkable likeness of ultimate purpose as well as a likeness of terminology. We noted the different directions

Marcel and Tillich took in answer to their specific investigations, yet we were also able to note the interrelatedness and the complementarity of those pursuits. We have seen Marcel's "presence" as more deeply interpersonal and phenomenological, and Tillich's "religious symbol" as more deeply theological and historical, but both contain elements of all the dimensions sketched. Our conclusion is that the two terms "presence"/"religious symbol" can be used in conjunction with each other to help us in better understanding important eucharistic issues.

Eucharist as "Memorial"

In the first chapter of this dissertation we gave a brief outline of the major eucharistic developments that have taken place during this century. In this section we would like to examine one of these developments in greater detail: the recovery and renewal of the Jewish notion of "memorial" (zikkaron, anamnesis). Our purpose is to see what insights Marcel's notion of "presence" and Tillich's concept of "religious symbol" add to a contemporary understanding of this notion.

The Recovery of "Memorial"

The development of biblical criticism, the interest in the study of comparative religions, and the quest for the historical Jesus all led to a renewed interest in the religious life of Israel and in the life of the early Christian communities.[32] When the results from new explorations into Patristic theology and a richer understanding of the sacrifice of Christ were added to this, the time was then ripe for the re-appearance of "memorial."

Interest in the Jewish notion of "memorial" seemed to surface from two directions: from research done on the cultic life of Israel which raised the question of the relation of cult to tradition, and specifically, of "memory" to tradition, from investigation into the institution narratives of the New Testament, which raised the question of the meaning of anamnesis as understood in the early Christian communities.[33] The two areas could not but be seen as interrelated, with developments in the one having ramifications in the other.

Within this context two major notions of "memorial" developed. The first, or more prevailing notion, saw memorial as the means whereby the person or community was called to "remember" the saving ways that God had touched their lives through history. Through "remembering" the past events were, in a sense, made present, and God, who acted in the past, was effectively experienced through the memorial ritual as present *now* in the same saving way.[34]

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[32] These statements are made by way of summary. Cf. especially pp. 5-9, 14-19 of chapter one.

[33] J. Pederson and S. Mowinckel were the pioneers in researching the cultic life of Israel and relating that to her tradition. J. Pederson, Israel I-II (London and Copenhagen: 1926); S. Mowinckel, Psalmenstudien II (Kristinia: 1922). These men were the forerunners of the Scandinavian School which generally stressed the psychological characteristics and the mental history of the Israelites, the positive

The second notion of "memorial," propounded especially by Joachim Jeremias, saw *God* as the one being called upon to "remember." Through this memorial God is reminded of what S-He had done in the past so that S-He might continue to effect *now* what was once effected previously. The symbolic ritual, in this case, takes on the appearance of an offering, a sacrifice, a symbolic remembrance of the

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influence of cult as creative drama, the role of both king and prophet in cultic activities, and the question of the "actualization" (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of the Tradition through cultic ritualization and "remembering." With regard to the specific question of the relation of "memory" to Tradition in Israel we refer you to Brevard S. Childs, *Memory and Tradition in Israel*, Studies in Biblical Theology (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1962). Noteworthy are two other works on this subject: P. A. H. de Boer, *Gedunken und Gedächtnis in der Welt des Alten Testament* (Stuttgart: 1962); W. Schottroff, *[Gedenken] im alten Orient im Alten Testament. Die Wurzel zakar im semitischen Sprachkreis.* WMANT 15 2nd ed. (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1967).

A major representative of those scholars who were interested in the institution narratives is Joachim Jeremias, *Eucharistic Words*.

[34] This position is held by such scholars as Douglas Jones, "Ἀνάμνησις in the LXX and the Interpretation of I Cor. XI.25," *Journal of Theological Studies* 6, 2 (October, 1955): 183-191; F. J. Leenhardt, "This is My Body," *Essays on the Lord's Supper*; C. F. D. Moule, *The Sacrifice of Christ* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, Facet Books, 1964); Jean-Jacques von Allmen, *The Lord's Supper*, trans. by W. Fletcher Fleet, Ecumenical Studies in Worship (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969); Edward Kilmartin, *The Eucharist in the Primitive Church* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965). This is also the major position of Childs, *Memory and Tradition*.

past.[35]

Both notions of "memorial" suggest the possibility of understanding the question of eucharistic "sacrifice" in a new light, and both notions also suggest the possibility of once more relating the areas of eucharistic "presence" and "sacrifice." These possibilities are concretely acknowledged in the World Council of Churches consensus statement, "One Eucharist," and seem to be implied in the Second Vatican Council's references to the eucharist as the "memorial of Christ's death and resurrection."[36] It is therefore not without a certain urgency that we examine "memorial" more closely and seek to understand it more fully. We also suggest that Marcel's insights into "presence" and Tillich's into "religious symbol" will help us in our understanding.

"Memorial:" The Community Remembers

What do we mean when we say that in "memorial" the community makes the past present so that that which was experienced in the past is now experienced anew? Is this to be understood in the manner of a play, that somehow through the drama that which is depicted is "re-enacted" for the audience? Or is it to be understood in some magical way: through the use of certain ritual gestures, words and objects the past is transported into the present and all of this quite beyond the comprehension of the individuals involved?

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[35] This position was suggested by Darwell Stone, A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist (1909) but grew in real influence through the work of Joachim Jeremias, Eucharistic Words. It is adopted by Louis Bouyer, Eucharist, and is also behind the major thrust of Max Thurian's position: Max Thurian, L'Eucharistie. There is also a position that sees anamnesis as relating to Greek memorial meals for the dead. J. Delorme is a representative of this position in "The Last Supper and the Pasch in the N. T.," The Eucharist in the N.T. , trans. by E. M. Stewart (Baltimore and Dublin: Helicon Press, 1964). We do not however, view this as a major position and will not treat it here.

[36] "The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," no. 47.

Neither of these descriptions seems to hit the mark. The reason is that several of the pieces of the anamnetic puzzle are still missing. For a true understanding of "memorial" one needs (1) a dynamic notion of history, (2) a proper understanding of the role of memory and (3) an appreciation of the power and functioning of symbols. We will therefore briefly consider each in turn.

Dynamic Notion of History

No one would doubt the centrality of the notion of "salvation history" for the Jewish people. The Jews view their past in terms of the saving intervention or "breaking through" of God into it. In fact, Jewish worship in the Old Testament actually celebrated the central events of God's intervention in their lives. But Jewish worship does not merely look to the past as past, as completed; Jewish worship "remembers" the past in relation to the present; it views the saving events of the past as effective, as efficacious for the present.

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> Redemptive history continues. What does this mean? It means more than that later generations wrestled with the meaning of the redemptive events, although this is certainly true. It means more than that the influence of a past event continued to be felt in successive generations, which obvious fact no one could possibly deny. Rather, there was an immediate encounter, an actual participation in the great acts of redemption. The Old Testament maintained the dynamic, continuing character of past events without sacrificing their historical character as did the myth.[37]

The "event" becomes the vehicle for the reality which continues throughout Israel's history. Put another way, a quality of time enters history through a particular event and this content continues to transform the chronological time of each new generation into redemptive time. Each generation is thus challenged to obedient response to this quality-content manifest through the medium of the tradition. Through the group's "remembering" the event, the quality of divine caring becomes present now, for this group.

The Role of Memory

Memory has the function of properly relating the present with the past. Thus if Israel was to have any sense of her own history, it would be through "memory." But "memory" for Israel was more than that: "memory" for Israel had more than a general psychological meaning to it: it had a highly theological meaning also. "Israel's remembrance became a technical term to express the process by which later

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[37] Childs, Memory and Tradition, pp. 83-84.

Israel made relevant the great redemptive acts which she recited in her tradition."[38] Israel's remembrance "actualized" the past; it intimately encountered the great acts of redemption; it participated now in the actualized past event through the power of the reality contained in that event.[39] This means certainly more than "thinking about" the past event as past, than viewing the past event as an accomplished act. The "memory" that Israel had related to her notion of history.

The Power and Functioning of Symbols

> Der Kult is Geschehen, geschehende Wirklichkeit, sich verwirklichendes Heilsgeschehen. Insoweit sind die Rites "Symbole": sie drüchen aus, "Bedeuten," das, was geschehen soll, und dadurch geschieht es.[40]

Mowinckel saw cultic action as playing a central role in Israel's religious remembrance. Cultic action was the vehicle through which the past event became actualized; in performing this action the community was called to "remember" the past.[41] But not only was it called, it was also "helped:" through participating in the cultic action the community was, in a sense, reintroduced into the event being commemorated. For example, when the community tasted the bitter herbs, it experienced the desert, their desert, not that of their ancestors. What the community celebrated in ritual action it experienced as real for itself.

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[38] Childs, Memory and Tradition, pp. 74-75.

[39] Ibid., pp. 56, 63.

[40] S. Mowinckel, Religion und Kultus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1953), p. 73.

[41] H. -J. Kraus takes a slightly different position. He explains the actualization as a transporting of the congregation back into the original historical situation. H. -J. Kraus, Gottesdienst in Israel (München, 1954), p. 127.

Through the symbols, then, the community was called to remember, and through the remembering the community could then offer thanksgiving.[42] The symbols, therefore, encouraged religious remembering and actually effected it. Furthermore, in this context, the symbols also facilitated a dynamic notion of history.

"Memorial:" God Remembers

Jeremias focused attention on the other way that "memorial" seemed to be understood by the Jewish people. Through his research on how the word anamnesis was used in the Septuagint, he came to understand God as the subject of "memorial," i.e., God was asked to remember or not remember this act or that offense. In relating this type of memorial to the anamnetic command of Jesus in the New Testament, Jeremias translated the meaning of that command: "Do this so that God will remember me."[43]

Max Thurian incorporates this same meaning of anamnesis into his scholarly work on the Eucharist. He sees

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[42] Thurian, L'Eucharistie, p. 35.

[43] Jeremias, Eucharistic Words, pp. 237-255.

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anamnesis, however, as having both meanings: in "memorial" not only is something evoked from the community, thus calling it into the actualization of the event, but something is also invoked in the direction of God.[44] Thurian takes the notion of "memorial" past zikkaron, which emphasizes the community's remembering, to azkarah, the memorial of the oblation or meal offering which emphasizes God's remembering. In azkarah God is not only proclaimed as present and faithful, but God is also given an offering from the people.[45] The "offering" or "memorial" is a mediating material that concretizes the relationship between God and people, that calls both God and people to remember. It is Thurian's position that anamnesis implies both of these elements.

The mere mention of this second meaning for "memorial" elicits angry responses from many Protestants. The reason for this is simple: this second meaning of memorial has tremendous sacrificial imagery and consequences. If one posits this meaning as the central meaning of anamnesis, then the anamnetic command becomes a command to offer sacrifice (in the sense that Christ is offered by the church to God so that God will remember and bring to completion what Christ had begun). Such a position, however, is not in keeping with the Protestant tradition.

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[44] Thurian, L'Eucharistie, p. 35.

[45] Ibid., p. 56.

Yet, this is just the position that Thurian takes. He sees eucharist as both sacrament of Christ's sacrifice (in that it communicates the benefits of the one sacrifice of the cross in the manner of zikkaron) and sacrifice of the church (in that eucharist represents before God and the community the sacrifice of Christ as a unique and perfect oblation in the manner of azkarah.[46]

"Memorial:" What is its Correct Meaning?

What is the correct meaning of memorial? Did Christ intend one meaning or the other, one meaning over the other? The answer to these questions can be no more than hypothesis. While most New Testament scholars seem to agree that anamnesis refers to the actualization of the Christ event, does this thereby exclude any other possible meaning from also being present? It is certainly true that God, theologically speaking, does not need to "be reminded"; it is God who initiates all graced events in the first place. But, from the human perspective, does it not, at times, seem as though God has to "be reminded"? Or are there not times when we feel that we must "remind" God, not for His-Her sake necessarily, but for ours? Such questions, however, do not prove that this is what Jesus intended.

At the present juncture of theological investigation no answer is completely satisfying, but the weight of scholarship seems to be leaning to the side of the community's remembering. Therefore, this is the meaning that will occupy our central concern. On the other hand, there seems to be something of truth in the second meaning also, something that cannot simply be discarded. It is our position that, in applying Marcel's "presence" and Tillich's "religious symbol" to the question of "memorial," a natural relationship will be established between the two meanings. The question will then have to be: is such an understanding helpful for us today?

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[46] Ibid., pp. 48-49, 148.

"Memorial" and its Relation to "Presence" and "Religious Symbol"

It must be reaffirmed from the outset that the purpose of this section is not an exercise in comparative linguistics. Our task is not one of substituting "these words" for "those words," but of translating the Jewish notion of "memorial" into an understandable idiom for our day. To do this requires analogous expression that conforms to our own culture and our own thought patterns. The ultimate question we see before us is how to make "memorial" a living, life-giving notion for the church today. We suggest that it is here that Marcel and Tillich make sizeable contributions.

In relating "memorial" to the thought of Tillich and Marcel we find two major areas of convergence: the first has to do with the "quality" of "remembering;" the second has to do with the role of cultic actions and religious symbols.

The Quality of Remembering

There seems to be a general consensus that the quality of "remembering" necessary for "memorial" (Gedächtnis) is different than that required for psychological recall (Erinnerung). Yet when one searches for a clearer understanding as to how these two "rememberings" are different, one finds little satisfaction. We turn to Marcel and find insights into Gedächtnis from several perspectives: from his reflections on the continued presence of the dead, and from his reflections on the experienced presence of another person even though absent.

In considering the experience of the continued presence of the dead, Marcel treats of two different types of remembering. The first type is the remembering of another person as one might remember an object, a picture on a mantelpiece, or a memory to be "held on to" and "preserved" (a form of idolatry). In this sense the other person is remembered as "it," as "thing," or as my possession. In this type of remembering I think about the other: I remember what the other was like and what the other did, and, perhaps, as years go by, my remembrance fades away.[47]

The second type of remembering for Marcel is the remembering of the other person as "thou," as other subject.

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[47] For more on this type of remembering see Marcel, P.I., pp. 63, 69-71, 185-186.

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In this type of remembering "I" adopt a living relationship to "thou," even though dead. The continued experience that "I" have of "thou's" presence (intermittent as it is) assures me of this possibility. In my "continued experience of thou" "thou" presents him/herself to me as "gift," as "revelation," and not as something that I have subjectively created.[48]

This second type of remembering is quite similar to the remembering of a living "thou" who is merely absent. The experience is a common one: the beloved, though absent, is experienced as more present than all the other people in the same room or on the same train or plane and even more present than the person seated next to me.

The basis for such experiences is found on the ontological level and is manifest in Marcel's ground-statement: To be is to be with. Being is in communion, and communion implies another subject on the interpersonal level experienced as "present with."[49] This communion, based in love, fidelity and hope, is what allows presence to transcend space and time. The "we" of love, once established, can live forever because love founds an intimacy that raises the relation above the world of absolutely perishable things and consecrates it.[50] Fidelity gives this love its permanency and conquers time by transcending the instant, while remaining in the temporal flow.[51] Hope, arising from the deep assurance that each of us is more than we understand, is the motivating force for the perpetuation of this presence.[52]

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[48] The experience of "giftedness" prevents the other from being a figment of my imagination. Marcel likens this experience to the "artistic insight" which an artist also experiences as "gift." P.I., pp. 190-191. See also p. 102 of the chapter on Marcel. For more on this type of remembering see Marcel, P.I., pp. 62-63, 65-66, 69-70, 139-141, 149-152, 165-167, 185-186, 191-193.

[49] This applies even to objects, which, when experienced on this level, mediate personal presence. See pp. 123-125 of the chapter on Marcel.

The actuality of such an experience, however, depends upon some medium; since everything that I experience must come through sensation, through my incarnate situation, some medium must mediate the presence of one who is dead or absent. This medium can be something that belongs to the beloved, something that is given by the beloved, or even an image that I "have" of the beloved.[53] The medium, although it is an "object," is also the locus of the subject in much the same way as the subject's body is. Through this medium the beloved continues to be invoked in what is essentially an act of worship.[54] Fidelity is therefore directed to the reality manifest through the image and not to the image or thing itself.

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[50] Marcel, P.I., p. 153. See also pp. 100-101, 126-128 of the section on Marcel.

[51] See pp. 104-108 of the chapter on Marcel.

[52] See pp. 109-111 of the chapter on Marcel.

[53] Even the image that I "have" of the beloved is a gift. It is the result of free communion.

[54] "The image," says Marcel, "is necessary for me in order that I can become aware of the adherence of this application. It is the modality according to which this

In Tillich's language, the medium would function like a symbol of the person: it at once points to "thou" and contains something of "thou;" it "manifests" "thou" in a given dimension; it "presents" thou to the subject and waits to be accepted and welcomed.

Certain similarities can be seen between Marcel's second type of "remembering" and Brevard Childs' description of religious memory in Israel, but is it valid to apply Marcel's "remembering" to the cultic religious situation? We suggest that it is, and we find the key to the connection in Marcel's brief reflections on the notion of "commemoration" of religious feasts in worship. Commemoration, for Marcel, is a dialogical act whose goal, communion with the event being celebrated, is attained through invocation, using the "images" that call the event to presence.[55] Commemoration, therefore, like remembering, is not a subjective recall of the past as past, the mere maintaining and renovating of images, but a genuine recreation, a genuine renewal.[56]

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adherence or application takes on a significance for me." Marcel, P.I., pp. 149-152.

[55] Commemoration can only be understood from the inside, not from without. Ibid., pp. 187-188. Note that this is the same process used in invoking the presence of the dead. Ibid., pp. 169-170.

[56] Ibid., p. 52.

The final question for consideration, then, is whether Marcel's "remembering" adequately translates Childs' religious memory. We see that both positions see remembering as it is used here, as different from the "normal" meaning of "remembering." But Childs' concerns are admittedly religious and Marcel's are purposely ontological: Childs is concerned with "actualizing" an event, Marcel with "actualizing" a person; Childs emphasizes obedience as the response of the community to the actualization, Marcel emphasizes love.

When the differences are put this way similarities appear. While it is true that the ontological and the religious are different dimensions, they share an essential grounding, at least from the viewpoints of Marcel and Tillich. The fact that both "rememberings" move in the direction of actualization underlines their similarity; what is different is the referent of that actualization. But even here the differences fade away, because involved in every "event" is some personal presence: in the case of Israel, the saving presence of God breaking into its history.[57]

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[57] It seems important to recall here that at the basis of every personal presence Marcel posits the presence of God. S-he is present as Thou in every experience of "we." In this sense every experience of "we" has a religious dimension. On this level too, differences between the two positions fade.

What remains different, then, is the emphasis: Childs' emphasis is on the historical event, Marcel's is on the personal. We suggest that such a difference merely mirrors the change in attention that seems to have taken place in contemporary American society. While we continue to possess a historical sense, we give much more attention to the "personal": personal rights, personal security and happiness, personal life-styles, personal associations, these are the concerns of people today. Therefore if cultic religion is to survive as "viable" today, it must have some sense of the personal, and if this can be related to a traditional salvation-historical perspective, so much the better. We believe that Marcel's insights here can move "memorial" in just such a direction, so that the notion can be seen as at once deeply theological, solidly salvation-historical, and richly presentative and personal.

The Role of Cultic Actions and Religious Symbols

The general explanation of the role of cultic actions and symbols in relation to the process of "actualization" is rather meager. Most writers simply state _that_ symbols are important in the actualization process and _that_ they make the past event present; _how_ they do this or _why_ they might do this are questions generally left unattended. In examining these last two questions we hope to _expand_ the understanding of "memorial." Since this purpose is different from the purpose of the last paragraphs (translation), the methodology below will also be different.

The "Why" of Cultic Action

Tillich sees Word and sacrament as necessary for God to reveal Him/Herself.[58] These religious symbols become the loci of God's revelation or, in Marcel's language, the "incarnate situation or reality" of God's presence. This word, or this sacrament reveals God-present in the particular dimension that is opened up by the symbolic material. To that extent, not only is some symbolic material necessary for revelation, but this particular symbolic material is necessary for revelation in this particular dimension.

A second reason why cultic action is necessary is that cultic action provides continuity both with regard to the referent of the symbolic material and with regard to the manner of manifesting that referent. Such continuity provides a broader base for communion among the recipients of the revelation and establishes a stable religious reference point to which each individual member can relate. Such continuity also permits a historical or salvation-historical perspective, since the present moment is able to be related to the past. The aspect of continuity is especially important for Tillich's view of Christianity, because it is only through the continuity of Christ-symbols that the final, full revelation of God (in all its self-transcending and self-critiquing power) remains in and for the church.[59]

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[58] See pp. 147-151, 210-212, 220-222 of the chapter on Tillich. See also S.T. 1: 106-159.

A third reason why cultic action is necessary is that it provides for the possibility of human response. Since each of us is incarnate, every experience, every communication, every communion is only through the incarnate situation. This holds true even of our response to God: if God is to be responded to, it is always through my incarnate situation. Every action, every object used, every word, every "image" used in personal communication is therefore an incarnation, either of God, of us, or of both.

A fourth reason why cultic action is necessary is that it provides for the visibility of the church. Once again this is Tillich's concern: if the church is to be more than a moral club, it must have a visibility that "shows" it as rooted in Jesus the Christ.[60] When the church is engaged in cultic action (worship) this Christ-rootedness becomes visibly manifest. Such manifestation is also necessary if the church is to be a Christ-presence in and for the world.

The "How" of Cultic Action

In trying to understand how symbols work in cultic action, how they "actualize" the past event, how they

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[59] See pp. 210-226 of the chapter on Tillich.

[60] Tillich, "Significance of the History of Religions," p. 87; Intro. to P.E., p. xix; S.W., pp. 66-70.

"make that event present," one has to consider symbolic reality from a number of different perspectives. The questions one might ask are: (a) in what sense do religious symbols "have power"? (b) how are religious symbols selected? (c) how do religious symbols operate in the cultic act?

(a) Tillich recognizes that certain things seem to have a natural power by which they mediate something of the depth, meaningfulness and holiness of life.[61] Upon closer examination the power of the religious symbol is seen as coming from the symbol's referent, being-itself, and of manifesting being-itself through the religious symbolic material. The reason some things can do this, Tillich suggests, is both because they maintain a less-clouded relationship with being-itself (they remain translucent to being-itself) and because they are naturally more meaningful for the community that receives them (they are perceived by the community as revealing more of life than their proper meaning).

(b) Certain of these "naturally empowered media" are selected or chosen to be the central symbols of the historical religions.[62] In some cases, the symbols are related to

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[61] Tillich, S.W., pp. 55-66. That Tillich describes the religious symbol in this way seems to correspond to what others have referred to as the "mythopoeic" referent of cult. Cf. Childs, Memory and Tradition, p. 81.

[62] Tillich, S.W., p. 69. This is certainly true of Christianity.

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central religiously significant events in the religion's reality; in some cases, they are related to a central religious person, either because of his/her connection to them or because of the meaning the followers of the person attach to them.[63]

(c) once chosen or acknowledged, the religious symbols operate in manifold ways. They serve as the focal point of the revelatory experience and manifest the power and presence of God in a specific dimension. They also manifest historical continuity with past celebrations and interpret the revelatory experience now in terms of the past event or through the form of the past event, with the result that the revelation now manifests itself as having historical rootedness in the tradition of the religion. Finally, these same symbols "touch" the receivers of the revelation and open up in them levels of meaning and reality which could have been opened up in no other way. These are the insights that Tillich contributes to the operation of religious symbols.

Marcel also has contributions to make in this matter, but his point of view is from the position of the believer or the receiver, rather than from the point of view of the giver. He notes that the same symbols that Tillich speaks about as manifesting revelation are used by those who receive the revelation to respond to it in return. Once the religious symbol has been received as revelatory, something of that symbol is retained by the receiver to be used as an "image" of the presence.[64] In the cultic action renewed presence is _invoked_ in response to the initial graced experience. What has therefore happened in the worship event is that the symbolic material of the revelation becomes the symbolic material of the invocation-response; put another way, the symbolic material is the locus of communion.[65]

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[63] Whatever the reasons behind the selection, the historically selected symbols take on central importance. These are the ones that bind the religion together and give it continuity. For Christianity these selected symbols preserve the final revelation through Jesus the Christ and guarantee the continued presence of the self-transcending power of that revelation. Tillich, S.W., pp. 66-67. See also pp. 218-219 of the chapter on Tillich.

Finally, Marcel makes one further contribution. Since openness, _disponibilité_ and relaxation are necessary for true communion to take place, the religious symbol must function as that through which one attends to worship or ingathers oneself for worship.[66] In other words, the religious symbol can call and effect recollection and contemplation thus disposing one for true communal prayer.

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[64] This is merely a reinterpretation of what happens in any experience of communion: something of the experience is retained. It is this that seems to supply the "image" referred to in Marcel's reflections on the continued presence of the dead.

[65] Once again this is true in any experience of communion. Such an explanation combines these Marcellian insights: presence is a gift experience: it is received; in presence the other is presented to me as embodied; something of this embodiment provides the locus of the "we."

[66] See pp. 117-121 of the chapter on Marcel.

The Demonization of Cultic Action

Tillich describes how abuses can creep into any cultic situation when the referent of the symbol is lost sight of and when the attention naturally turns to the symbol itself. Such abuses have always been part of the Christian tradition and of the tradition of Israel before that. When the symbolic action no longer points beyond itself but rather assumes the power of the holy to itself, it cuts itself off from its referent and, by that act, also changes the relationship it has with the worshippers. In some cases a magical relationship is substituted, in some cases a mechanistic one. It is for this reason that the community must always renew itself, both in the direction of its relationship with God, and in relation to its sacramental attitudes and practices. It is only in this way that "memorial" can be truly effective.

We have presented two major concerns: the quality of memory and the functioning of ritual, in which Marcel's and Tillich's insights converge with the question of "memorial." We have examined these concerns in greater detail and are now ready to suggest an understanding of eucharistic memorial that incorporates them. We will limit ourselves to the main lines of the question and only to those lines that directly relate to our investigation.

A Contemporary Understanding of "Memorial"

To make eucharistic memorial is to invoke God present and efficacious.

1. To make memorial is to invoke God. To "make memorial" and to "invoke God" are not totally synonymous phrases. To make memorial is a specific ritual way of invoking God, but it is not the only way. The reason we make this our first emphasis is to underscore the fact that if memorial does not invoke God, it is not memorial, no matter what else it does do. Invocation is central to memorial; it implies a special way of being present to and a special way of calling upon God.

2. To invoke God. Memorial is addressed to God even though Jesus the Christ figures centrally in its symbolism and meaning. Memorial is a dialogical word; it is addressed to God in dialogue as truly other "person," as "Thou."[67] While it is true that memorial recounts the wonderful ways that God breaks into human history, memorial does so in an invoking manner: each account of God's goodness and salvation is spoken in the manner of acknowledgment,

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[67] The insights for this paragraph are derived from Marcel. What is important above all else is that God be "invoked." If one admits that God can only be adequately conceived as "Thou," one will have no difficulty in understanding "memorial" in this way. The words used and statements made in memorial are therefore like words used between lovers, i.e., in the manner of worship. (Cf. p. 264 of this section.).

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i.e., of praise and thanksgiving, and in the manner of entreaty.

To invoke God is to "call to" Him-Her, not to try to "manufacture" Him-Her. As "Thou" God is free "person," and God's freedom must be acknowledged and safeguarded.[68] Whenever God reveals Him-Herself, His-Her presence is therefore experienced as free gift, as grace. In that God reveals Him-Herself in eucharist, S-He is acknowledged as faithful God, for God presents Him-Herself in eucharist according to His-Her promise and not according to what we do.

To invoke God is to respond in faith to Him-Her who first graced us. Memorial is not an initiatory act which the church does to make God present; memorial is a responsory act, the community's faith-act, that acknowledges God's first gracing, His-Her first reaching out in loving kindness.[69] Memorial, therefore, is necessary for communion in the sense that only if it is done, is God's presence truly acknowledged, truly responded to, truly welcomed now.

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[68] God does not need us to safeguard His-Her freedom; it is rather we who must not think that we can force God into anything. The paragraph merely acknowledges what Marcel holds is true for every real presence.

[69] God is always present as gift, and this holds true on the human level as well. Invocation is not demand, it is entreaty. Invocation in "memorial" is always, then, entreaty based on a first graced presence. But "memorial" is not something that God can force us to do, either. If communion is to be established, it will only be because we too, respond freely.

(3) To make eucharistic memorial. To make eucharistic memorial is to "remember," in the manner of the Hebrews, the manifold ways that God has visited and wrought redemption for His-Her people. It is to invoke God through the symbols in which S-He once manifested His-Her power and revelation so that God might manifest this power and revelation anew. Because God is faithful to His-Her promises, S-He does manifest Him/Herself anew through symbols to those who, in faith, are willing to see. These people S-He calls to Him-Herself in covenant, in renewed communion so that they might experience His-Her revelation, His-Her love, His-Her saving power now and remain loving, faithful, and hope-filled in the future.[70]

To make eucharistic memorial is to "remember" especially Jesus the Christ, who he is and what he did. To make eucharistic memorial is to invoke God in praise and thanksgiving through Jesus the Christ so that what is heard is God's Word (Jesus the Christ) and what is shared is God's

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[70] In memorial the past image or symbolic material is present-ed, made present, or presented. Because of God's promises S-He manifests His-Her presence through that material. In acknowledging that presence, one enters into communion through that same material and thus receives revelation and salvation here and now in that dimension. Certainly the conscious experience of this presence varies due to a variety of reasons. But Tillich's position suggests that something is also taking place on the unconscious level, something that might not be understood until much later.

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gift to us (Jesus the Christ).[71] To make eucharistic memorial is to make memorial in the manner of the eucharistic tradition and through the eucharistic symbols: the worshipping community, the Word, the bread and wine, and, in several traditions, the priest.[72]

The role of the symbols is central. The Word of God (1) calls the community to "remember," and (2) moves the community to experience the living reality of the Good News proclaimed in words and celebrated in action. Through "proclaiming," through "addressing" words (scriptural words and contemporary words) "to" the community in the manner of "invocation," the words become God's living Word, God's present Word, God's gracing Word, calling to communion. The bread and wine enjoy the same functions: these elements also (1) call the community to "remember" how God manifested His-Her love through Jesus the Christ in the past, and (2) manifest that saving presence now for this community in that they are acknowledged and shared, through the eucharistic action, as the life-giving sacrament of God's love.[73]

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[71] In eucharistic memorial Christ plays a central role, yet eucharistic memorial is still addressed to God. The clearest way to address this double referent is to take the notion of Christ as Ur-sakrament of God seriously. Christ is thus viewed as embodiment of, as manifestation of God.

[72] The manifold presence of Christ will be taken up in the next section. The importance of this statement is to acknowledge the central symbolism used in eucharistic memorial. While the Roman Catholic Church sees the priest as part of this central symbolism, other traditions do not. This matter will also be addressed in the next section.

In all that has been said one begins to realize that "making eucharistic memorial" actually involves several "moments:" the calling of the community to awareness and receptivity, the gracing by God through Word-sacrament, the community invocation to God, the gracing by God through Word-sacrament, and sacramental communion. Each of these "moments" corresponds to a given part of the eucharistic celebration and in that sense can be viewed as an ecclesial "moment," corresponding to the faith-dynamic taking place within each individual.[74]

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[73] Both Word and sacrament are considered as symbols, according to Tillich's largest notion of symbol. Their function is two-fold: to evoke an openness, an attention on the part of the gathered worshippers by at least having them center their attention on the symbols and "relax" in the presence of them; to invoke God in the sense of using the symbols as "images" (like Marcel's "images" of the beloved who has died), to call forth presence. From God's perspective, the symbols are the vehicles through which S-He manifests His-Her Word and His-Her saving love. The symbols are therefore the loci of both actions: God's and the worshipping community's.

In the Christ context the symbolic material, words and gestures come alive. Words once uttered are spoken and heard anew; the gift once given is gift given anew. The meaning of the Supper for the early Christians becomes the meaning of the Supper for us, and the death for them becomes the death for us; the same with the eschatological expectancy. Through invocation and symbolic action the event is recentered from past to present. But with each new celebration, with each new memorial, added meaning and richness becomes available for us. As we experience the reality through the symbols again and again, the symbols evoke deeper reality and meaning (presuming that one is growing in real communion).

One further point must be made. While it is true that the sacramental elements have a secondary role with regard to the presence of Christ (they are vehicles for his presence as Ursakrament), they have a necessary role with regard to the presence of Christ in this particular dimension. The necessity for sacramental elements derives from the physical (bodily) absence of Jesus the Christ.

Viewed in this way the structure of eucharistic memorial corresponds to Marcel's description of the event of "coming to presence."[75] The movement is from third-person discussion to second-person dialogue, from objective observation to intersubjective communion, from information to invocation. In the process talk _about_ God becomes prayer (the word of beloved "Thou" and the response of "I"), and bread and wine become gifts, offered and received. The event that began so distantly ends so intimately as the faith-community first grows into presence and then into deeper communion. It is from this perspective that one clearly sees eucharistic memorial as _event_, as process, which depends (1) on God's faithfulness to His-Her promise to _be with_ His-Her people and (2) on the community's willingness and availability to enter into communion.

Two Related Questions

1. _From what has been described above, can anything more be said about the second meaning of "memorial":_

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[74] The "moments" are not time segments. They are more likd "freeze-frames" from two different points of view: that of God and that of the worshipper. The "moments" as presented here take the following into consideration: (a) God's initiative, which not only effects his presence, but also grounds even the possibility of invocation, and (b) the twofold balance between Word and sacrament. In the liturgical action of memorial this whole process is ritualized. In reality, communion with God can be effected well before the communion section of the ritual or not at all. More will be said in the next section.

[75] See pp. 87-99 of the chapter on Marcel.

that God remembers? In the above approach this meaning of "memorial" is not alluded to. The understanding of "invocation" that is used here does not presume that God must be called to remember us; it does, however, underscore our need to be called to "remember" and our need to "remember" Him-Her (in the manner of faith-response). This understanding of "memorial" seems to reflect the real contemporary situation and, at the same time, stands on solid theological ground.

2. In what ways is the above description sacrificial? From what has been said three types of sacrificial importance can be distinguished: the importance of Christ's sacrifice, the importance of the individual's sacrifice, and the importance of the church's sacrifice.[76]

a. Eucharistic memorial is related to Christ's sacrifice in the sense that it sacramentalizes that sacrifice. Since Christ's sacrifice is seen as universally redemptive, it must, in some way, be seen as continuously efficacious. "Remembering" that sacrifice accomplishes this purpose, for it at once (1) acknowledges the past completion of Christ's historical sacrifice (his life-death-resurrection of absolute dependence and praise), and (2) calls that Paschal Mystery present here and now through the use of religious symbols. The result is that Christ's once-for-all sacrifice is able to be experienced now as present and efficacious for us. In this sense eucharistic memorial is "sacrificial:" related to and invoking the sacrifice of Christ.

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[76] We use the word "sacrifice" here primarily to refer to a sense of dependence and self-giving. In that sense Christ's entire life-death-resurrection can be seen

b. Eucharistic memorial is also related to the worshippers' individual sacrifices. Since the Christian is called to live as Christ, in the manner of Christ's sacrificial life, his/her life too must be sacrificial (it must be lived in dependence and praise). Since the Christian's life is actually a response to Christ's life, the sacrificial nature of his/her life must also figure in eucharistic memorial. In this perspective the eucharistic memorial seems to play three roles: (1) it calls the individual Christian to communion in the sacrifice of Christ; (2) it serves as the response of the individual to this call (it serves as the individual's acknowledgment of his/her absolute dependence and his/her willingness to live his/her life in that spirit); (3) it serves as the invocation-gift to Christ of lives already moving in that direction. Any one eucharistic celebration can serve this variety of purposes (singly or in combination) for each of the worshippers.

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as sacrificial: his constant attitude was one of obedience (and in that sense dependence), culminating in complete kenosis (self-emptying).

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All three roles have a common context: they all imply the initiatory action of God through Christ: S-He it is who calls, who invites first. Every eucharistic memorial is, in turn, an awakening of this call and/or a response to this call. If response, it can be either in the manner of initial acknowledgment and willingness or in the manner of deeper acknowledgment: life lived sacrificially, as gift.

But is this same true of invocation; can invocation be seen as response? Marcel notes that invocation presupposes or acknowledges the presence of "thou."[77] In that sense invocation is response. What is more, invocation is response on the inter-personal level; it therefore "requests" communion or re-union, as the case may be, without force or manipulation.[78]

The gift is really the invocation: it is at once the response to Christ's sacrificial call and the invocation that deeper communion might be established. This fact is recognized more readily if the parameters are expanded so as to see eucharistic memorial events in relation. While one eucharistic memorial might call the individual to a sacrificial life-style, another eucharistic memorial might actually "sacramentalize" the gift of a life lived in that way. This second memorial thus becomes gift and invocation, but always in response to a first call. In this sense, eucharistic memorial is a sacrifice of the individual in response to Christ's sacrificial presence.[79]

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[77] See pp. 87-90, 101, 104, 126-130.

[78] When viewed in this way there is no possibility of conceiving the eucharist as a good work that the person does to merit grace. Eucharist is always seen as response to Christ's saving love; it is also a request, an entreaty, not a demand.

c. From the viewpoint of the church eucharistic memorial is also seen as gift-invocation, and this always in response to Christ's unique sacrifice and his sacrificial call. The church sees itself as called to be Christ, to be sacrament of Christ, and it sees its life as one of constant response to that call: in praise and self-giving. In eucharistic memorial the church therefore offers its life as sacrifice, as gift to God, in such a way as to invoke God to new and deeper communion. The church also calls upon its members to enter into that same sacrificial posture and join in that same invocation.

Consequently, eucharistic memorial is also the church's sacrifice, but always in relation to Christ's first sacrifice and his first call. It is not done as a

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[79] One of the problems of the Reformers was in viewing the Mass in isolation from the sacrifice of Christ. Another problem was in viewing the Mass as the church's "good work," designed to merit grace. When the Mass is seen in the larger context of the continued relationship between Christ and his church, these difficulties fade away. On the interpersonal level the Mass is clearly seen as the locus for Christ's giving and the church's responding. Each individual Mass is seen, then, in the larger Christ-church relationship, as a specific "moment" in that relationship, as a presentative moment.

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"good work" used to merit God's grace or to force His-Her presence; it is rather done in order that God might be acknowledged, that His-Her covenant might be freely sealed, that His-Her power and presence might be deeply experienced in communion. This is why the church does invoke; this is why the church must invoke.

But what of the symbols? In the symbolic context of eucharistic memorial all the above dynamics take place, many of them simultaneously. The community calls and presents, the Word calls and presents, the bread and wine call and present, all in the context of Christ's once-for-all unique sacrifice. The offering of bread and wine bear Christ's offering, bear the individual's offerings, bear the church's offering; the sharing of bread and wine bear Christ's communion with the individuals and the church.

Conclusion

One might summarize the contributions of Marcel and Tillich to the question of eucharistic memorial in this way: Marcel provides "memorial" with a new thrust that keeps it from becoming magical and gives it greater contemporary unity and comprehensibility; Tillich provides "memorial" with an understanding of the function of symbols that results in the same conclusions.

Marcel's understanding of "memory" and his grasp of interpersonal presence and communion serve as the basis for his contributions. His grasp of "memory" (in the

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interpersonal context) as bearer of the "image" that makes continued presence of a past event or person possible allows comparison with the Israelite notion of "religious memory." Moreover, the fact that memory plays a positive role in the invocation of this past presence provides memorial with a new unity: one "remembers" so that "thou" can be invoked and experienced.

In being able to view "memorial" as "invocation," the interpersonal nature of the action is preserved and God in Christ remains effector of "presence," freely given. What is more, a fresh understanding of the relation of theological *anamnesis* and *epiklesis* is thereby suggested: while *anamnesis* and *epiklesis* are two liturgical moments, structurally separate, they are, on a deeper level, intimately related, so much so that the entire eucharistic action can be seen as anamnetic or epikletic, depending upon the emphasis.

Finally, Marcel's "I-thou" model permits one to see Christ's once-for-all sacrifice and all of the church's eucharists in relation. As every "I-thou" relationship enjoys special moments of presence, moments of giftedness, moments of invocation, so too the church and the individuals in the church enjoy these same moments with Christ. Each eucharist and all eucharists are seen then, as moments in the "I-thou" relationship of Christ and the church, but always flowing from his first once-for-all sacrifice and always in relation to it.

This fact, in turn, allows us to see the eucharist as sacrificial and sacrifice in different dimensions without causing serious misunderstanding. Within this context, Christ's sacrifice is received as initiating, primary and essential, and the church's and the individual's sacrifices are viewed as responsory, but no less essential for true communion. Not only is the eucharist a sacrifice, it must be a sacrifice if Christ's once-for-all sacrifice is to continue to be acknowledged as truly universal and efficacious even now. It should also be noted that all this can be affirmed without reverting to the second meaning of "memorial:" "that God may remember."[80]

Tillich's contributions to "eucharistic memorial" lay in his description of how sacrifice, in its various senses, is actualized. From God's point of view Tillich shows how symbols can and do manifest revelation and sanctification. On the human side he shows how symbols open the community to receive this revelation and how they touch the community in its depth, revealing more than is at first consciously realized. Tillich also shows how the community can respond to this revelation in worship. Most of this is admittedly done only in skeletal form here. It will be the burden of the next section to describe these processes in greater detail.

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[80] See pp. 283-284, 288-290 of this chapter. In our understanding "memorial" itself is invocational and responsorial; it is therefore "offered" by the Church as acknowledgment of dependence and as plea for deeper communion. It is in this sense that the church "sacrifices."

Eucharist and the Manifold Presence of Christ

Having treated the general question of eucharistic memorial, we would now like to examine the more specific question of the "manifold presence of Christ" in the context of that memorial. Once again we will employ the help of Marcel and Tillich. The section will consist of the following: the relation of the question of the presence of Christ to the question of the *manifold* presence of Christ in the eucharist, a short history of the notion of the manifold presence of Christ, and an investigation as to how Christ is present: in the worshipping community, in the Word, in the person of the presider and under the eucharistic species. This will be followed by a summary statement relating these various modes of presence to the celebration of eucharistic memorial and then a general conclusion.

The Relation of the Concept of the "Presence of Christ" to That of the "Manifold Presence of Christ" in the Eucharist

It is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to trace the progression of the eucharistic teachings of the Fathers of the Church, but it is important to note that the "paradigm around which the theological reflection of the Fathers of Christian teaching centered was the celebration of the eucharist by the whole of the Christian community in a given city or parish."[81] The teaching of the Fathers on eucharistic presence is found in the larger context of the eucharist, i.e., seen as the source of life and unity of the community. Whether that eucharistic presence be explained in the more metabolic terms of Ambrose or in the more symbolic language of Augustine, it must be understood in this larger context.[82]

By the eighth century, however, the theology of the eucharist had begun centering its attention on the specific nature of Christ's presence in the eucharistic species and by the eleventh century this "attention" had turned into "controversy."[83] Simply stated, there were two ways of describing eucharistic presence: realistically (metabolically) or un-realistically (symbolically). While neither position adequately reflected the understanding of either Ambrose or Augustine, each traced its rootedness to these respective figures. The problem thus posed was to remain one of the two central eucharistic questions up to

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[81] Powers, Eucharistic Theology, pp. 15-17. The quotation is found on p. 15.

[82] Ambrose's teaching on the eucharist is found in catechesis given to newly baptized converts; De Mysteriis; Augustine's position on eucharistic presence is found in various places, but always in relation to its effect on the community. See, for example, Sermon 227 and De Trinitata III, 4: 10.

[83] Powers, Eucharistic Theology, pp. 26-30.

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the present day.[84]

Through focusing in on the presence of Christ under the eucharistic species the scope of eucharistic presence fractured; no longer could the central question of the meaning of Christ's salvific death for the Christian community hold any priority. With the advent of the concern for "real presence," the one question became two, and the meaning of Christ's salvific death assumed a subordinate position. This question, in turn, lost its proper focus, centering itself on the efficaciousness of the eucharistic celebration. The division in eucharistic thought was even symbolized by the different languages used to describe these questions: for eucharistic presence the language was that of transubstantiation; for the sacrifice of the mass the language was that of representation. Neither the Council of Trent nor the Reformers could grasp the central insight into the essential relationship of the questions that they treated separately; both failed to perceive a key notion to the entire dialogue: the meaning of "memorial."[85] The results were disastrous: on the one hand, the notion of "sacrifice" gradually disappeared from Protestant eucharistic thought, while on the other hand, it continued to remain a separate question in Roman Catholic thought.

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[84] The other question deals with the relation between Christ's once-for-all sacrifice and the eucharistic celebration.

[85] Gerken, "Dogmengeschichtliche Reflexion," pp. 218-219.

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In the beginning of this century, the question of eucharistic presence, in Roman Catholic circles, still preserved its Tridentine form, but the advances of modern physics were raising questions about the Aristotelian concept of substance upon which that question was partially based. Between the two World Wars other aspects of the positive sciences also made their effects felt on eucharistic presence.[86] By the end of World War II, however, the stage had been changed: from physics to metaphysics and that in relation to a more sacramental approach.[87] This was further influenced by symbolism and phenomenology which appeared on the eucharistic scene in Roman Catholic theology in the 1950's. These accents, together with a growing appreciation for the historical context out of which eucharist had developed and a re-emphasis on the event-nature of the eucharist in relation to Christ through the notion of "memorial," effected the recognition that Christ's real presence was more expansive than his particular mode of presence under the eucharistic species.[88]

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[86] Schillebeeckx, Eucharist, p. 95. See, for example the writings of J. Ternus, A. Maltha and F. Unterkircher.

[87] Ibid., pp. 97-99; 107-114. Powers, Eucharistic Theology, pp. 112-119. The major names are J. de Baciocchi, A. Vanneste, L. Scheffczyk and B. Welte. However, we do not mean to imply that all other eucharistic concerns vanished, nor that this was the only emphasis of the period; it was rather, a major emphasis.

[88] F. Leenhardt, M. Thurian, J. Möller, P. Schoonenberg, L. Smits and E. Schillebeeckx figure among the notables

The question of the manifold presence of Christ in the eucharist in turn, re-focuses attention on the personal presence of Christ and off the isolated eucharistic elements. The new context stresses the _manifesting_, _redeeming_ and _sanctifying_ intentions of Christ _for people_, made possible through the eucharistic symbols, all of them: the worshipping community, the Word, the presider, the bread and wine. Once again, the meaning of the entire Christ-event for us becomes central, and the symbols used in the eucharistic celebration become the bearers of that meaning and reality for us today.

In this larger sacramental context even the question of Christ's eucharistic presence (under the elements) is reshaped. The concerns are still ontological (not physical) but from a different perspective: _in relation to_ the perceived reality (not in opposition to it) and always _in the direction_ of the person/community (not merely for itself). This presentative reality is now considered in relation to the other modes of Christ's presence, and from this perspective a different question arises: how does Christ manifest his presence to the community called church so that that community can fashion itself in him? It is this question that provides part of the background for our concern.

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here. See Schillebeeckx, _Eucharist_, pp. 114-151 and Powers, _Eucharistic Theology_, pp. 119-179 for descriptions of their major positions.

The Notion of the Manifold Presence of Christ

The notion of the "manifold presence of Christ" seems to be of Roman Catholic origin, stemming from and in response to the narrower question of eucharistic presence (presence under the appearances of bread and wine) as was noted above. This notion is specifically referred to in Pope Pius XII's encyclical, *Mediator Dei* (1947). He writes:

> Christ is present in the august sacrifice of the altar, *in the person of his minister* and *especially* (*maxime*) *under the Eucharistic species*; he is present *in the sacraments* by his power which he infuses into them as instruments of sanctification; he is present, finally, *in the prayer and praise that are offered to God*, in accordance with his promise, "Where two or three are gathered in my name, I am there in the midst of them."[89]

Here we see four different modes of Christ's presence in the eucharistic action, and in every case the formula is the same: "*praesens adest*"; the only difference is in the adverb, *maxime*, used to describe Christ's presence under the eucharistic species.

"The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy" of the Second Vatican Council sounds this same theme, repeating almost word for word the text of Pius XII, with one major exception:

> He [Christ] is present in his word since it is he himself who speaks when the holy Scriptures are read in the church.[90]

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[89] Pope Pius XII, "Mediator Dei," *Acta Apostolica Sedis* 39 (1947): 521-595. The quotation is found on p. 528. The reference to the presence of Christ in the worshipping community is underscored in one of Pius' earlier encyclicals, "Mystici Corporis" (1943).

[90] This document is found in its Latin entirety in

This addition is inserted after Christ's presence in the sacraments and obviously symbolizes the new sensitivity developing in the Roman Church with regard to the role of the Word.

Paul VI in his encyclical, *Mysterium Fidei* (1965) addresses himself to the same theme once again, but here the previous order is reversed. He begins with Christ's presence *in His church* when she prays and performs works of mercy, when she preaches and proclaims the Word of God, when she governs the People of God, when she offers the sacrifice of the Mass and administers the sacraments; he ends with Christ's presence in his church in the sacrament of the eucharist.[91] As one can see, not only is the order reversed, but the context is expanded: here one is not speaking about the manifold presence of Christ in the eucharistic celebration or the liturgical celebrations of the church; here one is speaking about the manifold presence

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Acta Apostolica Sedis 56 (1964): 97-138. The context is the liturgical action of the Church. Besides the addition of the text cited there was one other addition: in describing the minister of the eucharist the Council added a phrase from the Council of Trent: "idem nunc offerens sacerdotum ministerio, qui seipsum tum in cruce abtulit." This makes the understanding of that presence clearer.

There is also a change in the same section: The phrase, "which he infuses into them as instruments of sanctification," (describing sacramental presence in terms of power) is changed to "so that when someone baptizes, Christ himself baptizes." The change shifts the focus from power to person-as-mediator. The quoted text can be found on pp. 100-101.

[91] Pope Paul VI, "Mysterium Fidei," *Acta Apostolica Sedis* 57 (1965): 753-774. The portion cited is found on pp. 762-764.

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of Christ in the church itself, in her mission. In this context the ground-presence of Christ is seen in only one place, in the church, when the church acts as it should. It is little wonder then, that the order is changed, moving from the most fundamental of presentative modes to the deepest of them, in the sacrament of the eucharist.

A document from the Sacred Congregation of Rites, Eucharisticum Mysterium (1967) adopts the new order of Paul VI in its reference to this theme, but the emphasis again reverts to Christ's presence in the church's liturgical celebrations:

> He is always present in a body of the faithful gathered in his name (cf. Mt. 18:20). He is present, too, in his Word, for it is he who speaks when the Scriptures are read in the church.
>
> In the sacrifice of the Eucharist he is present both in the person of the minister, "the same now offering through the ministry of the priest who formerly offered himself on the cross," and above all under the species of the Eucharist.[92]

The focus of this last statement is definitely eucharistic: reference to Christ's presence in the sacraments has been omitted and the language is more specific. At the same time the preservation of Paul's ordering of the various modes of Christ's presence permits one to still see his presence in the praying community as the ground-presence. It is for these reasons that we have adopted this text as the starting point of our investigation. Our method will be to examine these modes of Christ's presence carefully in the context of eucharistic memorial (as we have suggested above), relying on further insights from Marcel and Tillich.

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[92] Sacred Congregation of Rites, "Eucharisticum Mysterium," Acta Apostolica Sedis 59 (1967): 539-573. The section quoted is found on p. 547.

The Presence of Christ in the Worshipping Community

Theological Basis: Oneness in Christ

The fact that the church has always seen itself in relation to Christ is not a new revelation and certainly cannot be denied. Paul says again and again, "Christ is in us and we are in Christ;" "All of you are one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3:28).[93] The church is Christ, therefore, in the sense that it is called to be one with Christ and in the sense that it allows itself to be formed by Christ.

One of the strongest biblical images of this closeness, of this unity, is Paul's image of the church as the "body of Christ."[94] What makes this image so fitting for our purposes is that Paul gives this image baptismal and eucharistic interpretation: to be baptized in Christ is to put on Christ (Gal. 3:37), to become one of many parts that make up the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:12-13); to celebrate eucharist is to show and effect communion with the body of Christ (1 Cor. 10:16-17), and, conversely, to eat without recognizing the Body is to condemn oneself (1 Cor. 11:29). These sacraments, then, play a central role in the church's reality: they manifest the body of Christ constituted and strengthened.

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[93] He actually cites this some 160 times.

[94] This image is closely related to his image of the church as the bridegroom of Christ. Cf. 1 Cor. 6:15-17.

This Pauline imagery is continued and expanded by the Fathers of the Church especially in their baptismal catecheses.[95] They see the life, death and resurrection of Christ contained in the church's sacraments, e.g., in baptism and eucharist. But this incorporation into Christ is also entrance into the church; eucharist is at once communion with Christ and communion in the church.[96] Indeed, for the Fathers of the Church the eucharist is the source of the church's life, and the unity of the community.

This "body of Christ" imagery is taken up by the Second Vatican Council in its "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," and reveals something of the church's understanding of sacramentality.[97] The Council Fathers see the church as being called to manifest Christ to the world through conducting itself in a manner by which he (Christ) will be able to be manifest. This is possible, say the Council Fathers, because the Holy Spirit dwells in the church, as the source of Christ's presence in it.[98]

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[95] See especially Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystagogical Catechesis; Ambrose of Milan, De Sacramentis and De Mysteriis; John Chrysostom, Baptismal Instructions; and Theodore of Mopsuestia, Baptismal Homilies.

[96] See, for example, the Homily Ascribed to Clement, ch. 14; Augustine, City of God, 22, 18 and On the Creed, 17; Cyprian, Epistles, 64: 13 and 74: 6; Chrysostom, Homily 24.

[97] "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," nos. 1-7. It was John Adam Möhler (1796-1838) who rediscovered the image of the church as the Body of Christ from his study of the ecclesiology of the early Fathers. This view was furthered by Matthias J. Scheeben (d. 1888) and provided the theological basis for twentieth century development; the liturgical movement of the early twentieth century provided

It is because of this deep communion in Christ that the church can manifest Christ in its worship. In fact, in its worship the church is most easily recognized as manifesting Christ: i.e., in worship the church as body of Christ is recognized as doing what Jesus did and, in so doing, manifests his presence. But there is more: in manifesting Christ's presence the church at the same time builds up Christ's presence; the two work hand in hand.[99]

Contemporary Understanding: the Presence of Christ

This last paragraph can be better understood if one returns to Marcel's "I-thou" model. From what he says about growing in being, about the primacy of the experience of "we," and the abstract nature of "I" and "thou," one can infer that the experience of "we" is proper to both incarnate "I" and incarnate "thou." In other words, if "we" is the concrete experience for me, it is so in and through my

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the inspiration or spirit. However, it was Pope Pius XII who gave the notion its profound and far-reaching effect and it is out of this that *Mediator Dei* arose.

[98] "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," no. 4.

[99] See "The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," no. 6.

corporeality; I in some way bear "we" in my incarnate being, I in some way also manifest "we." If this is Marcel's position, and it seems to be, then communion on the interpersonal level is really the union of the "we" that each party incarnates. This is the "we" that is born in love, deepened and continued in faith, and renewed in hope.

Such a model can explain what it means to be Christian. The Christian is one who experiences Christ in love (as initiating grace) and who responds to that experience. Experienced and responded to again and again, this love is deepened, continued in fidelity even in times of absence, and renewed in hope. The experience leaves the Christian "we:" "I" and "thou-Christ." Thus the name "Christ-ian:" it signifies being "with" Christ and "of" Christ at the same time that Christ is "in" me.

The question is, how can all this take place if the Christian of today has never "met" Christ-incarnate? If some type of incarnate situation is necessary for true presence (as Marcel claims), how can one "be with" Christ? The answer to this question lies in the sacramental dimension: I experience Christ today only in sacramental ways since these are the only ways that he is available as absent. Marcel lists a variety of ways through which I can experience him: in individuals, in groups, through objects and actions. In that those who are Christians are "of Christ," in that Christ is "with" them, he can be "with" me through them. Put more concretely, in that the Christian witnesses to Christ, the Christian "testifies," "manifests" or "makes present" Christ today through his/her embodiedness. In entering into a group of Christians on an interpersonal level, this same presence is available to me.

This same presence of Christ is also available to me when I hear Christ's words as addressed to me or when I see Christ's love-in-action as "for" me. In both cases this is ultimately effected through other persons, through other faith-persons who speak and act "in Christ" so that he might be real and present for me. While this matter will be taken up more specifically later on in this section, it should be presented now in this context so that the full, true human sacramentality of the Christ-event can be acknowledged. Whether Christ acts through words or gestures, these are ultimately experienced through other human beings acting in response to Christ and acting as one with Christ.

Contemporary Understanding: in the Dimension of the Christian Community

Matthew 18:20 states the promise of Christ, "where two or three meet in my name, I shall be there with them." This text, cited in Mediator Dei and Eucharisticum Mysterium, provides the basis for the Roman Church's statements on the presence of Christ in the worshipping community. Does this statement mean that when two or three Christians gather "in prayer" that they "confect" Christ's presence? Such a notion would not guarantee the freedom of Christ and could easily be interpreted magically.

Through Marcel's interpretation a different understanding can be put forward. Could not Christ's promise mean that when two or three Christians gather for the purpose of praising God through Christ, they "recognize" him present? In Marcel's language, through the gathering for prayer the persons "recollect" themselves, in-gather themselves so that they see themselves as they are _in relation to Christ_, and thus make themselves "available" to receiving him as "thou," to be "with" him. Could not Christ's promise mean that, for his part, he makes himself available to this group? In this way true communion is again achieved.

Or again, could not the recollection of the persons discover that Christ is indeed _already present_ in their midst? As Christians these persons have already "put on Christ"; they have already become one with him. Could not the prayer merely center their attention in the direction of Christ and thus actualize the "we" that is already present in each incarnate person, the "we" of whom Christ is "thou"?

Either description would seem theologically tenable, the former because it stresses God's constant faithfulness, the latter because it stresses God's abiding presence. Both descriptions underscore the "real" presence of God in Christ (these are not merely subjective projections); both see the prayer experience as a "centering" experience; both see it as a discovering experience, in which the individuals open themselves to receive.

What is the nature of this presence? If Marcel's terminology is used, one would say that the presence of Christ as manifest in the praying community is a personal presence; this presumes that it is a real presence. It is a real being "with" Christ which, as such, has ontological rootedness. What is more, it is the personal presence of Christ for the individuals involved and also for the group as one: it is the manifestation of Christ for the individuals and for the group, it is the ecstatic experience (to use Tillich's terminology) for the individual and for the group, which experience binds the group in communion to Christ and to each other. The individuals therefore recognize Christ present to themselves and to the group, through themselves and through the group.

To move one step deeper, we can ask the question, what kind of personal presence is this? To answer this question the insights of Tillich provide the most help. The key to the answer lies in the symbolic medium itself; for the medium is the necessary way that God reveals Him-Herself in a given dimension; the kind of personal presence is therefore determined by the symbolic material used to mediate the presence. In reference to the original question, the kind of personal presence of Christ is determined by the symbol of the praying community.

Christ manifests his presence through the medium of the community. This presence can be compared with Marcel's "group presence," under which he treats family and other small groups, including church as local community.[100] The group presence acts as an atmosphere for one's individual existence; as such it "imperceptibly impregnates and saturates" one's thinking, appreciation and love.[101] It is a presence that adds depth and richness to one's own reality, a presence, however, that also limits the individual's real possibilities. Group presence "incorporates" the individual, making him/her feel part of a larger reality. In this sense the individual is called to participate in the communal identification being established to manifest that identification along with his/her own individual identity. What s/he receives from the community in response is support, affirmation, and a sense of acceptance, of being loved.

In this sense Christ's real presence is seen as a surrounding, a supportive and accepting presence. It is a presence that creates an atmosphere for Christ-living, that calls the individuals to deeper, richer life in Christ. It is a presence that gives rootedness, that impregnates in very subtle ways, a presence that envelops and surrounds. It is also a human presence: one that makes Christ manifest through very human interaction: through caring, loving, challenging and sharing.

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[100] See pp. 121-123 of the chapter on Marcel.

[101] Marcel, H.V., p. 78.

But Christ's presence through the praying community is also a praying presence: through the medium of prayer. It is a spirited and spiritual presence which at the same time acknowledges sacramental (in the form of the community) and transcendent Christ-reality. It is a presence with Christ through the community which at the same time acknowledges and experiences the transcendence of God and therefore the holiness, awesomeness, and mystery of the communion. It is a presence, finally, that makes the individual aware of his/her personal sinfulness and dependence which, in turn, enables openness and availability, leading to true worship and true communion.

The importance of this real presence must not be underestimated, for it provides the ground of all the other modal presences of Christ, for the possibility of deeper presence in various other dimensions, and for full rich eucharistic memorial.

The Presence of Christ in the Word Proclaimed and Heard

Historico-Theological Basis

The conciliar acknowledgment of the presence of God in the Word is, as we have seen, a statement that developed through dialogue with Protestants and Anglican Catholics, but it is basically a faith-position that has extremely strong biblical roots. In the Old Testament God's Word is divinely powerful and creative; it is God's communication to the people and/or to the prophets.[102] In inter-testamental times the notion of God's Word was extended to the Scriptural message itself and even to the written words themselves. In the New Testament we find God's Word as referring to Jesus the Christ in a preeminent way: "The Word was made flesh" (John 1:14).

The Fathers of the Church used the image of the Word of God to stress the real power and presence of God as directed to the church and to stress the receiving role of the Church.[103] This continues even to our own day, most forcefully through the Protestant and Reformed traditions, least forcefully through the Roman Catholic tradition. Yet even here, through the influence of the Second Vatican Council, the role of the Word is enjoying renewed emphasis.[104] Furthermore, in both Roman Catholic and non-Roman circles there is a new respect for the inter-relationship of Word and sacrament.[105]

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[102] See, for example, Psalms 18(19), 32(33); Isaiah 55:10-11; Numbers 23:7, 24:25.

[103] See, for example, Justin, First Apology, chapters 21-24, Second Apology, 6, 8, Discourse to the Greeks 5; Augustine, Confessions VII, 18, XI, 7-9, De Trinitate XV, 11, Homilies on the Gospel of John.

[104] See especially the Council's "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," and "The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy."

[105] See pp. 220-22 of the chapter on Tillich for an example of this.

Contemporary Understanding: the Word Addressed and Preached

The Word of God manifest in all types of revelation, is pre-eminently manifest in Jesus the Christ.[106] While this statement offers no surprise, it does stress an extremely important point: that the Word of God is pre-eminently manifest in the *person* of Jesus the Christ. In examining this statement one begins to see that the Word of God is *primarily* manifest in the real, alive presence of Jesus, i.e., through his preaching and actions directed toward other human beings; it is therefore broader than the actual spoken words of Christ or the written words of Scripture.

The Word of God is therefore the *lived* Word, the Word acted out *for* and addressed *to* human beings. As the actions and words of the historical Jesus were always in the direction of others, so also must the actions and words be of the absent-but-yet-somehow-present Christ. If he is to be manifest, it must be through people, through their mediating actions and words, but through their mediating actions and words *addressed*, completed *for* others.

This is the basic meaning of kerygma: good news addressed, intended to be received, empowered, therefore, with Christ's presence, calling for faith and communion. The power of the oral tradition of the New Testament is eminently understandable from this perspective; it includes not only the *ipsissima verba Christi*, but also the faith-addressed words of the community established in Christ, the fluid, humanly and personally articulated words addressed to individuals in particular situations in order that they might believe. When in this oral tradition faith-filled people addressed these faith-filled words to other people, revelation was communicated. As soon as the oral tradition became written tradition, however, words could, unfortunately, be communicated without faith expression; the responsibility for the communication would then rest on the power of the written words themselves.[107]

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[106] Remember that the reason why the Word can "manifest" at all is because it is, first of all, the principle of the divine self-manifestation in the ground of being itself; it is the Word that allows us to understand. *S.T.* 1: 151-158.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the aim of all these addressed words, spoken or written, was people; the intention was to elicit faith in Jesus the Christ. For faith to happen, though, the addressed words had to be "heard" *as* addressed Word, as dialogical Word. This would presume, if Marcel is correct, that the individuals who

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[107] The transition from living spoken words to written words brought with it the transition from spirit to letter. While what is written down gains a certain objective reality, it can also diminish in its primary purpose: to be addressed. If this happens, the words themselves either lose all meaningfulness or take on a holiness all their own. In either case, there is no longer a referent and an addressee, and the word, as religious symbol, loses its meaning. Lucien Deiss, *God's Word and God's People*, trans. by Matthew O'Connell (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1976), p. 92.

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"heard" would have to let down the walls of their inner selves, or that the words themselves would have to break down or pierce through these walls. In either case, the Word would then have to be accepted or welcomed in; the individuals would become the dwelling place for the Word beneath the words.

Tillich certainly recognizes that there is something special about the "spoken" or "proclaimed" Word, but he seems content to stop with the power of the spoken words themselves.[108] The point Marcel makes is that spoken words are incarnate words and, consequently, if these words are spoken well, their power will ultimately rest not in the sound of the words themselves, but in the incarnate voicing of the words which includes both the person speaking and the potential sound of the words.[109]

If this is true, then the role of the liturgical reader is greatly expanded. S/He is the one who incarnates the Word in his/her person and speaks that Word, addresses that Word through his/her body and with his/her voice and in scriptural words. The Word, then, is no longer merely the written Word, but once again has the possibility of becoming the faith-Word, true kerygma, the Word of God through the person of the Christian reader. The piercing quality of this read-addressed Word is derived from the combined power of its several elements: the traditional Word handed down from generation to generation and recognized as the Word of God, the faith-Word communicated through the faith-voice of the reader and the empowered sound of the words, the personal Word directed and addressed to the hearers.

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[108] See pp. 222-226 of the chapter on Tillich.

[109] At this point we would like to acknowledge the real need for a well developed "theology of the spoken Word." Walter Ong argues in this same direction. Walter Ong, The Presence of the Word (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967; New York: Simon and Schuster, A Clarion Book, 1970), p. 180.

The above description holds true for the scriptural Word addressed, but what of the contemporary Word? It is difficult to distinguish between these two modes of the Word for one major reason: while the scriptural Word is the Word acknowledged by the church as "inspired," it is not made up solely (some would go further) of Christ's words. In fact, the major portion of the scriptural Word, as we have mentioned, consists in the life-giving kerygma of the Christian communities. The faith-words which make up this kerygma are not from the historical Jesus, but they are "of" Christ, of the Spirit of Christ, addressed to the faith communities to draw them into union with Christ. These are the contemporary Word, they make Christ's words and the church's inspired word contemporary, i.e., addressed today, present for today, understandable today.

This is the importance of the preached Word. The preached Word is the contemporary Word addressed. It is formed by contemporary words in union with Christ through the Spirit;

it is the Spirit-filled contemporary Word addressed so that communion with Christ can be achieved today. The preached Word, in that sense, is also kerygma; it is the Word of God in Christ addressed today. The one who preaches this Word is like the reader, religious symbol of Christ's presence, incarnating in him/herself the power and life of Christ in order that this life might be shared with those who believe.[110]

Contemporary Understanding: in the Dimension of the Addressed and Preached Word

Christ, then, is really personally present in his Word in the dimension of spoken words addressed. This dimension suggests a quality of presence that calls the recipient to communion and establishes that communion through the power of the addressed Word. The speaking of the words gives the Word a personal quality, but this quality ultimately derives from the person of Jesus the Christ and not merely from the individual person reading or preaching. Since the individual is, in reality, religious symbol or vehicle for the communication of God's Word who is the person of Jesus the Christ, s/he is the sacrament of that person for the recipient. The Word, moreover, is personally directed: it is present-ed

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[110] This is certainly the power of the preached word: when it perfectly conforms to the Word of God and thus fully manifests that Word. Such is not always the case. The variables are many: the preacher may "get in the way" and the preached word might be more his than God's, the "truth" of what is said might be questionable (the word has not, after all, been tested by the faith-community as has the canonical word). All of this is due to the existential situation of ambiguous life.

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through the reader/preacher to the recipient as "thou." In that the Word becomes personal in this way, it becomes living and life-giving "I" addressing "thou," communicated through contemporary words and relating to the present situation. In that this Word is accepted as "I," Jesus the Christ becomes really, personally present.

But Christ is present also in his Word in the dimension of the spoken scriptural words addressed. These words share many of the same qualities as contemporary spoken words but differ in that (1) they might not convey the full contemporaneousness of the situation and (2) they are limited to those words contained in Scripture. However, what these words lack in contemporaneousness they gain in continuity because these words are the words addressed through the ages, the words that have in the past communicated the real power of God, the Good News of the kerygma. It is these words that bear the history of the past and the connotations of faith-struggles and manifestations. When these words are spoken in the sense of addressed, they are directed as appeal to the recipient from God-in-history, and call for that same type of communion that they effected in the past.

In its fullness, then, as both scriptural and contemporary, the Word of God, Jesus the Christ, is manifest as a caring "thou," as "thou" of history and "thou" of contemporaneousness; "thou" who is the same as yesterday, "thou" who is present fully now. In that his Word is allowed to penetrate us, it is a creative Word fashioning a dwelling place within us and establishing "we" (as does the loving dialogue of two people), providing us with "presence" and leaving us with an "image" through which future presence can be invoked.

In the eucharistic memorial the addressed Word serves these same functions, whether that Word be in Scripture, homily, institution narrative, etc.: to call to faith and to real communion. This it does both for the individual and the community. For the community _already_ gathered in faith this presence through the Word enriches and deepens the communion; for the community not yet gathered, it calls for communion. In all cases, the addressed Word personalizes the presence to its depth and calls for response in kind. It is little wonder that this presence parallels eucharistic presence in the conciliar documents: both manifest Christ in an interpersonal dimension; both participate in Word (in its larger sense); both are the sacramental reality of Christ; each is complement to the other.[111]

The Presence of Christ in the Person of The Church's Special Minister

Theological Basis

From the way that the texts on the manifold presence of Christ are worded, one begins to see that the question is not properly directed to priests or to bishops, but to all those who "preside" at the sacraments generally, and at eucharist specifically: to all those who share in the "special ministry," the ordained ministry of the church.[112] Our concern will therefore not be with bishops, priests, ministers or deacons as they function in their specific offices; our concern will be with the special ministry of "presiding" at worship, especially eucharistic worship in which all of them share in some way.

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[111] This comparison does not eliminate the differences present between the two modes, nor does it take anything away

It is difficult to talk about a historico-theological basis of such a presider, since the discussion would involve the complex histories and theological questions of each of the abovementioned groups, and that task is far beyond this dissertation.[113] With regard to historical background we would merely like to state that in the church's worshipping traditions there have always been those who have

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from the depth of eucharistic presence. See Vatican II, "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," no. 21; "Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests," no. 18; "Decree on the Appropriate Renewal of the Religious Life," no. 6; "Decree on the Church's Missionary Activity," no. 6; "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," no. 56, Documents of Vatican II.

[112] The phrase, "special ministry" is accepted in ecumenical dialogues and is sometimes interchanged with the phrase, "ordained ministry." See for example, the World Council of Churches' most recent statement on ministry, "The Ministry," One Baptism, One Eucharist, pp. 29-56.

[113] Bernard Cooke has written an extensive work in this regard. Bernard Cooke, Ministry to Word and Sacraments (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976).

presided, and, as the church developed along structural lines, this group became more specifically identified.

There has been considerable discussion among the various traditions as to whether the "special ministers" merely share in the same priesthood of the faithful or whether they have some ontologically different status proper to themselves, but this question cannot be addressed here either because it would also carry us too far afield.

With regard to ecumenical discussion, however, there are areas of common agreement about this special ministry: (1) it is grounded in the ministry of the entire church; (2) it is always related to Christ's ministry. The discussion that follows is based on these two points and flows from them. The question to be answered is: from these two perspectives what can be said about the relation between the presence of Christ and the church's special minister as s/he presides in eucharistic worship? It is to this question that the insights of Marcel and Tillich will be applied.

Contemporary Understanding: the Special Minister and the Church's Ministry in Worship

The special minister, in that s/he *leads* the community in prayer, takes on something of greater importance in the praying community. In many traditions the minister takes on symbolic importance in relation to the community: s/he becomes symbol of the community, pointing to that community and "embodying" it in some recognizable way. S/He is, in some sense, the cosmic figure of the community, the "image" of the community, or the mirror of the community. When s/he speaks or acts in worship, it is the community speaking and acting through him/her. His/Her presence, incarnate and personal, is the medium, the locus of something of the community's presence.

But the minister is not the community. S/He is of the community and "with" it, but not a substitute for it. The minister acts "with" the community in doing things through his/her incarnate reality so that through his/her actions the individuals of the group can express their own intentions and yet remain "group" or "community." The minister is therefore, more like the common response of the community.

In that the community manifests Christ's presence in the dimension of the group, however, the special minister, as locus of the group, embodies that presence. S/He is then the visible sacrament of that Christ-presence in the community, and as such, calls individuals in the community to renewed faith and deeper communion. This is part of his/her role.

Contemporary Understanding: the Special Ministry and Christ's Ministry

The special minister, in that s/he accepts his/her position in the church and is "ordained" in the church, commits him/herself to "putting on Christ," to being sacrament of Christ in the world as much as s/he is able. This is not different from the rest of the community in that all are called to be Christ. However, it is different in this respect: that the minister is called, especially in worship, to mirror Christ to the community.

Some clarification is necessary. In the documents on the manifold presence of Christ that were cited the sentence on Christ's presence in the minister reads:

> In the sacrifice of the Eucharist he is present...in the person of the minister, "the same now offering through the ministry of the priest who formerly offered himself on the cross."[114]

What is being stressed here is not the minister's presence as Christ, but Christ's presence through the human personal presence of the minister, so that when the eucharist is celebrated, it is Christ who is acknowledged as celebrating. The minister is the medium, the vehicle of Christ's presence.

This is seen more clearly in the dimensions of Word and action. The minister is the central preacher to the community and bearer of the Word of God in that way. S/He is also the speaker of Christ's words and is therefore addressor of the spoken scriptural Word. In these senses s/he is a personal manifestation of the real presence of Christ in the dimension of the personally spoken Word addressed. S/He is therefore, from this point of view, sacrament of Christ addressing the faith community, calling that community forth to experience the Good News of Christ and to enter into communion with him. The minister must be present in such a way that when s/he speaks, it is God whose Word is heard.

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[114] See p. 324 of this chapter. The emphasis is mine.

The minister is also leader of cultic eucharistic worship and in that perspective manifests Christ in one other dimension: s/he is the real presence of Christ manifesting himself in the dimension of loving, directed action. The minister, in that s/he does in symbolic gesture what Jesus did, manifests and actualizes that presence of Christ-in-action now. S/He is therefore recognized as the praying Christ, the offering Christ, the obedient Christ gifting us.

The minister, then, is called to a unique presence: called to be minister of the community and minister of Christ. Yet, at the same time the minister must, in some way, also reflect him/herself because both communal manifestation and Christ-manifestation demand human, personal presence. This was the last point made on the section on Christ's presence in the addressed Word: it is through the human personal presence of the minister that the personalness and humanity of the other presences are mediated. Since the minister must see his/her personal presence as mediating other presences and not only as manifesting his/her own, because s/he must always allow the presence of Christ and the presence of the community to temper his/her own presence in some way so that these presences can also be manifest. This delicate balance must be the personal goal of every eucharistic minister.

Summary Applications to Eucharistic Memorial

What then is the minister's full reality in eucharistic memorial? It is a combination of these sacramental realities. The minister is certainly a locus of actualization: s/he is at once visible, personal, human symbol of the praying community and of Christ's manifestation in that community, preacher of God's Word, manifestation of Christ's loving action in the directions of God and of the community. When s/he prays, it is the church praying, but it is also Christ praying; when s/he preaches, it is the church preaching and it is Christ preaching; when s/he presides at eucharist, it is the church's action and it is Christ's action. All of this is accomplished most fully when Word and sacrament, when minister as symbol of community and as symbol of Christ meet.[115] It is in this very complex sense that Christ is present in the person of the church's minister.

The Presence of Christ
Through the Eucharistic Species

Historico-Theological Basis

There seems to be little doubt today that Christ is really present through the eucharistic species of bread and wine, but just how this happens and when this happens are unresolved questions.[116] Our investigation will offer its own perceptions on the matter.

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[115] Such notions can be dangerously misunderstood, that is true, but not if one continually resets the sentence in the context of religious symbol (the minister as the medium) and in the context of the worshipping community.

There is general consensus among Scripture scholars that the early Christian communities believed in a real presence of Christ in their eucharistic celebrations.[117] These Christians saw this real presence manifest through the thanksgiving with bread and wine in memorial. However, when the focus of Christian eucharist switched from "thanksgiving" to "offering," the focus of the church's celebration was moved more and more to the elements of bread and wine themselves, and when this celebration ceased to be a real community celebration, the isolation of the elements was complete.[118]

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[116] See, for example, the World Council consensus statement, "The Eucharist," One Baptism, One Eucharist, nos. 14-15.

[117] See, for example, F. J. Leenhardt, "This is My Body," Essays on the Lord's Supper; Allmen, The Lord's Supper, pp. 75-79; Eduard Schweizer, The Lord's Supper According to the New Testament, trans. by James M. Davis (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, Facet Books, 1967), pp. 33-38; Kilmartin, Eucharist in the Primitive Church, pp. 56-73; P. Benoit, "The Accounts of the Institution and What They Imply," The Eucharist in the New Testament, pp. 71-101; Jeremias, Die Abensmahlsworte. This is not to imply that these communities held to some form of transsubstantiation or that the focus of attention was on the bread and wine themselves. Consensus lies in acknowledging the real presence of Christ through the entire eucharistic action (of which bread and wine are a part) in such a way that Christ's meaning is effectively communicated.

[118] Josef A. Jungmann, The Mass, trans. by Julian Fernandes, ed. by Mary Ellen Evans (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1975), pp. 5-37.

Eucharistic theology assumed this same focus: one that perdures even today: the concern lay with the change that took place at the "moment of consecration."

As was mentioned in the beginning of this paper, a gradual re-discovery of the larger context and meaning of eucharist has been taking place in this century, and the question of eucharistic presence is being re-studied in this context. Our concern in this regard is to see eucharistic presence in relation to eucharistic memorial and in relation to the ways mentioned above in which Christ reveals himself as present. Our exposition, therefore, based on the structure of eucharistic memorial that has been established and on the insights of Marcel and Tillich, follows these lines: bread and wine as natural symbols, bread and wine and the presence of Christ, bread and wine in eucharistic memorial.

Contemporary Understanding: Bread and Wine as Natural Symbols

Although Tillich distinguishes bread and wine as products of human making and not as natural elements, he does not focus on the deeper ramifications of that insight: bread and wine are food *for people*.[119] Bread and wine are generally recognized as symbolizing human *meals*, not just human "eating." They also suggest "the staples of life," "human life" for many people (at least in Western culture) since they are the elements that enter into the celebration of that life at many points. Considering this, one might say that bread and wine (together) are food that manifests sharing in the dimension of human persons and at the same time serves as a locus for creation and human activity.

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[119] Tillich, *S.W.*, p. 51.

Contemporary Understanding: Bread and Wine and the Presence of Christ

The fact that Jesus the Christ is pictured in Scripture as offering praise and thanksgiving over bread and a cup and as giving these to his disciples with new meaning provides the bread and wine used in Christian eucharist with a new level of meaning. Already seen in something of a religious dimension because of their relation to the "grace" before and after meals in Hebrew piety, the bread and wine assume a further graced reality, that is, a reality imposed (freely given) by Jesus the Christ. This new reality (new basic meaning) does not destroy the former reality, the former meaningfulness, but rather fulfills it and re-directs it by displacing its meaning as central. Tillich's insight here is of great importance: what is chosen by Christ, is chosen because of its already natural power and, in this case, because of its already religious connection, and not despite them.[120] The meaning that Christ gives the bread and wine for the disciples elevates these elements' original meaning and their Jewish religious usage to a new dimension: the bread and wine are Christened: they are no longer merely human symbols nor are they symbols used in Jewish prayer; they are now deeply religious symbols of Jesus the Christ. While the direction in which they are intended is the same (to the human person), the referent of that material is now different (not pointing to human life and sharing, not pointing merely to the giftedness of God, but pointing now to Christ and sharing in his life). Thus the basic reality that the bread and wine chosen by Christ signifies, is Christ; at the same time the basic reality of the symbolic material as material, is bread and wine. Through Christ's purposes the referent of the bread and wine changes while the symbolic reality still directs that new meaning in the dimension of food to be eaten and shared.

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[120] Tillich, S.W., pp. 51-53. See also pp. 222-226 of the chapter on Tillich.

All of this takes on importance because Christ is absent from our midst in a normal corporeal way. If Christ would have remained physically present, bread and wine would only hold a secondary importance, if even that. At most, bread and wine would then have been gift, but that too would have been confusing. The reality, however, is that Christ died, rose and ascended and that now he is absent from our sight. In this circumstance bread and wine take on a new and profound meaning: they become the locus of Christ's continued presence and the locus of his sacrificial life seen as lived for us. In other words, because of Christ's death, the bread and wine have become the symbolic gift and symbolic *sacrifice* for us: they are the means through which he is present with us still. Christ in the eucharist is therefore, a presence once removed, a presence that at the same time recalls his absence: we proclaim the death of the Lord until he comes (1 Cor. 11:26).

What kind of real presence is the bread and wine capable of conveying? Following Tillich's analysis of symbol, the bread and wine manifest Christ's presence *in the dimension of food to be eaten and shared*. The food quality of the symbolic material communicates the presence of Christ as the food for our lives: the life-force, the very constituting "stuff." To present himself as food is to underscore the depth and richness of the communion: eaten, taken in to such an extent that it becomes one with who we are as embodied persons and who we will become. The dimension of food "for human persons" expresses the direction of the gift: for *human persons*, expressing the deep personal oneness desired. From this perspective it is easy to see why Christ and the Christians were one for Paul: the Christians ate of the bread who is Christ (1 Cor. 10:17). It is also easy to see why this mode of presence would be considered the presence of Christ par excellence.[121]

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[121] See p. 322 of this chapter. The Latin adverb used is *maxime*.

But eucharist is also presence of Christ in the dimension of *food to be shared*, to be eaten in community. In *sharing* eucharist, Christ's presence is shared on this deepest level: the food eaten is eaten in common. It is certainly in this sense that Paul writes: "though there are many of us, we form a single body, because we all have a share in this one loaf" (1 Cor. 10:17). Not only, then, does the eucharist as food manifest the extremely deep presence each of us has with Christ, it also manifests the deep presence each of us has with each other, with those who share this bread with us.

With this understanding we return to the eucharist as *gift* and *sacrifice*. The bread that is eaten and the wine that is drunk is *gift* to us: it is not what we have earned; it has been freely given out of Christ's desire to be "with" us. As gift it serves as locus for personal presence here and now and for as long as it remains gift. But the bread that is eaten and the wine that is drunk is also *sacrifice* for us: the bread and wine are filled with sacrificial imagery: the covenant blood of Exodus, and the suffering servant of Isaiah. When it is eaten and drunk one experiences the deep, loving, broken and poured-out giftedness of the Lord.

Again, there is a common dimension. Since the bread and wine are not only eaten but also shared, one senses Christ's deep love for *us*. This too binds us to each other and calls us to a deeper communion and service. What is given personally demands a personal response; what is given communally also demands a communal response.

Contemporary Understanding: Bread and Wine in Eucharistic Memorial

Bread and wine take on their new meaning in Christ in the context of the eucharistic memorial. In the act of making memorial, the church "sets aside" bread and wine for a religious purpose. Recognizing that its entire reality is to be Christ in the world, it invokes God, through praise and thanksgiving centered in the bread and wine, so that God might make Him-Herself present through Jesus the Christ. Through this invocation-memorial the church opens itself to Christ's presence and recognizes it, discovers it here and now for us in the dimension of bread and wine to be eaten and shared as gift of sacrificing love. Because of Christ's promise to be "with" it, the church knows this to be a "real" presence: because bread and wine manifest this reality the church can experience the deep richness of Christ's saving love anew and thus renew itself in this communion.

But the meaning is even broader than that; it extends in two other directions: in the direction of the _community for the world_ and in the direction of _all creation_. Because the presence of Christ constitutes the individual and community as _one with Christ_ and because it is received as gift and sacrifice of love, it calls for the same mission from that community: to be gift of Christ for the world, to be sacrifice of love in Christ for the world. Since the eucharistic memorial also acknowledges the power, the real possibility, that creation has to manifest the Lord's presence so deeply (as is done through the use of bread and wine), it thereby acknowledges the power and worth of all of creation and includes this in its praise and thanksgiving. Thus eucharistic memorial itself becomes the locus of praise for all creation and all humanity.

Summary: Eucharistic Memorial and the Manifold Presence of Christ

How then is the manifold presence of Christ expressed in eucharistic memorial? In eucharistic memorial the church gathers in prayer and, in so doing, manifests Christ in the dimension of his communal personal presence. This community opens itself through God's Word here and now, addressed and spoken, alive and penetrating. It enters into communion with Christ through that Word and experiences a presence and concern that is at once deep, rich, powerful and fresh. Moved by this communion the community, through its presider, invokes God in praise and thanksgiving, recalling the depths of his love and offering, through humble gifts, its own sacrificial witness as the voice of its sincerity. As it does this the church recognizes Christ's presence in its midst, seeing in the bread and wine his gift and sacrifice for us here and now, old yet new, once but renewed, to be eaten and shared. Indeed, as the church shares in this communion it proclaims the death of the Lord until he comes, and it becomes the Body of Christ in itself only to be called in turn to be the Body of Christ for others.

All of this is done through the power of God who gives to creation the ability of manifesting His-Her presence in a most personal and deep way. It is S-He who grounds religious symbols and communicates His-Her grace through them. God works marvels with simple gifts: human beings, words and gestures, bread and wine, and S-He gives us the ability to respond to Him-Her in our freedom, to enter into communion, and to be sacrament of His-Her presence in the world. Eucharistic memorial celebrates this mystery and longs for its fulfillment.

Conclusion

In many ways this entire last chapter serves as a conclusion. We have just demonstrated not only that Gabriel Marcel's notion of "presence" and Paul Tillich's concept of "religious symbol" are compatible, but that together they can contribute contemporary understanding to two major questions in eucharistic theology: how is the eucharist a "memorial," and what is the importance of the "manifold presence of Christ."

The investigation discovered some important insights. Through the use of Marcel's analysis of personal presence, "eucharistic memorial" was found to be primarily "invocative" (in the direction of God through the sacramentality of

Jesus the Christ) rather than "recalling." Such an insight causes a rippling effect throughout many other eucharistic questions. Eucharistic epiclesis can be seen in a new light, not as that which _follows_ anamnesis, but as that which _is_ anamnesis, from a different perspective, however. The "recalling" or recounting aspect of anamnesis then, itself takes on an invocatory character and consequently suggests a different presentative attitude on the part of the presider. The understanding of the sacrificial character of memorial takes a new twist also, in the sense that the church's sacrifice can actually be understood as a necessary responsory action to Christ's call to communion instead of as a cultic action used to gain favor or to "remind" God.

Through the use of Tillich's many insights into the positive role that religious symbols play in the process of divine revelation, new understanding is able to be given to the manifold presence of Christ in the eucharistic memorial and especially to his presence under the eucharistic species. The fact that Tillich recognized the real necessity of the religious symbol for manifestation _in a given dimension_ provided the major insight upon which all others followed. In the specific case of the presence of Christ under the eucharistic species, Tillich's stress on food as _created_ material and his stress on the real absence of Christ's physical body provided the additional impetus; his analysis of the religious symbol itself provided the perspective from which to examine the change that takes place when bread and wine are

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used in eucharistic memorial.

All of this, of course, was dependent on our first demonstrating the compatibility and complementarity of Marcel's and Tillich's thought, which, in turn, was dependent on an investigation and analysis of each man's position. Should Marcel's notion of "presence" have lacked continuity or consistency or should it have but dimly related to human experience, it would have been of no use in this study. Should Tillich's concept of "religious symbol" have been so bound to his vision of Jesus the Christ as the New Being, it would have held slight power for understanding the eucharistic mystery, at least for this author. The fact that neither man concentrated on eucharist in his writings tended to free us from their eucharistic content and allow us to then apply their methods, structures and insights from various areas more freely.

The first chapter of this dissertation set the eucharistic atmosphere as it is evolving in the church of Christ today. From this we have received an idea of the many eucharistic questions that are being asked and the many eucharistic areas that are being investigated: the Last Supper and its meaning for the early Christians, the development of the eucharistic prayer form, the eschatological nature of the eucharist, the role of the eucharist for the church and for the churches, the questions of intercommunion and validating ministry, etc. Out of this entire area we chose two: the question of memorial and the manifold presence of Christ, and even here, we were merely able to lay a groundwork on which further building can be done. The basic outline that we have presented would take volumes to enflesh: we need only look at the tremendous work done by such people as Lucien Deiss and Walter Ong on the Word of God, and Bernard Cooke on the priesthood, as examples.[122]

What is more, we have not even been able to exhaust the contributions of Marcel and Tillich to the eucharistic field as such. Their insights could cover a variety of topics: the eucharistic implications of a one-world theory, the moral implications of eucharist as such; the relation between "presence" and futurist-presentist eschatology (as Küng calls it). In a pastoral dimension one might examine the implications of "memorial" for presidential style, the implications of "manifold presence" for the role of lector or the role of preacher, for liturgical planning, for helping a community grow in liturgical prayer, for concrete preaching symbolism or for liturgical adaptation. Finally, one might examine the ecumenical implications of Marcel's and Tillich's contemporary style, free of the destructive symbolism of past centuries yet solidly theological.

This study, therefore, is only a beginning, a first step in uncovering the liturgical and eucharistic implications of Marcel's and Tillich's thought, and the extent to which it will be useful or helpful will be manifest by the fruit that it bears.

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[122] Deiss, God's Word and God's People; Ong, Presence of the Word; Cooke, Ministry to Word and Sacraments.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

D.F.	Tillich, Dynamics of Faith
D.S.	Marcel, Le déclin de la sagesse
E.A.	Marcel, Être et avoir
E.B.H.D.	Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity
F.P.	Marcel, Fragments Philosophiques
G.W.	Tillich, Gesammelte Werke
H.H.	Marcel, Les hommes contre l'humain
H.P.	Marcel, L'homme problématique
H.V.	Marcel, Homo viator
J.M.	Marcel, Journal métaphysique
M.E.	Marcel, Le mystère de l'être
M.J.R.S.	Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols"
P.A.	Marcel, Position et approches concretes du mystère ontologique
P.E.	Tillich, The Protestant Era
Ph.E.	Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism
P.I.	Marcel, Présence et immortalité
R.I.	Marcel, Du refus à l'invocation
"R.S.K.G."	Tillich, "Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God"
R.V.	Tillich, Religiöse Verwirklichkung

S.T.	Tillich, *Systematic Theology*
S.W.	Tillich, *Symbol und Wirklichkeit*
T.C.	Tillich, *Theology of Culture*

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